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This thesis explores the complex system of relationships that links global labour governance,
exports and work standards. Motivated by theories in the spatial interaction literature, it argues
that the existing scholarship has largely overlooked the effects that a shock in one country, or
firm, can have on competitors. The main argument of this work is that researchers should take a
systemic approach to explore how competitive dynamics interact with trade, labour governance,
and working conditions, and agree on shaping the outcome for the target country or firm and its
competitors. The body of this thesis consists of three empirical papers that discuss these systemic
effects. The first paper explores whether labour provisions in trade agreements (LABPTAs) with
the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) affect working standards of the signatory
countries and their competitors. Using a generalised method of moments approach, the paper
finds that LABPTAs with the US can trigger a displacement effect whereby promoting decent
working conditions in the signatory country results in increased labour abuses by competitors.
The second paper examines how LABPTAs with the US and the EU affect the trade flow between
signatory countries and their competitors. Using a structural gravity methodology, the paper
finds that the more a country has competitors engaging in LABPTAs with the EU, the more its
international export volumes will increase relative to domestic trade. This paper also finds that
LABPTAs with the US negatively affect the trade of signatory countries. The third paper
analyses the effect of the Chinese shock on child labour by examining its impact on Brazilian
states and their competitors. The paper finds that Chinese trade penetration can increase the
number of children working in the target states, but that competitors will engage in patterns of
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Over the past 50 years, globalisation has transformed the world economy. Now more than ever,
firms, workers and consumers around the world are linked through global production patterns
that cut across national borders. Before reaching the consumption stage, goods are manufactured
and processed in multiple countries through a functional division of labour that is coordinated
and controlled by multinational corporations (Bartley et al. 2015; Ponte et al. 2019; Gereffi 2018;
Ponte, Gereffi, and Raj-Reichert 2019). Over the decades, this internationalisation of production
has expanded to an ever-greater number of countries, goods and services, making the ability to
trade an increasingly important feature for countries worldwide (Mayer, Phillips, and Posthuma
2017).1
For many workers and firms, especially in developing countries, participating in trade and
global value chains (GVCs) provides opportunities for economic growth and development that
can incentivise the promotion of decent labour standards (Ponte, Gereffi, and Raj-Reichert 2019;
Fors 2012a). However, as many developing countries have engaged in export-oriented development
strategies, it has become clear that participation in GVCs does not necessarily lead to inclusive
development and social upgrading (Ponte, Gereffi, and Raj-Reichert 2019; Staritz, Gereffi, and
Cattaneo 2011). Journalists and human rights and anti-sweatshop activists have repeatedly
1According to the World Bank estimates, in 2019 world trade accounted for over 60% of the global GDP (World
Bank 2020).
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revealed that (in some instances) suppliers of large multinational corporations adopt inhumane
production practices likened to sweatshops (Spar and Burns 2000; Distelhorst, Hainmueller, and
Locke 2017). Moreover, some scholars argue that participation in the global economy can have
adverse effects on workers’ rights (Mosley and Uno 2007). Suppliers in developing countries
aiming to win subcontracts for labour-intensive activities may try to minimise costs by violating
fundamental labour rights (Mosley 2017b).
The internalisation of production also creates new challenges for the governance of labour
rights. The geographical dispersion of productive activities places firms beyond the reach of the
national institutions of developed countries, and developing countries often lack the infrastructure,
bureaucracy and ability, if not the willingness, to efficiently regulate production processes (F.
Mayer and Gereffi 2010). The absence of effective multilateral governance aggravates these
shortcomings. Institutions such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) face considerable challenges in addressing the social externalities of
globalisation. . Distributional problems among member states prevent the reaching of ambitious
agreements (such as in the case of the ‘social clause’ in the context of the WTO), while the
agreements that are reached suffer from problems related to the monitoring of labour standards
and from the lack of meaningful enforcement powers (Hale, Held, and Young 2013; VanGrasstek
2013; F. Mayer and Gereffi 2010). Governments, policy-makers and firms have tried to address
these challenges by designing bilateral or transnational initiatives - such as private regulations,
multi-stakeholder initiatives or trade agreements with labour clauses (LABPTAs) - aimed at
ensuring acceptable labour conditions across GVCs. While these global labour governance (GLG)
tools make an important attempt to govern globalisation externalities in a changing international
system, their effectiveness is questioned (Ahlquist and Mosley 2020; Hafner-Burton, Mosley, and
Galantucci 2019; Meardi and Marginson 2014).
In this dissertation, I aim to contribute to the literature examining the complex system of rela-
tionships that links global labour governance, trade and working conditions. Focusing on LABPTAs
and the case of child labour in Brazil, this collection of essays contributes to addressing three over-
arching research questions:
1) What is the impact of trade on labour standards?
2) What is the impact of global labour governance on working conditions?
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3) What is the impact of global labour governance on export flows?
This collection of essays contributes both to the issue-specific literature and to the general
debate over the connection between GLG, trade and labour standards. By and large, political
economists exploring these questions have focused on the direct effects involved in the relationships.
For example, they have studied whether increasing trade flows in a given country can bring about
local improvements in labour standards; they have examined whether GLG tools are effective in
improving working conditions in firms and countries participating in these initiatives. This research
argues that to address the overarching questions, it is necessary to take a systemic approach that
considers both the direct and the indirect effects of these relationships. Political economists have
long noted that trade competition can engender ‘races to the top’ or ‘races to the bottom’ in
labour standards, where countries (and firms) strategically determine the optimal level of labour
conditions by taking into account the approach of their competitors. This implies that labour
conditions are interdependent across different states (Wang 2018 at p. 656). Moreover, consistent
with a general equilibrium approach, trade scholars have demonstrated that a country’s exports
impact those of its competitors (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003). Building on these insights,
this thesis provides an original attempt to evaluate how these competitive dynamics interact with
trade, labour and governance shocks and come together to shape outcomes, not only in the target
country (or firm), but also in its competitors.
This thesis speaks to two main strands of the political economy literature: the research that
examines the link between globalisation and labour standards, and the work that studies the effects
of GLG on working conditions and trade flows. The next section provides an account (by no mean
exhaustive) of these research lines. In particular, I engage with the empirical papers that are
linked to the essays of this dissertation in terms of issues covered and methodology. The aim is
to illustrate how existing approaches may have overlooked potentially significant systemic effects
that link GLG, trade and labour standards. The last section illustrates how the papers in this
dissertation contribute to addressing this gap in the literature.
1.2 Positioning the Research Within the Existing Literature
There is burgeoning scholarship examining the relationship between globalisation, trade and
working conditions. The first generation of scholars approach the issue by looking at monadic
15
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economic indicators. These studies examine whether trade openness, foreign direct investment
and high export volumes increase or reduce labour abuses in developing countries, mostly with
inconclusive results. The pessimistic view argues that trade openness induces firms and govern-
ments seeking to retain and attract export opportunities to ‘weaken their labour standards in
an effort to reduce their production costs’, leading to a race to the bottom in working conditions
(Gamso 2017 at p. 4). Empirically, Mosley and Uno (2007) and Mosley (2011) found trade
openness was negatively correlated with freedom of association and collective bargaining (FACB)
rights. Similarly, Blanton and Peksen (2017) found that trade openness significantly increased
the number of industrial accidents in developing countries. There is also firm-level evidence
suggesting that global buyers reward factories whose standards worsen (Anner 2020; Amengual,
Distelhorst, and Tobin 2020). Conversely, more optimistic studies argue that globalisation creates
opportunities for developing countries to socially upgrade. According to the race to the top
literature, trade openness can be an essential channel through which to promote respect for core
labour standards. Increasing exports are associated with economic growth and development, which
can lead to political and social upgrading. Several studies have found that trade can reduce child
labour, improve respect for FACB rights and promote human rights in general (Neumayer and
De Soysa 2005, 2006; Edmonds 2010; De Soysa and Vadlamannati 2011; Ab-Rahim and Tariq 2016).
The second generation of scholars analyse the impact of trade on labour conditions, looking at
dyadic economic indicators. They argue that what triggers improvements in labour standards is
not trade per se, but bilateral exports with countries with high labour conditions. They move from
merely looking at how much a country trades to examining with whom a country trades (Greenhill,
Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Gamso 2017; Mosley 2017a). Looking at data from over 90 developing
countries, Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash (2009) found that producer countries improved their
protection of collective labour rights when the export destination countries had stringent labour
laws. They adopted the term ‘California effect’ to describe how states with strong labour laws
facilitated the diffusion of acceptable working standards in other jurisdictions.2 Bilateral trade
flows with developed countries can contribute to improving labour conditions in numerous ways.
For instance, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) promote improvements in
labour conditions through political pressure, granting market access and development aid on the
2This insight is drawn from the environmental literature. Vogel shows that trade relations with highly regulated
markets (such as California) facilitated the diffusion of environmental standards to other countries (Vogel 1995;
Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009).
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condition of labour reforms (Hafner-Burton, Mosley, and Galantucci 2019; Gamso 2017; Hafner-
Burton 2005; Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014). Moreover, multinational corporations from advanced
economies – facing pressures from trade unions, NGOs and human rights groups – often adopt
private regulations to ensure that their suppliers respect fundamental human and labour rights
(Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017; Mosley 2017a). Looking at firm-level data, a series of recent
studies have found that retailers in developed countries rewarded suppliers with higher working
standards with increasing purchases (Distelhorst and Locke 2018; Amengual and Distelhorst 2019).
Recently, scholars have argued that as emerging economies rise as major export destinations at
the expense of developed countries, increasing trade could start to trigger a ‘Shanghai effect’.
In this vein, Adolph, Quince, and Prakash (2017) find that in African countries, FACB rights
decline as China becomes the major trading partner. This Shanghai effect occurs as a result of the
different characteristics of South–South trade. In contrast to traditional trading partners, China
tends to highly value the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.
Moreover, unlike firms in developed countries, multinational ‘firms in developing countries perceive
relatively little pressure from the public with regards to corporate social responsibility disclosure’
(Ali, Frynas, and Mahmood 2017 at p. 273). The argument of the Shanghai effect is that Chinese
multinationals may not value to the same extent as developed countries’ multinationals the process
standards of their suppliers, and that this may create downward pressure on labour conditions. It
must be remarked that the second generation of studies is closely linked to the discussion over the
effectiveness of GLG. Indeed, a critical factor that differentiates trade with the developed world
from other trade is that governments and firms from developed countries are more likely to engage
in policy initiatives aiming to ensure that fundamental labour rights are protected.
A third group of scholars takes a different approach, examining the trade–labour standards link
through the lenses of spatial interdependence (Robert J. Franzese and Hays 2008). Building on the
insights of the race to the bottom, these scholars notice that the ‘causal mechanism through which
globalisation (negatively) affects labour rights’ runs through economic competition (Wang 2018
at p. 659). In the context of a highly competitive international trade environment, countries and
companies are incentivised to competitively undercut labour standards to reduce production costs,
attract investments and remain competitive in global exports. From this perspective, considering
the effects of trade flows on working conditions in isolation mis-specifies the causal mechanism
that links trade to labour conditions. Labour standards are interdependent among economic
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competitors. Taking a more systemic approach, these scholars examine whether labour standards
in one country are affected by the working conditions of that country’s competitors. Empirically,
they rely on country-level cross-sectional data, finding evidence consistent with the race to the
bottom hypothesis (Davies and Vadlamannati 2013; Olney 2013; Wang 2018).3
In recent years, numerous studies have started to investigate whether policy initiatives aimed at
improving labour standards across global supply chains are effective. Scholars have mostly focused
on the issue of compliance, asking whether firms and countries engaging in GLG tools abide by the
commitments they make and improve labour conditions. Examining the case of LABPTAs, some
scholars have found that trade agreements with sanctions and coercive mechanisms, which tie the
material benefits of market integration to compliance with fundamental human rights and labour
standards, can improve labour conditions in signatory countries (Hafner-Burton 2005, 2009; Kim
2012; Kamata 2018; Francois, Lechner, and Manchin 2019). Other scholars have focused on trade
agreements with alternative approaches to compliance, such as capacity building, dialogue and
consultation with civil society actors, finding that these systems are equally effective in diminishing
labour abuses (Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014; Sari, Raess, and Kucera 2016). However, these
findings have been contested. Giumelli and Roozendaal (2017) argue that LABPTAs with the US
do not improve freedom of association and bargaining rights in signatory states. If anything, trade
agreements with weaker labour clauses are more likely to ensure improvements. Moreover, scholars
have challenged the Hafner-Burton study on methodological grounds, arguing that improvement
of labour conditions is the consequence of self-selection into treatment rather than de facto
improvement (2005; Spilker and Böhmelt 2012; Spilker, Bernauer, and Umaña 2016). A similar
debate is ongoing within the scholarship of private regulations. Recent papers focusing on specific
supply chains have found encouraging results, showing that, under certain conditions, value chains
can provide incentives to improve labour conditions (Amengual, Distelhorst, and Tobin 2020; Dis-
telhorst and Locke 2018; Amengual and Distelhorst 2019; Chakrabarty and Grote 2009; Amengual
2010). However, numerous studies have found that these schemes do not improve workers’ welfare
(Locke 2013; Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014; Lund-Thomsen, Jamali, and Vives 2014).
Even worse, private regulation can fall victim to opportunistic behaviours. Businesses engage in
voluntary schemes as a way of ‘fairwashing’, providing misleading communications about their
3This suggests that countries strategically downgrade their labour conditions in an attempt to minimise labour
costs, attracting business and investments.
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sustainability performance (Lyon and Montgomery 2015; Jamali, Lund-Thomsen, and Khara 2017).
Another question that scholars ask is how GLG affects trade flows. This issue is important
not only for its economic impact, but also because trade can have significant consequences on
labour outcomes. The literature proposes three hypotheses. Neoclassical economists argue that
labour governance can exclude developing countries from legitimate competition in an area –
cheap labour – where they have the greatest comparative advantage, distorting markets and
leading to reductions in trade, employment and overall welfare (Van Daele 2004; Bhagwati 2001,
1995; Panagariya 2006). Focusing on Indonesian suppliers, Bartley and Egels-Zandén (2016)
present numerous examples of factories that, thanks to the engagement in private regulations,
established trade unions but later closed down because they were unable to retain access to
foreign markets (Amengual, Distelhorst, and Tobin 2020). Second, scholars argue that GLG can
have a positive impact on exports. Improved working standards are likely to increase workers’
welfare and productivity, boosting economic efficiency and output and leading to more not less
trade (International Labour Organization 2016; Freeman 2010; Maskus 1997; Brown 2000; Palley
2004). Along these lines, Brown et al. (2015) found that firms in the Vietnamese apparel industry
were more profitable when managers adopted more humane practices and avoided exploitative
behaviours. To note that both the comparative advantage and the productivity arguments posit
that there is a two-way relationship between trade and labour standards, whereby working
conditions affect the competitiveness of a country (or firm) in international exports (Siroën 2017).
Finally, GLG can generate a demand effect, attracting purchasing from more socially concerned
buyers. If firms and consumers in developed countries prefer goods produced with good labour
standards, taking part in GLG initiatives can have significant reputational effects. These initiatives
signal a commitment to adequate labour conditions, potentially attracting the demand of socially
concerned consumers and promoting international exports (International Labour Organization
2016 at p. 85; Brown, Dehejia, and Robertson 2013). Malesky and Mosley (2018) and Distelhorst
and Locke (2018) have found evidence that suppliers that improve labour standards may be
rewarded with increasing purchases (or price mark-ups) from socially concerned buyers. Moreover,
Amengual and Distelhorst (2019) show that, in some instances, private regulations align sourcing
practices with supplier compliance with social standards, terminating business relationships with
non-compliant factories. On the other hand, if these initiatives are effective in improving labour
standards, they may increase costs, potentially alienating price-sensitive and socially indifferent
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buyers. To sum up, it can be argued that the literature examining trade effects of GLG has taken
both monadic and dyadic approaches, examining whether GLG initiatives have affected trade
volumes in general, or whether they have had an impact on exports towards particular destinations.
1.3 Main Contributions and Thesis Outline
Table 1.1 summarises the literature review discussed above and helps to illustrate the main
contribution of this thesis. Existing studies on the impact of GLG initiatives have exclusively
examined the direct effects of these policies on target countries (or firms). While this is arguably
an important contribution, these studies fail to consider the indirect effects that such initiatives
can have on competitors. As the spatial interaction literature observes, countries and firms
strategically determine the optimal level of labour conditions in response to market incentives
by taking into account what their competitors are doing. Moreover, consistent with a general
equilibrium framework, trade scholars have demonstrated that bilateral trade flows depend on
the costs of trading with other economies. In other words, a country’s export profile affects its
competitors’ trade flows (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003; Krugman 1995). Hence, if GLG
has any impact on the working conditions or trade flows of target countries, it can also have an
impact on those countries’ competitors. Aiming to address this gap in the literature, the present
collection of essays takes a systemic approach in order to analyse the GLG–trade–labour standard
link, examining both the effects on the target country and on its competitors.
The first paper in this dissertation, The Systemic Effects of Trade Agreements with Labour
Clauses: Diffusion or Displacement?, examines the effects of LABPTAs on the working conditions
of signatory countries and their competitors. The paper argues that countries (and firms) can
engage in convergent and divergent patterns of strategic competition (Robert Jr. Franzese and
Hays 2008). Convergent competition means that competitors will try to match the change in
labour standards that the LABPTAs trigger in signatory countries. In other words, if LABPTAs
improve labour conditions in signatory states, they may generate positive spill-overs among the
countries’ competitors, whereas if they lead to a worsening of working conditions, they may
negatively affect competitor.4 Alternatively, countries and firms can engage in divergent patters
4Note that the race to the bottom literature predicts patterns of convergent competition, whereby states and firms
decide to downgrade in parallel with their peers.
20
CHAPTER 1 21
Table 1.1: Empirical literature examining the relationship between GLG, trade and labour stan-
dards
Monadic Dyadic Systemic
Trade → Lab. Stand.
Neumayer and De Soysa 2005, 2006; Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Davies and Vadlamannati 2013;
Mosley and Uno 2007; Lim and Prakash 2017; Olney 2013;
Edmonds 2010; Gamso 2017; Wang 2018;
Mosley 2011; Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017 Chapter 4 of this thesis
De Soysa and Vadlamannati 2011;
Ab-Rahim and Tariq 2016;
Blanton and Peksen 2017;
Anner 2020;
Amengual, Distelhorst, and Tobin 2020
GLG → Trade
Brown et al. 2015; Brown, Dehejia, and Robertson 2013; Chapter 3 of this thesis
International Labour Organization 2016; Distelhorst and Locke 2018;
Bartley and Egels-Zandén 2016; Malesky and Mosley 2018
Siroën 2017;
Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess 2017;
Amengual and Distelhorst 2019;
Amengual, Distelhorst, and Tobin 2020
GLG → Lab. Stand.
Hafner-Burton 2005, 2009; Chapter 2 of this thesis
Chakrabarty and Grote 2009;
Amengual 2010;
Kim 2012;
Spilker and Böhmelt 2012;
Locke 2013;
Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014;
Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014;
Lund-Thomsen, Jamali, and Vives 2014;
Lyon and Montgomery 2015;
Spilker, Bernauer, and Umaña 2016;
Sari, Raess, and Kucera 2016;
Giumelli and Roozendaal 2017;
Kamata 2018
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of strategic competition. From this perspective, LABPTAs may trigger a displacement effect,
whereby the promotion of good working conditions in a given supply chain or jurisdiction results
in increased labour abuses elsewhere (Koenig-Archibugi 2017; Duprez 2012; Baland and Duprez
2009). The idea is that instead of competing for the same end market, firms in competing countries
can decide to specialise in the production of goods for low-end markets where they are more
likely to enjoy comparative advantages, putting working conditions under pressure. Focusing on
LABPTAs with the EU and the US, I use a spatial estimation strategy on unbalanced panel data
for 108 developing countries over 28 years (1985-2012). To address endogeneity concerns, I employ
a variety of estimation techniques including static and dynamic models as well as the two-step
difference generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator with doubly corrected robust variance
standard errors (Arellano and Bond 1991; Hwang, Kang, and Lee 2019). I find no evidence that
LABPTAs are able to improve labour conditions in signatory countries. Nevertheless, I find
a significant and negative spatial lag that is consistent with the displacement hypothesis. In
particular, the result shows that labour practices of exporters are negatively associated with their
competitors’ ratification of LABPTAs with the US.
The second paper, entitled The Effects of Trade Agreements with Labour Clauses on Trade
Flows, makes two relevant contributions to the literature. On the one hand, it is the first paper
that examines the effects of LABPTAs on export destinations, investigating whether committing
to decent labour standards favours exports towards more socially concerned markets, or whether it
reduces the export towards price-sensitive markets (dyadic approach). In investigating this, I adopt
an innovative identification strategy that allows estimation of the impact of country-level variables
in a structural gravity-consistent framework. On the other hand, the paper analyses the systemic
effects of LABPTAs on trade flows, exploring the effects of LABPTAs on the export volumes and
destinations of signatory countries and their competitors. Empirically, the work employs structural
gravity equation estimation methodology. The findings of this research are that LABPTAs with
the US harm export volumes of signatory countries, and that in low-income countries, LABPTAs
reduce demand from more price-sensitive markets. In particular, I find that low-income economies
with LABPTAs with the US trade significantly more with developed countries than with emerging
markets. The paper also discovers relevant systemic effects. In particular, it shows that the more
a country has competitors engaging in LABPTAs with the EU, the more its international export
volumes will increase relative to domestic trade. This finding suggests that countries can benefit
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from competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs, possibly because they are able to exploit new market
niches for price-sensitive goods. However, the paper does not find consistent evidence to support
the idea that LABPTAs with the US have an impact on competitors’ trade flows.
Solid arrows indicate relationships directly examined in this thesis. Dashed lines indicate relationships not directly examined in this research, but
analysed in previous studies. The orange arrows are the new relationship explored by this PhD. Blu arrows indicate relationships also explored
by previous research. i = target country (or firm) of the shock. j = competitor(s) of the target country (or firm).
Figure 1.1: The relationship between global labour governance, trade and labour standards
In The Impact of the China Shock on Brazil’s Efforts to Combat Child Labour, I focus on
the relationship between trade and labour outcomes. The paper examines whether the rise of
China as the largest destination for Brazilian exports has affected child labour incidence in the
country. This work contributes both to the child labour literature and to the general debate
over trade and labour standards. With regard to the former, this is the first paper to analyse
whether export destinations affect child labour incidence (using a dyadic approach); it is also
the first paper to examine whether child labour affects export destinations, promoting trade
with China. With regard to the latter, the paper introduces a systemic perspective evaluating
whether trading more with China affects child labour in competitor states and whether an
increasing incidence of child labour in competitor states affects exports to China. It is important
to note that this goes beyond the existing research on spatial interactions. Earlier studies
only analyse how changes in labour outcomes in one country affect the working conditions of
economic competitors (Davies and Vadlamannati 2013; Olney 2013; Wang 2018). However, as
shown in Figure 1.1, there are multiple patterns through which a country’s trade flows can have
an impact on its competitors’ labour standards. For example, if a state is able to increase its
comparative advantage thanks to technological, organisational or other productivity gains, its
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competitors may attempt to compensate by reducing labour costs, requiring labour to work
overtime with minimal compensation5 One state increasing its comparative advantage may affect
its competitors’ labour conditions even without any observable change in competitors’ exports.
Switching suppliers is a costly activity for international buyers. Before altering the structure of
their GVCs and moving to more convenient producers, global buyers are likely to attempt to
renegotiate purchasing agreements with current suppliers, perhaps creating upward/downward
pressure on their labour conditions.6 Finally, countries and firms can decide to strategically adapt
their labour standards in anticipation of trade or labour outcome shocks in their competitors.
For example, it is possible that as a country engages in LABPTAs, its competitors will decide to
strategically upgrade/downgrade labour standards, anticipating a potential loss. In sum, there are
multiple causal mechanisms through which competition may shape competitors’ labour outcomes,
and the existing ‘systemic’ scholarship focuses only on the interdependence between working
standards. By looking directly at the effects of trade shocks in competitor states, this paper is able
to account for alternative patterns of strategic interaction. To deal with the endogeneity concerns,
this work employs a spatially lagged autoregressive model with a shift-share instrumental variable
estimator and structural gravity model. The results, which are based on household survey data
on child labour and federative state-level data on exports, confirm that both exports to China
and competitors’ exports to China have significant effects on a state’s child labour incidence.
We also find that child labour incidence promotes export to China. However, we do not find
any evidence that a country’s export profile is affected by the child labour incidence of competitors.
In sum, this thesis makes an original attempt to explore the systemic relationships between
GLG, trade and working standards. It examines how competitive dynamics interact with trade,
working conditions and governance shocks, affecting the outcomes in the target country and in its
competitors. The thesis comprises five chapters. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 consist of the three papers
introduced above, and the final chapter critically discusses the findings of those studies and draws
the relevant conclusions.
5Note that an effect on exports can also be triggered by a commitment to improving labour standards. For example,
if firms engage in private regulations, they may be able to fairwash their business, attracting more socially concerned
buyers, even if the regulations are ultimately not effective.
6Indeed, they either can ask to reduce costs or to upgrade in order to meet the labour standard of the competitor.
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Chapter 2
The Systemic Effects of Trade Agree-
ments with Labour Clauses: Diffusion
or Displacement?
2.1 Introduction
In November 2018, President Donald Trump, the Mexican President Enrique Nieto and the
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau signed the new trade Agreement between the United
States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (USMCA). In a press conference,
President Trump defined the deal as the “largest, most significant, modern and balanced trade
agreement ever signed” as it contained “the most ambitious environmental and labour protections
ever placed into a major trade agreement [. . . ] that first and foremost benefits working people,
something of great importance to all three of us”.1 The deal contained a whole chapter (Chapter
23) dedicated to the protection of labour standards, which prescribes a series of rights that have
to be ensured (art 23.3), it posits a series of measures that promote compliance (art 23.5) and
establishes a Labor Council to monitor compliance (art. 23.14).2 It also has an Annex specifically
dedicated to improving collective bargaining rights in Mexico.
1From the formal press conference released the 30 of November 2018 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQrJ5
RWSjMg
2Chapter 23, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/23-Labor.pdf
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While the USMCA is extremely advanced when it comes to labour protection, its approach is
not new. Its predecessor, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in 1992,
already contained an Accompanying Labor Side Agreement that required parties to enforce labour
laws and created a complaint mechanism for third parties (Muniz 1995). Similarly, the European
Union (EU) systematically signs trade agreements with extensive provisions on labour standards.
Indeed, most of the preferential trade agreements that have been signed since the early 1990s
include clauses regarding labour protection, and as Figure 2.1 shows, in the last decade, trade
agreements have become more and more stringent.3
Figure 2.1: Number of (LAB)PTAs signed by inclusion of labour provisions
Arguably, the proliferation of preferential trade agreements with labour clauses (LABPTAs)
signals that governments and policymakers are convinced that there is a relationship between trade
and labour standards and that LABPTAs can be an effective tool in promoting decent labour
conditions. Yet, the nature of these relationships is highly contested in academic debates. A major
critique of economic globalisation is that it can engender races to the bottom in social standards
(Olney 2013, at p.191). In this view, countries and companies are incentivised to competitively
undercut labour standards in order to diminish production costs and remain competitive in global
exports (Mosley 2017a; Davies and Vadlamannati 2013). More optimistic studies, however, have
argued that trade and globalisation can engender races to the top, providing opportunities for
3The data is drawn from a combination of three datasets from the DESTA project: (1) The list of treaties; (2) the
market access; and (3) the non-trade issues databases (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014; Lechner 2016). The figure only
includes free trade agreements, monetary unions and customs unions, while partial scope agreements and unilateral
trade concessions are not included as defined by the market access database (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). The level
of stringency is drawn from the economic and social right indicator from the Lechner database, as discussed later in
this paper (Lechner 2016).
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developing countries and firms to socially upgrade. The idea is that the increasing demand
for goods produced with decent labour conditions in wealthier economies – promoted through
LABPTAs or private regulation – is an upgrading opportunity for workers in supplier countries
abroad (Amengual and Distelhorst 2019; Barrientos et al. 2016; Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash
2009). There is also a growing amount of empirical literature focusing on the effectiveness of
LABPTAs. These studies examine whether LABPTAs improve labour standards, or at least they
prevent their deterioration, in the countries that are signatories to such agreements.4 While a
growing amount of the empirical literature finds that LABPTAs can reduce labour abuses, the
issue is still contested (Cf. Kamata 2018; Häberli, Jansen, and Monteiro 2012).
The aim of this study is to provide a fresh outlook into the effectiveness of the LABPTAs of
the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). The paper argues that both proponents
and critics of LABPTAs have overlooked the systemic effects of these initiatives. Bridging the gap
between the “races” and “effectiveness” literature, the paper argues that to truly assess whether
and to what extent LABPTAs affect labour conditions abroad, research should also take into
account the spatial dynamics that LABPTAs may generate in a context of international exports
competition. The paper examines whether LABPTAs can shape labour conditions, not only
in the signatory countries but also in their competitors.5 The core assumption is drawn from
the races debate. In this sense, countries and firms strategically determine the optimal level of
labour conditions in response to market incentives, taking into account what their competitors are
doing. Two alternative patterns of strategic interaction are hypothesised. A country may engage
in competitive behaviours that mimic the change in labour standards in the LABPTA country
(diffusion). In this view, if LABPTAs improve labour conditions in the signatory country, its
competitor could decide to upgrade its working conditions in order to remain able to target the
demand for goods produced with the decent labour standards in the EU and US. Alternatively, a
country could engage in diverging competitive behaviour. As its competitors gain privileged access
to high-end markets that are concerned with labour conditions, its opportunity cost to reduce
labour standards to target low-end markets increases. Firms in competing countries may decide
(or be forced) to increasingly squeeze the labour force to be able to target markets abroad that
are overwhelmingly motivated by price rather than labour conditions abroad in their purchasing
4Countries that are members of the trade agreement and are not the US or the EU, are hereinafter called partner
countries.
5To exemplify, the paper asks at what happened to Mexico’s competitors when the country signed NAFTA.
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choices (displacement) (Cf. Koenig-Archibugi 2017; Duprez 2012).
This paper tests the systemic effects of LABPTAs with the EU and the US on an unbalanced
panel dataset of 108 developing countries over 28 years (1985–2012). I examine the effect of
LABPTAs on the competitors’ labour conditions separately for trade agreements signed and
LABPTAs that have entered into force. A variety of estimation techniques are used: static and
dynamic fixed-effects models as well as the two-step difference generalised method of moments
(GMM) instrumental variable estimator to address endogeneity concerns (Arellano and Bond 1991;
Hwang, Kang, and Lee 2019). The results suggest that LABPTAs can trigger a displacement effect,
creating downward pressure on the working conditions of competitor countries. At the same time,
they are unable to improve labour standards in the signatory country. More specifically, the labour
practices of suppliers appear to be negatively and significantly associated with their competitors’
signing of LABPTAs with the US. The more a country’s competitors have trade agreements with
the United States, the more its labour conditions on the ground will be put under pressure. On
the other hand, LABPTAs with the EU appear to be inconsequential when it comes to labour
standards since they are not associated with significant changes in labour conditions both in the
signatory country or its competitors. The results are consistent with a series of robustness checks.
Three insights can be drawn from these results. First, the scholarship focusing on the
effectiveness of LABPTAs may have overestimated their potential to improve working conditions
abroad. Even if one concedes that LABPTAs can improve labour standards in signatory countries,
patterns of strategic interactions seem to favour, in the case of the US, displacement of poor
labour conditions to competitors. This is a concern threatening the potential for these bilateral
mechanisms to improve the overall welfare of workers abroad. Similar competitive mechanisms
could also undermine other governance tools such as private regulations. Second, displacement
appears to be associated with competitor’s signing of LABPTAs, but less consistently with the
entry into force of these agreements. This suggests that signalling plays an important role in
triggering the competitors’ strategic behaviours. This has two possible explanations. On the
one hand, LABPTAs are a credible commitment to improving labour standards that could have
reputational effects. Signalling decent labour standards may be enough to attract more socially
concerned buyers, forcing competitors to target the lower segment of the market. On the other,
signing LABTPAs signals to firms in competitor states that the signatory country will soon gain
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privileged market access to the US. To remain competitive, these firms may start to cut corners
in order to reduce costs.6 Third, trade agreements with the United States have a different effect
from trade agreements with the EU. Most likely, this is related to the fact that while coercive
enforcement mechanisms generally characterise US LABPTAs, while EU LABPTAs “lack sanctions
and rely on dialogue with trading partners as a means of enforcing and implementing labour
provisions” (Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014, at p.924; Leeg 2018).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
literature, discusses the key theoretical insights and introduces the main hypotheses. Section 3
presents the main empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the data used. Section 5 illustrates the
preliminary empirical results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
Do preferential trade agreements (PTAs) – and in particular trade agreements with labour
clauses – improve or worsen labour standards? This issue has been highly debated in the scholarly
literature. Following the leading example of Hafner-Burton (2005), advocates of LABTAs have
found that trade agreements with sanctions and coercive mechanisms, which tie the material
benefits of market integration to the compliance with basic human and labour rights standards,
can improve labour conditions abroad (Hafner-Burton 2009; Francois, Lechner, and Manchin 2019;
Kim 2012; Pevehouse 2002). These findings are supported by a recent quantitative study (Kamata
2018). More recently, the literature has examined LABTAs by focusing on alternative approaches
to compliance such as capacity building, dialogue and consultation with civil society actors –
rather than sanctions and coercion – finding that such systems are equally effective in diminishing
labour abuses (Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014; Sari, Raess, and Kucera 2016).7 However, these
findings have been contested. Giumelli and Roozendaal (2017) argue that LABPTAs with the US
do not improve freedom of association and bargaining rights in signatory states. If anything, trade
agreements with weaker labour clauses are more likely to ensure improvements. Moreover, scholars
have challenged the Hafner-Burton study on methodological grounds, arguing that improvement
of labour conditions is the consequence of self-selection into treatment, rather than de facto
6As it will be discussed in the theoretical section; the first mechanism relies on the assumption of differentiated
buyers preferences when it comes to labour standards, while the second is a consequence of trade liberalisation.
7This, up until 2012, was the approach of the EU.
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improvement (2005; Spilker and Böhmelt 2012; Spilker, Bernauer, and Umaña 2016). Going
further, Häberli and Jansen find that PTAs and market liberalisation harm countries’ employment
protection laws and unemployment benefits (2012).
This debate on the effectiveness of LABPTAs is embedded in the broader discussion relating
to the relationship between economic globalisation, trade and labour rights. This strand of the
literature has examined how exposure to international trade and foreign direct investments, can
trigger competitive dynamics and create patterns of diffusion affecting workers’ welfare (Sari,
Raess, and Kucera 2016; Mosley 2017a; Vadlamannati 2015). Critics have argued that international
trade could engender races to the bottom in social standards (Olney 2013 at p. 191; see also Davies
and Vadlamannati 2013; Barrientos et al. 2016; Wang 2018; Menashe 2020). The core idea here
is that in order to maintain a comparative advantage as suppliers of cheap labour, countries
and companies are incentivised to competitively undercut process standards at the expense of
workers’ welfare (Mosley and Uno 2007; Lim, Mosley, and Prakash 2015; Blanton and Peksen
2017). Conversely, more positive accounts have argued that trade provides opportunities for social
upgrading. Many mechanisms can play a key role in triggering social upgrading. Some scholars
focus on the proliferation of LABPTAs that can have a positive impact on labour conditions
abroad (Hafner-Burton, Mosley, and Galantucci 2019; Sari, Raess, and Kucera 2016; Postnikov and
Bastiaens 2014; Kim 2012), while others point to the exponential diffusion of private regulations,
which, as recent scholarship has proven, under certain conditions, can promote decent labour
conditions (Amengual and Distelhorst 2019; Barrientos et al. 2016; Gruère 2013). Others further
suggest that trade and the engagement in global value chains may trigger a “diffusion of best
practices and democratic norms” (Payton and Woo 2014, at p.462; see also Barrientos et al. 2016;
Perkins and Neumayer 2007; Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Neumayer and De Soysa 2005).
In sum, the race to the top mechanisms rely on some form of spillover of better labour conditions
from more socially concerned importers to the developing partner countries.
These two strands of the literature, while touching on overlapping issues, have taken very
different approaches. Focusing on the issue of “compliance”, scholars examining the effectiveness
of LABPTAs narrowly focus on whether member countries abide with the labour provisions in
trade agreements (Von Stein 2015; Simmons 2010; Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014; Sari, Raess,
and Kucera 2016). Conversely, the races debate examines the relationship between exporters,
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importers and competitors, analysing how they interact in shaping a country’s labour standards,
while overlooking the effects of global labour governance initiatives such as LABPTAs (Olney 2013;
Davies and Vadlamannati 2013). While the former approach thoroughly analyses how LABPTAs
can affect the signatory countries’ working conditions, the latter sheds light on the systemic
interplay between states by examining how competitive dynamics contribute to shaping labour
standards. This paper argues that in order to truly assess the potential of LABPTAs to tackle
globalisation externalities – i.e. whether they can improve the overall condition of workers – one
should also consider how they affect competitors’ behaviours (Koenig-Archibugi 2017). Aiming to
bridge the gap between these two streams of the literature, the present study provides the first
attempt to evaluate the spatial consequences of LABPTAs on labour outcomes.
2.3 Theoretical Framework & Hypotheses
Firms and states can engage in convergent and divergent patterns of strategic competition
(Robert Jr. Franzese and Hays 2008). Convergent competition predicts that competitors will try
to match the change in labour standards that the LABPTAs trigger in the signatory country.
Some evidence suggests that engaging in global supply chains can generate cost and time pressures,
triggering violations of workers’ rights and that global buyers reward factories whose standards
worsen (Mosley 2017a at p. 8; Anner 2020; Amengual, Distelhorst, and Tobin 2020). Such a process
could trigger a race to the bottom in labour standards among competitors. In the context of trade
agreements, the effect on competitors is likely to be particularly significant. Facing restricted access
to large markets, firms in competing states may be forced to further cut labour costs, squeezing the
workforce for their export to remain viable.8 However, it is also possible that LABPTAs improve
the labour conditions of signatory countries and generate positive spillovers in competitors. To
remain able to target destination markets with significant demand for goods produced with decent
labour standards, competing firms may attempt to mimic these labour improvements generating
a “race to the top” in working conditions. It is important to note that while the two sides of
the “race” literature debate over the direction of the initial effect (LAB)PTAs have on working
conditions, they both argue that this will similarly diffuse to competitors as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
8From this perspective labour clauses in trade agreements are simply unable to counter the negative effect of trade
liberalisation.
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Recent scholarship has hypothesised an alternative pattern of strategic interaction (Koenig-
Archibugi 2017; Duprez 2012; Baland and Duprez 2009). Examining the case of private regulations,
such studies posit that improving labour conditions could also lead to divergent patters of strate-
gic competition. Even if the demand for socially concerned goods provides opportunities for
the signatory suppliers to upgrade, it creates incentives not to improve or even to deteriorate
labour standards among their competitors. They argue that private regulations can generate a
displacement of labour abuses – i.e. a total or partial transfer of social externalities from one
supplier to its competitors (Duprez 2012 at p. 1129). Rather than upgrading in parallel with
their competitors, firms in competing countries can decide to specialise in the production of goods
for low–end markets, where they are more likely to enjoy a comparative advantage, thus putting
workers’ conditions under pressure.9
Arguably, this could also occur in the case of LABPTAs. The logic is simple provided that
importers have differentiated preferences when it comes to labour standards and that improving
labour conditions is a costly endeavour (Koenig-Archibugi 2017).10 Trade agreements offer
upgrading opportunities for signatory countries that can address the demand for higher process
and product standards of the EU and the US, thanks to the reduced tariffs.11 However, this
privileged access to high-end markets decreases the competitors’ incentives to ameliorate labour
conditions. All else being equal, improving their labour standards will be less likely to attract
the demand of concerned markets due to the lack of the trade agreement. At the same time, the
competitors’ opportunity cost for diminishing labour standards increases. Companies in countries
outside of these agreements will increasingly have to rely on price to remain competitive and to
9From this perspective, the displacement hypothesis is akin to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis that scholars have
investigated with regard to climate change (Cf. Millimet, Daniel L., Roy 2016; Baghdadi, Martinez-Zarzoso, and
Zitouna 2013).
10Much of the scholarship examining the relationship between trade and labour conditions tends to recognise that
some “northern” markets are more socially concerned than others (Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Gamso
2017; Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017). Along these lines, recent experimental data from the US shows that using
fair labour standards labels has “a substantial positive effect on sales” also in low-end outlets “where customers are
predominantly concerned with prices” (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2015 at p. 1). Throughout this paper, I will refer to
socially concerned importers as those that are willing to pay a price premium for goods produced by suppliers with
decent labour conditions. Operationally, the US and the EU are deemed to be more socially concerned than other
markets, while socially unconcerned importers are those importers that are overwhelmingly motivated by price in their
purchasing choices and are not willing to pay any price premium to ensure higher labour standards. In addition, the
idea that, ceteris paribus, observing higher labour standards leads to increased costs is intuitive. Paying employees
decent salaries, investing in safe infrastructures and paying for aid facilities are widely regarded as costly activities in
the literature (Distelhorst et al. 2015; Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014; Zhu, Cordeiro, and Sarkis 2012; Vogel
2005).
11Whether this privileged access to high-end markets leads to improvements in labour conditions remains an open
question, as discussed previously.
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target socially unconcerned markets. This could encourage a cost-cutting culture were managers
ask workers to work overtime, perhaps with insufficient compensation, thus increasingly exploiting
the labour force (Mosley 2017a).
Analytically, it is possible to identify four causal mechanisms generating displacement, the
first two of which are triggered by the costs of improving labour conditions and by differentiated
social concerns of international buyers.12 The while the other two are a consequence of trade
liberalisation.13
First, displacement may be triggered by the improvement of labour conditions on the ground. If
improving working conditions leads to rising labour costs, signatory countries will lose competitive-
ness in targeting (more) price-sensitive markets when compared to their competitors. Competing
firms will have the opportunity to exploit their new comparative advantage in targeting low-end
markets, thus triggering displacement.
Second, displacement can also be triggered by the reputational effects of LABPTAs, even if there
is not a de facto improvement in labour conditions in the signatory country. Indeed, LABPTAs
provide a positive signal to importing companies from socially concerned markets. These buyers
will be able to show to their stakeholders that they are importing from countries that have agreed
on a certain level of labour standards, regardless of whether they can truly ensure decent labour
conditions (Bigler and Raess 2019, at p.14).14 The existence of fairwashing behaviours in Western
firms is a well-documented phenomenon in the scholarship, and importing from LABPTA countries
can facilitate such conducts (Bartley et al. 2015; Jamali, Lund-Thomsen, and Jeppesen 2017; Bowen
2014; Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou 2016; Delmas and Burbano 2011; Blackman 2012; Amengual and
Distelhorst 2019).15 Signalling decent labour standards could be sufficient to attract the demand
of “concerned” firms, regardless of whether they have any real effect in the country. This, in
turn, makes competitors increasingly reliant on price-sensitive unconcerned buyers triggering the
downgrading mechanism.
Third, it is possible that competitors downgrading is the unavoidable result of bilateral trade
liberalisation. Trade agreements provide privileged markets access, reducing tariffs and trade costs,
12Hence, they are also relevant to private regulations.
13Hence they are solely relevant to LABTAs.
14Of course this mechanism may also occur if labour conditions do improve.
15This scholarship argues that companies attempt to provide “communications that mislead people into forming
overly positive beliefs about an organisation’s’ environmental (and social) practices or products” (Lyon and Montgomery
2015 at p. 223).
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thus favouring exports among members. However, trade scholars have shown that trade between
member countries grows at the expenses of trade with non-members (Anderson and Van Wincoop
2003).16 This phenomenon is called the “trade diversion” effect of PTAs, which has strong the-
oretical foundations and large empirical support (Mattoo, Mulabdic, and Ruta 2019; Dai, Yotov,
and Zylkin 2014; Viner 1950). For instance, Doan and Xing (2018) found that Vietnamese exports
were negatively affected by the creation of NAFTA.17 Regardless of whether they include labour
clauses, trade agreements with high-end markets increase pressure on competitors to address so-
cially unconcerned markets, potentially triggering the downgrading process. This is especially true
today given that large emerging markets, with lower concern for labour standards, become major
export destinations (Lim and Prakash 2017).
Fourth, competitors downgrading does not necessarily require the existence of socially concerned
and unconcerned importers. As LABPTAs cut tariffs, they provide a decisive price advantage
to signatory countries relative to their competitors. Countries that are outside of the agreement
will necessarily have to find other ways to reduce costs – for instance, reducing labour and
environmental standards – if they want to keep the same share of the US and EU markets.
It is important to remark that anecdotal evidence from the private regulation literature suggests
that codes of conduct can generate displacement. As a result of certain companies engaging in
private regulations to target the high-end market, their competitors are forced to downgrade.
For example, in Uganda, horticulture smallholders lacking the technical and financial capacity to
meet the standards of the GlobalGAP, increasingly reverted to price-sensitive regional GVCs –
in particular towards South African supermarkets – requiring less stringent standards (Staritz,
Gereffi, and Cattaneo 2011). As a result, ‘smallholders reported that farm work has become more
arduous and labour intensive’ (Barrientos et al. 2016 at p. 1277). Focusing on environmental
outcomes, Kaplinsky, Terheggen, and Tijaja (2011) research on the timber industry in Gabon
shows results in line with displacement. They argue that the local industry faced severe difficulties
in obtaining certifications such as the Origine et Légalité des Bois from the Forest Stewardship
Council, that European buyers required. This, together with the rise of China as an end market,
16While having a positive net effect on trade
17Theoretically, the idea is that trade between the two countries depends on the “remoteness” – or the resistances
– that these countries have with the rest of the world (Yotov et al. 2016). Krugman (1995) provided an intuitive
explanation of this phenomenon by comparing the hypothetical levels of trade between two identical states once they
are on Mars and once they are in Europe (Yotov et al. 2016). Obviously, trade between these two economies will be
more on Mars. Hence, remoteness from the rest of the world affects trade between two countries, and trade agreements
are a tool to reduce trade frictions (“remoteness”) between two countries.
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led Gabon industry to significantly decrease its exports towards Europe, making China – a market
virtually free of all standards – the first export destination for timber products (Kaplinsky,
Terheggen, and Tijaja 2011; Kaplinsky and Farooki 2011). This shift also led to downgrading.
Indeed, as export to China increased, so did illegal logging and degrading environmental practices
(Kaplinsky, Terheggen, and Tijaja 2011). Cross-national studies confirm the idea that targeting
more price-sensitive markets can have adverse effects on working conditions (Lim and Prakash
2017). For instance, Adolph, Quince, and Prakash (2017) show that in African countries, when
the exports to China increase significantly at the expense of Northern destinations, labour rights
deteriorate.
Figure 2.2: ‘Races‘ vs ‘Dispalcement‘: Alternative Strategic Patterns.
To summarise, Figure 2.2 illustrates the different underlying logic of the “races” debate and
displacement. The “races” debate postulates patterns of convergent strategic behaviours, whereby
an increase (or decrease) in the labour conditions of the signatory country i (⇑ / ⇓ Lci) is matched
by its competitor j (⇑ / ⇓ Lcj). Conversely, in the case of displacement, competitors may engage
in acts of strategic diversification, whereby producers decide to specialise in the activities for
which they have a strategic advantage.18 Hence, as a country improves its labour conditions
(⇑ Lci) its competitors may experience a drop in working standards. To be sure, it is not argued
that convergent and divergent competitive behaviours are mutually exclusive. On the contrary,
there can be multiple and heterogeneous competitive patterns in international markets. Some
competitors may react to improvements by upgrading workers conditions, while others may reduce
labour standards. This paper takes a country-level cross-sectional approach that (only) reveals
18Many scholars have focused on strategic diversification as a means to exploit the opportunity arising from the
growth of emerging markets (Cf. Barrientos et al. 2016; Horner 2014; Gibbon and Ponte 2005).
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whether one of these effects is significantly dominant.19 Further research should investigate what
determines different competitive patterns.
From these theoretical insights, I draw the two main hypotheses for testing in the empirical
part of the paper. The races literature maintains that the effect of LABPTA on the signatory
country and its competitors will have the same sign. If a country improves (deteriorates) its labour
conditions as a consequence of the engagement in LABPTA, so will its competitor.
Hypothesis 1 : The effects of LABPTAs on the labour conditions of the signatory
country and the impact on the labour conditions in its competitor are of the same sign.
Displacement theorises that while the coefficient of LABPTAs on the partner country labour
conditions may be positive, its competitors may have incentives to downgrade their working stan-
dards. In this regard, as a country improves labour standards, its competitors may reduce theirs.
Hypothesis 2 : The effects of LABPTAs on the labour conditions of the signatory
country and the impact on the labour conditions in its competitor have a different sign.
2.4 Empirical Approach
This section discusses a series of static and dynamic models that are employed to test the diffu-
sion and displacement hypotheses. The models presented will be employed in the next section using
both an operationalisation considering only LABPTAs with the US and then another considering
trade agreements with the EU. The baseline OLS specification is the following:
Lci,t = ψLABPTAi,t−1 + β
∑
j 6=i
WLABPTAi,t−1 + ηXi,t−1 + µi + τt + εi,t (2.1)
Lci,t is the main dependent variable of interest; it is a measure of the labour conditions of coun-
try i at time t. LABPTAi,t−1 is a variable measuring if country i has a LABPTA. LABPTAi,t−1
is weighted to account for the different stringency of the labour provision in trade agreements.20
ψ captures the effect of having a LABPTA on the signatory country. The main independent
variable of interest is
∑
j 6=iWLABPTAi,t, which aims to capture the competitors’ engagement in
19It is important to note that this approach is likely to underestimate the impact of LABPTAs on competitors
given that coexisting convergent and divergent competitive behaviours may attenuate the size of the dominant effect.
20The next section describe the stringency measure in more detail.
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LABPTAs. It is the sum of all LABPTAs with the EU or the US signed by the competitors j of
the country i, weighted by the level of competition between the two countries i and j at time t
(
∑
j 6=iWLABPTAi,t).21 The idea is that the more a country will have close competitors signing
stringent LABPTAs, the more it will have incentives to strategically change its labour standards.22
Competition (W ) is measured in terms of similarity in export portfolios. This measure captures
similitude in countries’ sectoral-level export profiles – i.e. looking at product similarities in exports
portfolios with no discrimination on export destinations (Chatagnier and Kavaklı 2017; Wang
2017; Baccini and Koenig-Archibugi 2014; Cao 2010; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Elkins, Guzman,
and Simmons 2006; Polillo and Guillén 2005; Guler et al. 2002).23 The intuition is that the
more two countries export the same kind of products, the more they are close competitors. The






Following Guler et al. (2002), I calculate trade similarity (tsj,i,t−1) by computing the Pearson’s r
correlation between the product vectors of every pair of states. This measure is further refined to
account for the trade volumes of the competitors. The idea is that competition does not depend
exclusively on similarity but also on volume. If two competitors have identical export portfolios,






average share of exports of products k over the global export volume of product k in year t.25
21In the model two versions of the variable are used separately: one that captures competitor engagement with
LABPTA with the US and one for the EU.
22For illustrative purposes consider the following example: if Switzerland signs a trade agreement with the US with
strong labour clauses, this is unlikely to affect the labour conditions in Sri Lanka because Switzerland and Sri Lanka
are not close competitors. On the other hand, if Vietnam – which has a similar export profile to Sri Lanka – signs a
trade agreement with the US this might affect labour conditions in Sri Lanka.
23Data at the product level is drawn from the United Nations’ (UN) Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC). Product level specification is intentionally kept at the three-digit level rather than using more refined measures
(4-5 digits). For developing countries, very refined granular data for exported products, suffer from severe problems of
missing observations. Hence, it would create a systematic bias for those countries that export more towards more
developed countries and that regularly keep track of export products at a very refined level. Those suppliers that
export more towards developing countries would have a systematically less precise measure of competition. Given
the theoretical importance of exports’ destinations in shaping a country’s labour practice, this would severely risk to
biasing the results. Using an accurate, yet, less detailed measure of product specification, is a compromise between
the precision of the measure and the risk of bias.
24The standard approach of evaluating similarity in export profiles and not accounting for volume has important
problems in that it creates a false competitive symmetry among countries with dissimilar trade volumes. Take the
case of three countries A, B and C, wherein A and B have identical export portfolios with a 0.9 similarity score with
country C. However, while country A is one of the biggest exporters in the market, B is a small state, and its exports
amount to 1/100 of the total of A. It is here argued that country C will not be equally sensitive to competition with
country A and B and that it will be more responsive to the changes in the larger competitor. In other words, it is
argued that the size of the exporter matters in evaluating the competition. Moreover, trade volumes matter regardless
of export composition. For instance, a large country may be exporting large absolute volumes of a product k, while
this remains a small share of its overall exports. For a small country, heavily relying on the export of k, this large
state might be an important competitor, even if their export share do not overlap.
25ki,j,t is the number of products exported by both i and j. Exportj,k,t refers to the total exports of j of product
k and
∑
j 6=i Exportk,t is the total volume of exports of product k. All of these vectors have a time dimension t.
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Hence, the more a competitor has a larger share of exports of the exports of a particular good, the
more it will be an important competitor.
Xi,t−1 is a vector of the usual control variables of the country i that are known to influence
labour conditions. Drawing from the literature, this vector includes: (1) GDP growth; (2) the
level of economic development (GDP per capita); the (3) level of democracy and (4) the amount
of FDI stocks that are thought to be positively associated to labour standards (Lim, Mosley, and
Prakash 2015; Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017; Davies and Vadlamannati 2013; Olney 2013;
Mosley and Uno 2007; Mosley 2010; Neumayer and De Soysa 2005).26 Also, the (5) strength of
civil society – measured considering the number of international labour NGOs in every state – and
(6) left-leaning governing party ideology are thought to be positively associated with better labour
conditions and are therefore included in the model (Peksen and Blanton 2017; Greenhill, Mosley,
and Prakash 2009; Beck et al. 2001).27 The controls also comprehend the (7) population size
that scholars have found being negatively associated with the respect of human rights (Greenhill,
Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Gamso 2017; Cao and Prakash 2011).28
The model also includes a series of country (µi) and time (τi) fixed effects. The literature
has made a strong case for using country fixed effects to account for unobserved time-invariant
economic, political, or cultural determinants of labour standards (Potoski and Prakash 2009; Baier
and Bergstrand 2007; Cao and Prakash 2011). Indeed, there may be unobserved endogenous
country-specific factors – such as the domestic industrial structure, unmeasured cultural and
political affinity or rivalry – that may influence the variation in the dependent variable. Likewise,
year fixed effects are used to control for unexamined global shocks, such as sudden changes in
commodity prices, that may reshape national attitudes towards labour practices, and they can ac-
count for time trends in the panel data (Potoski and Prakash 2009; Fredriksson and Millimet 2002).
It is important to note that to deal with some endogeneity issues and to avoid simultaneity




26Data on economic growth and GDP per capita are drawn from World Bank indicators (https://data.world
bank.org/indicator). Data on bilateral FDI is drawn from the OECD databases (http://www.oecd.org/corpora
te/mne/statistics). Data on democracy is taken from the Freedom House’s civil and political liberties database
(https://freedomhouse.org/content/freedom-world-data-and-resources)
27Data on democracy is from the Polity4 project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017). Data on the number of Labour
INGO is drawn from the Yearbook of International Organizations (https://uia.org/yearbook).
28Data on population is from the World Bank indicators.
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bias in the estimation of the model, all of the regressors have been temporarily lagged by one year
(Millimet, Daniel L., Roy 2016; Cao and Prakash 2011). Lagging variables assumes that whatever
happens in a country closely competing with i, it will take one year to influence the i. Scholars
have warned about the risks of lagging as the neglect of the contemporaneous effect can lead to
distorted standard errors (Franzese, Hays, and Cook 2016). However, scholars have also noticed
that policy changes in labour conditions are unlikely to be instantaneous and that trade patterns
are relatively sticky, hence the contemporaneous effect bias should be less of a concern in our case
(Wang 2017 at p. 560; see also Cao and Prakash 2011, at p.124).
The analysis of two coefficients β and ψ will be key in testing the hypotheses. If they have the
same sign, then the races convergent competitive behaviour is dominant, while if β and ψ have
opposite signs, or if β is negative and ψ is not significant, then the divergent competitive behaviour
predicted by displacement is dominant.
The hypotheses are also tested using a dynamic lagged dependent variable model (LDV). Equa-
tion 2 includes the autoregressive term Lci,t−1 that captures the level of labour conditions in the
previous period. This approach is often used in the literature because it can control for the partic-
ular factors, including exogenous shocks, that have persistent effects over country labour standards
(Davies and Vadlamannati 2013; Wooldridge 2002). Moreover, it also accounts for partial adjust-
ment of labour conditions over time, and it can eliminate serial correlation in the error term.
Lci,t = γLci,t−1 + ψLABPTAi,t−1 + β
∑
j 6=i
WLABPTAi,t−1 + ηXi,t−1 + µi + τt + εi,t (2.2)
A well-known issue with dynamic fixed-effects models is that the lagged dependent variable is
correlated with the error term. This generates a bias in the estimate of the coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable that is particularly severe in small T and large N contexts. Indeed, Nickell
demonstrated that the bias is of order 1/T (1981). Given that the data covers 27 years, this bias
should be moderated in our specific case.29
Despite the use of lags, of a wide variety of controls and fixed effects, there might be lingering
endogeneity concerns. The competitors’ engagement with trade agreements may be endogenous
29About 3.7%.
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to the level of labour conditions in a country. Countries with very high labour conditions may
self-select into trade agreements, creating incentives for their competitor to not engage in LABP-
TAs.30 Moreover, the other variables in the model, including, for instance, democracy, GDP per
capita, and number of labour NGOs in the country, are also unlikely to be strictly exogenous to
labour standards. To deal with these concerns, this paper will estimate the model via the dynamic
Arellano Bond GMM two-step difference estimator (1991). This approach has been largely used
in the literature for its ability to produce consistent estimates in cases with arbitrarily distributed
fixed effects, heteroscedastic errors and independent variables that are not strictly exogenous (Cf.
Lim and Prakash 2017; Millimet, Daniel L., Roy 2016; Vadlamannati 2015; Olney 2013; Roodman
2009a). To account for fixed effects, the Arellano Bond estimator applies a first difference trans-
formation to all the variables in the model. Including time fixed effects (θt) the estimated model is
therefore:
∆Lci,t = ∆γLci,t−1 + ∆ψPTAi,t−1 + ∆β
∑
j 6=i
WLABPTAi,t−1 + ∆Xi,t−1η + ∆τt + ∆εi,t (2.3)
The model deals with endogeneity using an instrumental variable approach. Drawing on the
insights of Anderson and Hsiao (1982), it uses the lagged level of the endogenous explanatory
variables as an instrument for the differenced endogenous variables, thus creating consistent esti-
mates in the presence of endogeneity. For instance, endogenous variable ∆γLci,t−1 is instrumented
using Lci,t−2, Lci,t−3, . . . , Lci,t−n in a GMM heteroskedasticity consistent framework.31 GMM ap-
proaches, however, do not come without concerns. There is a well-known issue of lag sensitivity of
the estimates (Hwang and Valdés 2020). To address this issue, the model is estimated using a wide
variety of alternative GMM lag specifications (Olney 2013). Moreover, researchers have found that
even if the estimates are consistent, the standard errors of the two-step efficient GMM are often
severely downward biased when used with small samples (Hwang, Kang, and Lee 2019; Roodman
2009b; Arellano and Bond 1991). To address this concern, scholars have routinely used Windmeijer
(2005) finite sample correction for the two-step standard errors. His formula corrects for the bias
arising from using the efficient weight matrix being evaluated at an estimate, rather than at the
true value. However, as the most recent research shows: “Windmeijer correction does not take into
30For instance, competitor countries with an export profile increasingly reliant on cheap labour may resist the
inclusion of stringent labour clauses that may harm their comparative advantage when negotiating a LABPTAs.
31Clearly ∆Lci,t−1 and Lci,t−2 are correlated, but, the key insight of the model is that yi,t−2 is not correlated with
∆∆εi,t = ∆εi,t −∆εi,t−1 if errors are not serially correlated.
40
CHAPTER 2 41
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 3024 1985 2012
Labour Practices Score 2274 21.89 4.62 0 27.5
Comp.’s signing of LABPTA with the US 3024 1.52 1.92 0 10
Comp.’s signing of LABPTA with the EU 3024 .79 1.4 0 10
US LABPTA 3024 .76 3.23 0 18
EU LABPTA 3024 1.33 6.18 0 61
Export % of GDP 3018 .24 .24 0 4.11
FDI stock % GDP 2757 28.22 82.82 .01 1798.27
Polulation (log) 3020 15.46 2.1 10.62 21.02
GDP per capita (log) 3015 7.4 1.38 4.55 11.39
GDP growth 2982 3.92 4.92 -50.25 35.22
N. of labour INGOs 2511 15.98 7.86 0 36
Government ideology 2860 .28 .45 0 1
Democracy 2601 1.13 6.69 -10 10
Statistics are for the 108 countries included in Table 2.6. The maximum value for EU LABPTA is the value for EU
member states (additive sum of stringency of all EU agreements). As figure 2.4 shows, the maximum value for any
single EU LABPTA is 17. This is the Colombia-Peru-EC trade agreement (2012).
account for the over-identification” (Hwang, Kang, and Lee 2019 at p. 1; Hansen 2019). In other
words, Windmeijer correction does not provide consistent variance estimates when the moment
condition of the model are mis-specified (e.g. invalid instruments, too many lags or heterogeneous
effects). As a robustness check, this paper applies the new doubly corrected robust variance esti-
mator for linear GMM that corrects for this bias, providing consistent variance estimates when the
moment conditions of the model are inaccurately specified (Hwang, Kang, and Lee 2019 at p. 1;
see also Hansen 2019).32
2.5 Operationalizing key variables
This section provides a short overview of how the main variables are operationalized. Table 2.1
reports summary statistics for all of them.
Labour conditions. Measuring de facto labour conditions in a cross-national setting is an
extremely arduous task. In most developing countries, ‘reliable data on employment practices
and working conditions over time have been almost impossible to obtain’ (Berliner et al. 2015 at
32The estimates are calculated via a pilot STATA command that is under development by Hwang, Kang, and Lee
(2019). While estimates and standard errors are reported in Table 2.7, I do not use these as the main estimation
strategy because it is not possible to compute Hansens’j statistic with the pilot command.
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p. 198). These countries often suffer from poor infrastructure and bureaucracies and are unable,
if not unwilling, to collect such information (Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Flanagan
2006). To measure the dependent variable, this study employs the comprehensive labour standard
index developed by Mosley and Uno (2007) as integrated by Marx et al. (2015).33 The original
dataset covers 135 countries from 1985 to 2002 and consists of ‘an annual measure of labour rights
violations’ calculated by looking at 37 types of violations relating to the freedom of association
and the right to bargain collectively (FACB) (Mosley and Uno 2007 at p. 924). These violations
are weighted to account for their gravity. The data is further refined to distinguishing violations
in law and practice (Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009). The final labour practice index, which
is the key dependent variable of this study, ranges from 0 to 27.5, where higher values represent
better labour practices. Marx et al. (2015) have updated this dataset for 73 countries from 2003
to 2012. Following the recent scholarship, I integrate these two databases and run the analysis
on an unbalanced panel dataset with 108 developing countries over a period of 28 years (Ye 2019;
Pond 2018).34 Admittedly, this data has some limitations. Most notably, the data measures
FACB rights, which is only a second-order measure of de facto labour conditions. To use this
data I have to rely on the assumption that, in countries where fundamental working rights are
increasingly violated, firms and government will also restrict and violate FACB rights to “reduce
demands for wages and nonwage benefits” (Mosley and Uno 2007 at p. 927). To my knowledge,
however, this is the best data available as it provides a rigorous, consistent and cross-national
measure of labour practices, and it has been used in numerous recent studies (Adolph, Quince, and
Prakash 2017; Gamso 2017; Ye 2019; Pond 2018). It is also important to note that the paper also
takes a country-level approach because, to my knowledge, reliable cross-national data on factories
working conditions is not available. In particular, while there is data on firms participating in
private regulations, it is much harder to have information about labour standards of competing
firms, not participating in these initiatives. A preliminary examination of the data suggests
that, if anything, increasing trade openness has led to a drop in labour standards.35 Figure 2.3,
shows that labour practices have declined, on average, both in OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries. This decline, however, has been swifter for developing countries rather than for OECD ones.36
33Content analysis is based on reports from US State Department, the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the
Applications of Conventions and Recommendations, the Committee on Freedom of Association and the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Mosley and Uno 2007).
34The list of countries is reported in Table 2.6 of the Annexes.
35Indeed, trade volumes have constantly increased in the sample period
36Note that after 2002, the sample size changes. This is why the overall means for OECD countries are overrepresented
when compared to the period 1985–2002.
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Figure 2.3: Labour practices trends
Stringency of the labour clauses in trade agreements. A total of 77 free trade agreements with
the US and the EU are considered in this study.37 Here, I rely on the work of Lisa Lechner to
evaluate the stringency of their labour provisions (2016). As part of the Design of Trade Agreement
Project (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014), Lechner has created a comprehensive dataset covering
over 663 trade agreements signed from 1948 to 2016 and classified them according to their level of
legalisation of non-trade issues (NTI) (2016; W. Abbott and Snidal 2000). Every non-trade issue
clause is weighted by the level of precision, obligation, and delegation that it entails, and these
scores are summed to assess the overall level of legalisation of NTI. Lechner produces a measure
focusing specifically on economic and social rights directly targeting labour rights clauses. I use
this measure to account for the stringency of labour clauses in LABPTAs.38 This measure goes
from a minimum score of 0, taken by the trade agreement between the European Community and
Iceland (1972), to a maximum of 18, taken by the US-Bahrain Trade agreement (2006). Figure 2.4
37Table 2.5 reports the list of treaties. The list also includes trade agreements signed before 1985.
38Note that the economic and social rights measure includes all of the following: “the right to work, rights at work
(right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour, the effective abolition of
child labour, the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, minimum wage, and the
right for leisure), right to education, the right to development, and the right to health” (Lechner 2018, at p.1). I use
the variable in its aggregated from esr_all_sum.
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shows that while the EU has signed more trade agreements with labour conditions, the US tends
to sign agreements that are more legalised.39 This does not come as a surprise as it is well known
in the scholarship that while LABPTAs with the US tend to include enforcement mechanisms
and sanctions, LABPTAs with the EU rely on dialogue and best practices as a means to imple-
ment labour provisions (Raess and Sari 2018; Leeg 2018; Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014; Kim 2012).
Figure 2.4: LABPTAs of the US and the EU by level of legalisation
Competitors engagement in LABPTA. The main explanatory variables of this study are the
competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs with the EU and the US (
∑
j 6=iWLABPTAi,t−1). They
aim to capture the incentives a country has to change its labour practices as a consequence of
its competitors’ participation in LABPTAs. As discussed in the previous section, these variables
are a weighted sum that accounts for differences in the level of competition and differences in the
stringency of the LABPTAs. These sums are later rescaled from 0 to 10 to facilitate interpretation.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the mean values of these measures for every year in the sample. As expected,
these measures show a positive trend and major increases are connected to a set of new trade
agreements being signed.40
In creating the competitor engagement measure, I used the following rules. First, if the com-
petitor signs a new trade agreement replacing the previous one, the LABPTAs stringency score is
replaced. For instance, this is the case for the Canada–US trade agreement signed in 1988 that was
later replaced by NAFTA. After 1992, only the stringency of NAFTA matters is shaping competitor
39With a higher legalisation score in the x-axis.
40Unit root tests for these variable can be found in Table 2.8 in the Annexes. Do note that while unit root tests of
the competitor engagement with the US,do not show evidence of a UR, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test suggests




Figure 2.5: Mean competitor engagement with LABPTAs of the US and the EU
behaviour.
Second, if the competitor signed an additional protocol with labour clauses, only the treaty with
the highest legalisation score is considered. This assumes that while signing an additional protocol
with more stringent labour clauses can affect competitors behaviours if the additional protocol has
lower labour provisions, this will not undermine the effects of the base agreement.
Third, I excluded the US and the EU from the weighted sum of competitor engagement. Based
on qualitative evidence, it is argued that LABPTAs are tools developed countries use to avoid social
dumping and ensure that basic labour conditions are protected abroad. They are not a progressive
instrument used to advance domestic labour conditions by developing states (VanGrasstek 2013;
Sutherland 1998 ).41 This means that when the US and Peru sign an LABPTA, only the latter is
signalling a commitment to improving labour standards, while labour standards and competitors’
views on the commitments towards the respect of labour standards in the US are unchanged.
Fourth, creating the measure of competitors’ engagement with EU LABPTAs required ad-
ditional choices. The main issue is that in the timeframe considered, the EU has more than
doubled its membership. Countries such as Bulgaria and Romania went from having no formal
trade agreement with the EU to being full members of the European Union. This increasing
membership poses questions of which country to exclude from the measure of the weighted sum
41For instance, there has been an intense debate over the inclusion of the social clause in WTO negotiations that
saw the developed and developing countries taking opposing sides (Cf. VanGrasstek 2013; Sutherland 1998 ).
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of competitor engagement in LABPTAs. I opted for excluding only countries that are also part
of the OECD because they belong to a group with already established high labour standards.42
Conversely, former eastern European countries are part of the competitor sample precisely because
it is assumed that they were incentivised by the EU-15 group to improve their labour conditions
also through increasingly stringent LABPTAs (and later EU membership). Indeed, both the
“races” and displacement perspectives predict that as these countries increasingly engaged with
the EU, competing firms in states not in the process of joining the European Union would
strategically adapt labour conditions to remain competitive. In other words, excluding the ef-
fects of Eastern European countries is likely to downward bias the systemic effects of EU LABPTAs.
Finally, an additional challenge was to assign a stringency score to European Treaties. The
measure of legalisation developed by Lechner is poorly equipped to grasp the full potential of EU
Treaties (2016). Indeed, her metric looks at the legalisation of the EU Treaties without taking into
account the potential for direct EU regulation or the progressive jurisprudence that are directly
affecting labour rights in EU members. To account for the particular stringency of EU member-
ship, the legalisation scores of EU Treaties have been additively summed rather than substituted.
This avoids the paradoxical situation that emerges in the data showing that the Korea–EC trade
agreement is more stringent than the membership in the Lisbon Treaty.43 This approach should be
better able to reflect the higher level of commitment of EU membership relative to all other trade
agreements. Admittedly, this makes the measure of competitor engagement with EU LABPTAs
less precise and more subjective than its US counterpart. Alternative approaches could be taken: a
multiplicative relation between EU treaties or the complete elimination from the sample of countries
that become members of the EU. These strategies, however, appear to be flawed. The former risks
making the competitor engagement with EU LABPTAs overly dependent on the competition with
those countries that joined the Union. In this perspective, competitors of Bulgaria and Romania
will have exponential incentives to strategically change their labour practices relative to anyone
else. On the other hand, excluding incoming members risks severely underestimating the effect of
EU LABPTAs. For these reasons, it is argued that the cumulative sum is a more sensible approach
to build the variable of interest.
42Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom
43The score for the Korea-EC LABPTA is 16, while the Treaty of Lisbon is 10.
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2.6 Results and discussion
Table 2.2 reports the results of estimating the fixed effects, the LDV and the two-step GMM
models on an unbalanced panel consisting of 108 countries over 28 years (1985–2012). Columns
1 to 3 estimate the effect of competitors engagement with trade agreements with the EU, while
Columns 4 to 6 look at LABPTAs with the US. Models 1, 2, 4 and 5 show mostly consistent results.
In line with previous research, these models find that FDI, democracy and left-leaning governments
are positively and significantly associated with better labour practices (cfr Adolph, Quince, and
Prakash 2017; Lim and Prakash 2017). Moreover, these models suggest that LABPTAs with
the US (US LABPTA) have a positive and significant effect on labour practices of the signatory
country.44 In contrast, LABPTAs with the EU are not statistically significant at the 95% level (EU
LABPTA). However, once the potential endogeneity of our variable of interest is taken into account
– Column 3 and 6 – LABPTAs with the US are no longer significant, suggesting that LABPTAs are
unable to improve working conditions in the signatory country.45 The main variables of interest,
competitors engagement with LABPTAs of the EU and the US, show consistent patterns across all
models. There is no evidence to support the idea that a country’s labour practices are affected by
its competitor, signing a trade agreement with the EU. Indeed, Models from 1 to 3 have a negative
but insignificant coefficient for this variable. Conversely, Models from 4 to 6 suggest that there is
a negative and highly significant relationship between competitors’ engagement with LABPTAs
with the US a country labour practice.46 Model 4 predicts that a 1% increase in competitors
engagement in LABPTAs is associated with a 0.05% decline in labour practices. In practical terms,
this means that the effect of competitors engagement in LABPTAs will be particularly visible when
new trade agreements are signed. For instance, in 2004, Vietnam experienced a roughly a 57.7%
increase in competitor engagement in LABPTAs as the US signed trade agreements with Morocco,
Australia, Bahrain and some Central American States. Controlling for the other variables, the
model predicts that this increase is associated with a 2.9% decline in labour conditions in Vietnam
in 2005. The coefficient on competitor engagement is even larger once we control for the potential
endogeneity of other regressors (Model 6). Taking the case of Vietnam discussed above, the GMM
44These results are consistent with the previous scholarship (Hafner-Burton 2005; Kim 2012).
45Note that GMM models are estimated with collapsed instruments and a maximum lag length of 5. These restraints
are made to avoid issues coming from instrument proliferation, but results are consistent with alternative lag length
specification (Roodman 2009b). Including an extra lag does not change the results. Also, note that the Arellano-Bond
test for autocorrelation (AR2) shows the lack of second-order autocorrelation, and the Hansens Test suggests that the
instruments, considered jointly, do not correlate with the error term hence boosting our confidence in the results.
46Note that the estimates are similar for all the control variables and coherent with the Models 1 and 2
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model predicts a 5.9% decline in labour practice scores in 2005.47 These results are consistent with
alternative specifications of the competition measure as reported in Table 2.3. In these models,
I employ the mainstream measure of competition that only looks at the similarity in export
portfolios, without the adjustment for the volume of the export (Baccini and Koenig-Archibugi
2014; Guler et al. 2002).48
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that the while EU trade agreements are completely inconsequential
when it comes to labour standards, trade agreements with the US can generate a displacement
effect, whereby countries that are not part of the agreement can suffer a drop in working conditions
as a result of their competitors taking part to LABPTAs.
Table 2.3: The estimated effect of competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs on labour practices
(competition = trade similarity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed Effects LDV GMM Fixed Effects LDV GMM
TS Comp.’s engag. in LABPTAs with the EU -0.013 -0.004 -0.293
(0.034) (0.025) (0.212)
TS Comp.’s engag. in LABPTAs with the US -0.099*** -0.079*** -0.127**
(0.028) (0.020) (0.051)
US LABPTA 0.004** 0.003** -0.017 0.004** 0.003*** -0.013
(0.002) (0.001) (0.026) (0.002) (0.001) (0.016)
EU LABPTA 0.000 0.000 0.029* 0.001 0.001 0.032
(0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025)
lagged DV (log) 0.295*** 0.268*** 0.291*** 0.260***
N 1723 1723 1627 1723 1723 1627
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments 74 74
Hansens Test 0.597 0.376
AR2 0.386 0.405
The Windmeijer correction is applied to GMM estimates. All regressors are instrumented using dynamic GMM instruments.
GMM models are estimated with collapsed instruments and lag length constraint to 5. All regressors are lagged by one year.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The fixed effects and LDV models report Driscoll and Kraay standard errors.
Why is there a difference in the competitor engagement of LABPTAs with the EU and the US?
A possible explanation is that only the trade agreements with the US are effective in improving
labour standards in the partner country and hence to trigger the displacement mechanism.49 From
this perspective, only countries with LABPTAs with the US will specialise in targeting high-end
markets improving labour standards hence creating the opportunity for their competitors to
47Table 2.7 shows that the results are also robust using doubly corrected standard errors (Hansen 2019). These are
not reported in the main analysis because they have been estimated using a pilot version of the command that is
unable to estimate the Hansen test and the Arellano Bond test for autocorrelation.
48Controls are included but not reported.
49As confirmed by Models 1,2,4 and 5 of Table 2.2.
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exploit the market niche of low-end goods. Less stringent LABPTAs with the EU instead, will not
have any effect on altering strategic incentives. However, there is mixed evidence in support of this
hypothesis, given that the effectiveness of LABPTAs with the US appears to be sensitive to the
estimation technique employed. Another potential explanation could relate to the different design
of these LABPTAs agreements. While sanctions and hard enforcement mechanisms often support
the trade agreements with the US, the European LABPTAs rely more on cooperative incentives
(Raess, Dür, and Sari 2018). This qualitative difference in the type of enforcement mechanism is
only partially accounted for by the continuous measure of LABPTA legalisation employed in the
model (Lechner 2016). It is possible that only trade agreements with the sanctioning mechanisms
– such as those with the US – have strong reputational effects promoting exports to concerned
importers around the world. Firms aiming to promote their “fair” sourcing policies, may prefer to
import from countries that have trade agreements with the US rather than the EU, as they will
take the type of commitment more seriously. This, in turn, will make the competitors of these
suppliers more reliant on low-end markets, hence activating displacement. Section 2 discussed
how it is the signalling, rather than the reality, of greater effects of US LABPTAs that matters.
Finally, it is possible that the EU estimates are influenced by the specific decisions taken to build
this measure. Section 3 discussed how the dynamic nature of EU membership makes it more
elusive and difficult to precisely define the concept of competitor engagement in LABPTAs in the
context of the EU and that alternative choices could be made in building this series.
To gain more insight into the precise mechanisms that trigger displacement, the models are
estimated with different specification of the LABPTAs variable. The regressions in Tables 2.2 and
2.3 considered the LABPTAs from the moment of signature between the parties. However, these
treaties often take several years before they enter into force. For instance, while NAFTA was
signed in 1992, it only entered into force in 1994. It would be reasonable to argue that the effects
that these agreements can trigger both on the signatory country and on its competitors’ labour
standards are amplified, if not activated, when these agreements enter into force. Columns 1 and
2 of Table 2.4, report the estimated effect of LABPTAs with the US as they enter into force.50
These models do not find any evidence that as LABPTA enter into force, they affect the labour
practices of developing countries.51 This suggests that rather than their actual implementation
50In this measure the LABPTA measure and the competitor engagement in LABPTA measure keep the value of 0
until the agreement enters into force.
51The same insignificant results hold for LABPTAs entered into force with the EU, though these are not reported
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in terms of tariff cuts or labour provisions, trade agreements activate strategic displacement
behaviours because they signal a commitment to improving labour standards and that the
ratifier will enjoy privileged market access. Firms will anticipate the effects of these agreements by
starting to adapt their labour conditions to meet the demand of more socially unconcerned markets.
An additional concern is that the measure used to evaluate the stringency of LABPTAs is
biasing our results. Indeed, there might be multiple rationales to evaluate the stringency of
labour clauses in PTAs, and alternative measures may bias our results. To deal with this issue
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.4 test whether the mere existence of a trade agreement with the US,
with little attention to the legalisation of the labour clauses included, can trigger displacement.
For both signatory and competitor countries, here the LABPTA variable is a simple dummy,
taking the value of 1 if it has been signed and 0 otherwise. The idea is that, at the sub-national
level, firms and companies will look at the existence of a trade agreement with labour clauses,
regardless of how stringent they are, as a sufficient reason to adapt their labour standards. The
estimated models offer results that are largely consistent with the equivalent models considering
the stringency of labour conditions.52 It is essential to remark that while this approach is critical
to evaluate if the specific measure of legalisation employed biases the baseline results, it cannot
fully reveal the underlying mechanism driving displacement. The results of the dummy approach
suggest that the existence of a LABPTA, regardless of its stringency or enforceability, can trigger
displacement. However, as Figure 2.4 shows, the overwhelming majority of trade agreements
involving the US are extremely legalised. Hence, it is not possible to fully disentangle the effect of
these trade agreements from their more stringent design.
All in all, Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 provide evidence supporting the displacement hypothesis.
Though it is beyond doubt that further research is necessary, these models suggest that countries
are incentivised to take the low road to international competitiveness, and hence to downgrade,
when their competitors engage with trade agreements with the US. At the same time, LABPTAs
with the EU do not appear to have any effect. Another important finding is that this strategic
due to space constraints.
52The estimated coefficient for competitor engagement in LABPTAs, not accounting for labour stringency computed
in Model 3 of Table 2.4 (-0.32), is almost identical to the coefficient computed taking into account the level of
legalisation of LABPTAs in Model 5 of Table 2 (-0.38); what changes are the standard errors that make us more
confident of the results presented in Table 2.2. Again when estimated for the EU, none of the estimates of interest are
significant.
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Table 2.4: Alternative LABPTAs secifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LDV GMM LDV GMM
Comp.’s engagement in e.i.f LABPTAs with the US -0.017 -0.087
(0.014) (0.054)
Comp.’s engagement in LABPTAs with the US (Dummy) -0.032* -0.112**
(0.015) (0.044)
US LABPTA enterend into force 0.002 0.014
(0.001) (0.020)
EU LABPTA enterend into force 0.003* 0.008
(0.001) (0.027)
US LABPTA (Dummy) 0.044** -0.094
(0.019) (0.237)
EU LABPTA (Dummy) -0.042* 0.145
(0.023) (0.237)
lagged DV (log) 0.293*** 0.276*** 0.292*** 0.295***
(0.057) (0.039) (0.057) (0.040)
N 1723 1627 1723 1627
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments 74 74
Hansens Test 0.316 0.501
AR2 0.477 0.515
The Windmeijer correction is applied to GMM estimates. All regressors are instrumented using dynamic GMM instruments.
GMM models are estimated with collapsed instruments and lag length constraint to 5. All regressors are lagged by one year.
The LDV model reports Driscoll and Kraay standard errors.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
behaviour appears to begin with signing the agreement rather than its entry into force. This,
together with the fact that the results are consistent using a dummy approach, suggests that a
significant role in triggering the displacement is played by the signalling effect of signing a trade
agreement. As a country engages in LABPTAs, it sends a credible signal that it is willing to
improve labour standards and that it will increase trade with the US, and its competitors react to
this signal.53
2.7 Conclusion
This paper makes the first attempt to evaluate the systemic consequences of LABPTAs with
the US and EU on the labour standards of developing countries. It contends that to assess if
LABPTAs are effective in improving the aggregate welfare of workers, it is not sufficient only to
examine whether they impact labour conditions in signatory countries; but it is also essential to
consider their effects on competitor countries. Theoretically, LABPTAs could trigger patterns of
both diffusion and displacement. Empirically, we do not find (consistent) evidence that LABPTAs
53Note that this finding is in line with most studies examining the effects of trade agreements on trade. These study
found that increasing trade begins when the trade agreement is signed rather than at the moment where it enters into
force (Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin 2019; Baier and Bergstrand 2002, 2007).
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can improve labour conditions in a signatory country. On the other hand, we find that LABPTAs
with the US can generate downward pressure on the labour conditions of competitors states; these
results are consistent when using multiple estimation techniques and alternative specifications of
the key variables of interest. Hence, displacement does not appear to be triggered by de facto
improvements in labour conditions. Theoretically, it has been discussed how this effect could also
depend on the reputational impact that these LABPTAs have on firms in signatory countries or
alternatively on the trade liberalization effects of these agreements. Given that LABPTAs with the
EU, that significantly cut tariffs but have a very different design when it comes to labour clauses,
have no effects on working conditions, it is reasonable to assume that reputation is an important
causal mechanism. To be sure, this paper does not claim to have found a definitive answer to
the issues it raises. Cross-sectional studies with a high level of aggregation in their data have their
limitations in terms of inference and are unable to precisely reveal the causal patterns triggering this
effect. Rather, the paper aims at encouraging dialogue about the issue of displacement, which has
been widely under-investigated by existing empirical studies and which may affect the potential of
bilateral approaches to labour governance – such as LABPTAs and private regulations – to improve
labour standard globally.
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2.8 Annexes
Table 2.5: List of treaties by year in which they were signed
Name Year Name Year
Israel US 1985 EC Maastricht 1992
Canada US 1988 European Economic Area (EEA) 1992
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1992 Bulgaria EC 1993
Jordan US 2000 EC Estonia 1993
Chile US 2003 EC Romania 1993
Singapore US 2003 EC Slovakia 1993
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) Dominican Republic 2004 EC Latvia 1994
Morocco US 2004 EC Lithuania 1994
Australia US 2004 EC Estonia Europe Agreement 1995
Bahrain US 2004 EC Israel Euro-Med Association Agreement 1995
Colombia US 2006 EC Latvia Europe Agreement 1995
Oman US 2006 EC Lithuania Europe Agreement 1995
Peru US 2006 EC Tunisia Euro-Med Association Agreement 1995
Korea US 2007 EC Turkey 1995
Panama US 2007 EC Faroe Islands 1996
EC 1957 EC Morocco Euro-Med Association Agreement 1996
EC Greece Association Agreement 1961 EC Slovenia Europe Agreement 1996
EC Malta 1970 EC Amsterdam 1997
EC Turkey Additional Protocol 1970 EC Jordan Euro-Med Association Agreement 1997
Cyprus EC 1972 EC South Africa 1999
EC Finland 1972 EC Switzerland Bilaterals I 1999
EC Iceland 1972 EC Mexico 2000
EC Portugal 1972 EC Egypt Euro-Med Association Agreement 2001
EC Sweden 1972 EC Macedonia SAA 2001
EC Switzerland Liechtenstein 1972 EC Nice 2001
Austria EC 1972 Algeria EC Euro-Med Association Agreement 2002
EC Norway 1973 Chile EC 2002
EC Turkey Supplementary Protocol 1973 EC Lebanon Euro-Med Association Agreement 2002
EC Greece Additional Protocol 1975 Albania EC SAA 2006
EC Israel 1975 EC Lisbon 2007
EC Portugal Additional Protocol 1976 EC Montenegro SAA 2007
EC Yugoslavia 1980 Bosnia and Herzegovina EC SAA 2008
EC Single European Act 1986 CARIFORUM EC EPA 2008
Andorra EC 1989 Cote d’Ivoire EC EPA 2008
Czech Republic EC 1991 EC Serbia SAA 2008
EC Faroe Islands 1991 EC Korea 2010
EC Hungary 1991 Central America EC 2012
EC Poland 1991 Colombia Peru EC 2012
EC San Marino 1991
Do note the list also includes trade agreements signed before the estimation period (1985-2012)
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Table 2.6: List of countries
iso3c Code Country iso3c Code Country iso3c Code Country
AGO Angola AGO Angola NGA Nigeria
ALB Albania ALB Albania NIC Nicaragua
ARE United Arab Emirates ARE United Arab Emirates NPL Nepal
ARG Argentina ARG Argentina OMN Oman
ATG Antigua and Barbuda ATG Antigua and Barbuda PAK Pakistan
BDI Burundi BDI Burundi PAN Panama
BEN Benin BEN Benin PER Peru
BFA Burkina Faso BFA Burkina Faso PHL Philippines
BGD Bangladesh BGD Bangladesh PNG Papua New Guinea
BGR Bulgaria BGR Bulgaria PRY Paraguay
BHR Bahrain BHR Bahrain QAT Qatar
BHS Bahamas BHS Bahamas RWA Rwanda
BLZ Belize BLZ Belize SAU Saudi Arabia
BOL Bolivia BOL Bolivia SDN Sudan
BRA Brazil BRA Brazil SEN Senegal
BRB Barbados BRB Barbados SGP Singapore
BRN Brunei BRN Brunei SLB Solomon Islands
BTN Bhutan BTN Bhutan SLE Sierra Leone
CAF Central African Republic CAF Central African Republic SLV El Salvador
CHL Chile CHL Chile SUR Suriname
CHN China CHN China SYC Seychelles
CIV Cote d’Ivoire CIV Cote d’Ivoire SYR Syria
CMR Cameroon CMR Cameroon TCD Chad
COD Congo, Democratic Republic of COD Congo, Democratic Republic of TGO Togo
COG Congo, Republic of COG Congo, Republic of THA Thailand
COL Colombia COL Colombia TTO Trinidad and Tobago
COM Comoros COM Comoros TUN Tunisia
CPV Cabo Verde CPV Cabo Verde UGA Uganda
CRI Costa Rica CRI Costa Rica URY Uruguay
CUB Cuba CUB Cuba VCT Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
CYP Cyprus CYP Cyprus VEN Venezuela
DMA Dominica DMA Dominica VNM Vietnam
DOM Dominican Republic DOM Dominican Republic VUT Vanuatu
DZA Algeria DZA Algeria WSM Samoa
ECU Ecuador ECU Ecuador ZMB Zambia
EGY Egypt EGY Egypt ZWE Zimbabwe
AGO Angola ETH Ethiopia NGA Nigeria
ALB Albania FJI Fiji NIC Nicaragua
ARE United Arab Emirates GAB Gabon NPL Nepal
ARG Argentina GHA Ghana OMN Oman
ATG Antigua and Barbuda GMB Gambia PAK Pakistan
BDI Burundi GNB Guinea-Bissau PAN Panama
BEN Benin GRD Grenada PER Peru
BFA Burkina Faso GTM Guatemala PHL Philippines
BGD Bangladesh GUY Guyana PNG Papua New Guinea
BGR Bulgaria HND Honduras PRY Paraguay
BHR Bahrain HTI Haiti QAT Qatar
BHS Bahamas IDN Indonesia RWA Rwanda
BLZ Belize IND India SAU Saudi Arabia
BOL Bolivia ISR Israel SDN Sudan
BRA Brazil JAM Jamaica SEN Senegal
BRB Barbados JOR Jordan SGP Singapore
BRN Brunei KEN Kenya SLB Solomon Islands
BTN Bhutan KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis SLE Sierra Leone
CAF Central African Republic KOR Korea, Republic of SLV El Salvador
CHL Chile KWT Kuwait SUR Suriname
CHN China LAO Laos SYC Seychelles
CIV Cote d’Ivoire LCA Saint Lucia SYR Syria
CMR Cameroon LKA Sri Lanka TCD Chad
COD Congo, Democratic Republic of MAR Morocco TGO Togo
COG Congo, Republic of MDG Madagascar THA Thailand
COL Colombia MDV Maldives TTO Trinidad and Tobago
COM Comoros MEX Mexico TUN Tunisia
CPV Cabo Verde MLI Mali UGA Uganda
CRI Costa Rica MLT Malta URY Uruguay
CUB Cuba MNG Mongolia VCT Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
CYP Cyprus MOZ Mozambique VEN Venezuela
DMA Dominica MRT Mauritania VNM Vietnam
DOM Dominican Republic MUS Mauritius VUT Vanuatu
DZA Algeria MWI Malawi WSM Samoa
ECU Ecuador MYS Malaysia ZMB Zambia
EGY Egypt NER Niger ZWE Zimbabwe
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Table 2.7: Two-step GMMs with doubly corrected standard errors
(1) (2)
GMM-DC SEs GMM-DC SEs
Comp.’s engagement in LABPTAs with the US (log) -0.101*
(0.060)






US LABPTA (Dummy) -0.103
(0.267)
EU LABPTA (Dummy) 0.126
(0.304)
lagged DV (log) 0.266*** 0.296***
(0.051) (0.037)
Export % of GDP 0.044 -0.073
(0.354) (0.244)
FDI stock % GDP -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Polulation (log) 0.247 0.386
(0.913) (1.158)
GDP per capita (log) 0.036 -0.077
(0.206) (0.178)
GDP growth 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
N. of labour INGOs 0.003 -0.010
(0.018) (0.026)





Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes
Instruments 74 74
Hansens Test NA NA
AR2 NA NA
Doubly corrected standard errors in parentheses Hansen2019.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Unit Root Tests
Unit Root Tests: Phillips-Perron Test Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Comp.’s engagement in LABPTAs with the US (log) 0.0000 0.0059
Comp.’s engagement in LABPTAs with the US (Dummy) 0.0000 0.0350
Comp.’s engagement in LABPTAs with the EU (log) 0.0000 0.1879




The Effects of Trade Agreements with
Labour Clauses on Trade Flows
3.1 Introduction
Today, the vast majority of all trade agreements signed include some form of commitment
relating to labour standards.1 While there is great variation concerning the scope, stringency
and bindingness of these provisions, they all create links between trade liberalisation and respect
for core labour standards (Raess and Sari 2018).2 Governments and policy-makers designing
these agreements argue that including labour conditions can promote good working standards,
fostering sustainable development. As President Clinton said in the ratification speech of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): ‘the environmental and labour side agreements
negotiated by our administration will make this agreement a force for social progress as well as
economic growth’ (Clinton 1993).
The academic debate over the consequences of trade agreements with labour clauses (LABP-
TAs) on working standards is far from settled. Scholars argue that these agreements can have an
impact on labour conditions in two ways: by encouraging compliance with their labour clauses and
by promoting international trade. Focusing on compliance, optimists contend that LABPTAs can
1According to some estimates, in 1995, only 34% of all the agreements signed included labour conditions, but in
2014, this share had increased to 84% (Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess 2017).
2Often these agreements refer to the labour rights recognised by the most highly ratified International Labour
Organisation (ILO) Conventions (International Labor Organization and Walk Free Foundation 2017; Brown, Dehejia,
and Robertson 2013).
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trigger social upgrading because they impose rules, often paired with some form of monitoring,
capacity building and (sometimes) enforcement mechanism, which incentivises firms in developing
countries to improve working conditions. Recent empirical studies have found that LABPTAs have
a positive effect on statutory minimum wages, employment protection laws and compliance with
FACB rights in signatory countries (Kamata 2018; Sari and Kucera 2016; Postnikov and Bastiaens
2014; Kim 2012). However, their effectiveness is contested by multiple studies finding that these
clauses are unable to improve labour standards of partner countries (Giumelli and Roozendaal
2017; Spilker, Bernauer, and Umaña 2016; Spilker and Böhmelt 2012). Focusing on the effects of
trade flows on working conditions, scholars argue that LABPTAs can improve labour standards
by increasing trade volumes and facilitating bilateral trade with developed countries. According
to the race to the top literature, trade openness can be an important channel to promote respect
for core labour rights in developing countries (Fors 2012a). Trade liberalisation is associated with
economic growth and development, which can lead to political and social upgrading (Adolph,
Quince, and Prakash 2017; Neumayer and De Soysa 2005; Edmonds 2016; Ab-Rahim and Tariq
2016). Moreover, good working conditions may spread, following a California effect from importers
with better labour standards to suppliers abroad (Vogel 1995). Some cross-national research has
found evidence that suppliers targeting countries with more stringent labour regulations improved
their protection of collective labour rights (Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Lim and Prakash
2017; Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017). There are also more pessimistic views. Some research
finds that trade openness leads to a race to the bottom, rather than social upgrading. In the
highly competitive context of international trade, countries and companies are incentivised to
competitively under-cut process standards at the expense of worker welfare, to reduce production
costs and remain competitive in global exports (Mosley and Uno 2007; Davies and Vadlamannati
2013; Weil 2014; Blanton and Peksen 2017; Olney 2013; Payton and Woo 2014; Wang 2018).
Most of the literature to date has examined whether LABPTAs are effective in improving
working conditions in signatory countries. In contrast, little attention has been given to their effects
on trade flows (Cf. Hafner-Burton 2005; Kim 2012; Pevehouse 2002; Giumelli2017; Postnikov
and Bastiaens 2014; Spilker, Bernauer, and Umaña 2016; Sari, Raess, and Kucera 2016; Kamata
2018). However, the two views (race to the top and race to the bottom) share the assumption that
trade openness and export destinations affect the labour conditions of developing countries, even
if they disagree on the direction of this effect. If this is true, it is not possible to fully compre-
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hend the effects of LABPTAs on working conditions without considering their impact on trade flows.
Focusing on LABPTAs with the EU and the US, this paper aims to contribute to the literature
on how these agreements affect export volumes and destinations of signatory countries and
their competitors. Scholars have hypothesised that linking the benefits of market access to
respect for labour standards can affect trade flows in three ways. The comparative advantage
argument contends that labour conditions are a disguised form of protectionism that harm the
legitimate comparative advantage that developing countries have in cheap labour, leading to a
decline in exports (Bhagwati 2001, 1995; Panagariya 2006; International Labour Organization
2016). Conversely, the productivity argument argument contends that soaring labour standards
may improve workers’ productivity, boosting economic efficiency and leading to increasing trade
volumes (International Labour Organization 2016; Freeman 2010; Maskus 1997). Finally, the
demand-side argument predicts that labour provisions can affect export destination (International
Labour Organization 2016 at p. 85; Brown, Dehejia, and Robertson 2013). Signalling decent
working standards may attract firms and consumers that prefer goods produced under such
conditions, favouring trade with more socially concerned markets. At the same time, if LABPTAs
increase labour costs, they may alienate more price-sensitive markets.
Empirically, only two studies have addressed the issue of the trade effects of LABPTAs
(Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess 2017; International Labour Organization 2016). Their focus is
on understanding whether linking trade liberalisation to labour conditions harms trade volumes
between the signatory countries; they find no evidence to support this claim (International Labour
Organization 2016 at p. 85; Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess 2017). Building on these works, this
paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it explores the effects of LABPTAs on
exports towards all trade partners. It is argued that if LABPTAs have a comparative advantage
or a productivity effect, they will not only impact trade between signatory countries, but will
affect trade towards other countries. Second, it studies the effects of LABPTAs in shaping a
country’s export destinations. In particular, it evaluates whether LABPTAs favour trade with
high-income economies relative to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).3 This analysis may
have important implications for labour conditions. Indeed, while the California-effect literature
3In this paper, I use a wide range of terms interchangeably to indicate high-income countries (e.g., ‘developed
countries’ and ‘high-end markets’) and LMICs (e.g., ‘low-end markets’ and ‘emerging economies’).
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argues that trading more with developed countries can lead to improved working conditions, one
recent paper argues that trading more with countries with low labour standards may trigger a
Shanghai effect, leading to a deterioration of workers’ welfare (Adolph, Quince, and Prakash
2017; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018). Third, this research examines the unintended consequences
LABPTAs, studying whether they have an impact on the export volumes and destinations of
competitors of signatory countries. The idea is that one country’s gains (or losses) in comparative
advantage/productivity are its competitors’ corresponding losses (or gains). From this perspective,
I hypothesise that competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs (CELABPTAs) will have specular effects
to the ones that LABPTAs have on the signatory countries.
To estimate the impact of LABPTAs on international trade flows, I use a panel of 127 developing
countries with international and intra-national trade flows in manufacturing goods, covering over
20 years (1985–2006). The paper employs a state-of-the-art gravity estimation methodology that
allows estimation of the causal impact that (CE)LABPTAs have on international export volumes
and destinations. To produce estimates, I employ a series of econometric strategies, including
exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects, which account for the multilateral resistance terms
implied by theory (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003; Feenstra 2004); dyad fixed effects (to address
the endogeneity of trade policy variables) (Baier and Bergstrand 2007); a pseudo-Poisson maximum
likelihood (PPML) estimator (to address issues related to heteroscedasticity and zero trade flows)
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006, 2011); and multi-way clustering of the standard errors (Egger
and Tarlea 2015; Larch et al. 2019). I build on recent developments in the identification literature
and exploit the presence of intra-national trade flows in the panel to identify the effects of
country-specific variables (such as LABPTA and CELABPTA) in the presence of exporter-year
and importer-year fixed effects (Heid, Larch, and Yotov 2020; Beverelli et al. 2018). I use a
similar but innovative approach to estimate the effects of (CE)LABPTAs on export destinations
in a structural gravity-consistent framework. Finally, I run a battery of robustness checks to
determine the sensitivity of the results. These include: changing the operationalisation of the key
independent and dependent variables of interest; controlling for phase-in effects of the agreements;
reverse causality (Baier and Bergstrand 2007); time-varying heterogeneity (Bergstrand, Larch,
and Yotov 2015; Larch et al. 2019); and the newly developed analytical bias corrections for the
estimates and the standard errors in PPML estimation (Weidner and Zylkin 2020).
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The key findings of this paper are as follows. First, consistent with the comparative advantage
argument, I find that, controlling for the trade-enhancing effects of bilateral liberalisation with
the US, LABPTAs with the US harm international exports relative to domestic trade. Second, on
average, LABPTAs with the US do not generate a demand-side effect and do not promote trade
with high-income economies relative to LMICs. However, there is interesting heterogeneity among
countries with different levels of income. Indeed, I find that low-income economies with LABPTAs
with the US export significantly less to LMICs than to high-income countries. Third, the results
suggest that a country entering into a LABPTA with the US does not affect competitors’ trade
volumes or trade patterns.4 Fourth, LABPTAs with the EU do not appear to affect the trade
volumes or export destinations of signatory countries. Fifth, the models find that competitors’
engagement in LABPTAs with the EU has a positive impact on the international export volumes
of developing countries. This finding suggests that the more a country has competitors engaging
in LABPTAs with the EU, the more it gains a comparative advantage in exporting cheap goods,
increasing its overall level of exports.
In sum, the empirical analysis suggests that LABPTAs can have significant effects on trade
flows. However, these effects appear to be heterogeneous for LABPTAs with the US and those
with the EU. Further research should investigate in more detail what explains this heterogeneity.
The paper is organised as follows. Section (2) reviews the relevant literature and presents the
central hypotheses. Section (3) discusses the empirical methodology, introducing the structural
equation model and explaining the identification strategy. Section (5) presents the data used for
the estimation. Section (6) discusses the results. The final section concludes.
3.2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
Since the 1990s, governments and scholars alike have debated the opportunities for linking
trade liberalisation to good labour standards in light of the effects that this could have on
trade flows.5 During the first WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Singapore in 1996, the
inclusion of a social clause (proposing the incorporation of core labour rights in the context of the
GATT and WTO agreements) was ‘the most controversial issue’ (VanGrasstek 2013 at p. 380;
4The findings in this area appear to be model-dependent.
5Of course, the debate also has normative concerns; however, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on the economic
side of the arguments (Cf. Collier and Bamu 2012).
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Sutherland 1998).6 The Social Clause allowed states to withhold trade privileges in response to
the most extreme forms of labour exploitation (International Labor Organization and Walk Free
Foundation 2017). The proponents were developed countries such as the US, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries and the European Parliament. The opponents were the
group of 77 states led by Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Egypt, India and Pakistan (Sutherland 1998
at p. 100). The debate carried on into subsequent WTO conferences. The issue was so divisive
that, according to the Indian diplomat Amit Dasgupta, the disagreement over the Social Clause
was ‘the proverbial last straw that broke the camel’s back and precipitated the collapse of the
Seattle Ministerial Conference’ (2000 at p. 113). Trade negotiations were able to advance only as
developed countries relinquished the idea of creating this trade–labour linkage, moving forward
a parallel agenda (Dasgupta 2000; Hughes and Haworth 2011).7 Developing countries saw the
attempts by developed countries to ‘impose “standards” for social or environmental protection
as disguised forms of protectionism’ that would lead to increased labour costs, harming exports
and foreign direct investment (Cheow tong 1994 at p. 4; Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess 2017).8
Conversely, developed countries argued that a trading partner not complying with fundamental
labour rights had an unfair advantage over countries that respected good working conditions. The
inclusion of labour standards in the context of the WTO was a way to prevent unfair competition,
social dumping and ultimately a race to the bottom (Collier and Bamu 2012).
Scholars examining the issue have put forward three separate claims that I call the comparative
advantage, the productivity and the demand-side arguments; these are summarised in Table
3.1. Neoclassical economists, focusing on the issue of increasing labour costs, argue that linking
trade liberalisation to labour clauses prevents developing countries from legitimate competition
in an area in which they have the greatest comparative advantage (i.e. cheap labour), distorting
markets and leading to reductions in trade, employment and overall welfare (Bhagwati 2001, 1995;
Panagariya 2006; Van Daele 2004).9 Conversely, other scholars argue that improved working
6Core labour standards are identified by the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
as: freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all
forms of forced or compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimination in
respect of employment and occupation (Giumelli and Roozendaal 2017).
7Indeed, even after the Doha Development Round, the discussion about the Social Clause remained marginalised
(Hughes and Haworth 2011 at p. 66).
8Firms that need to comply with labour clauses may face additional costs and, as a result of the higher prices for
goods produced domestically, exports may decline (International Labour Organization 2016, at p.85).
9Focusing on Indonesian suppliers, Bartley and Egels-Zandén (2016) present numerous examples of factories that
(thanks to engagement in private regulations) were permitted the establishment of trade unions but later had to close
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standards are likely to increase workers’ welfare and productivity, boosting economic efficiency
and output, leading to more trade, not less (International Labour Organization 2016; Maskus
1997; Brown 2000; Palley 2004). Along these lines, Brown et al. (2015) found that firms in the
Vietnamese apparel industry were more profitable when managers adopted more humane practices
and avoided exploitative behaviours. Labour provisions can also affect demand. If consumers in
high-income economies prefer goods produced with good labour standards, signing a LABPTA
can have reputational effects that facilitate the participation of a country in global value chains.
LABPTAs signal a commitment to adequate labour conditions, potentially attracting the demand
of socially concerned consumers and firms, thus promoting international exports (International
Labour Organization 2016 at p. 85; Brown, Dehejia, and Robertson 2013). Indeed, evidence
from experimental data shows that, in the developed world, some consumers are willing to pay
a price premium for products made under fair conditions (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2015).10 It
is important to note that the simple commitment to improving labour standards can trigger
a demand effect, even while working conditions on the ground remain unchanged. Importing
firms interested in ‘fairwashing’ – i.e., aiming to display a socially responsible image to the
public, rather than seeking fundamental improvements of labour standards – may base their
purchasing choices on their suppliers’ credible commitment to good labour standards more than
on their de facto progress (Bartley et al. 2015). On the other hand, if LABPTAs improve
labour conditions, increasing labour costs, the demand effect can become a double-edged sword.
Firms facing mounting costs may struggle to target markets that are overwhelmingly motivated
by price rather than process standards in their purchasing choices. Rather than attracting
the demand of high-income countries, LABPTAs could end up reducing purchases from more
price-sensitive economies, negatively affecting export volumes. In sum, there are good theo-
retical reasons to expect that a country signing a LABPTA will trade significantly more with
socially concerned markets than with more price-sensitive ones; either because LABPTAs at-
tract the demand of socially concerned firms, or because LABPTAs alienate price-sensitive markets.
Despite this heated debate on the consequences of linking trade liberalisation to labour
clauses, to my knowledge, only two papers have examined the effects of LABPTAs on trade flows
down because they were unable to retain access to foreign markets.
10Of course, there is also considerable variation at the sub-national level. For example, Tully and Winer (2014)
finds that around 40%of consumers are unwilling to pay more for socially responsible goods, even in countries where
consumers are expected to be more socially conscious.
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Table 3.1: The hypothesised effects of LABPTAs on trade flows
Signatory Country Competitors
Comparative advantage ⇓ Trade ⇑ Trade
Productivity ⇑ Trade ⇓ Trade
Demand-side ⇑ Trade with HI countries ⇓ Trade with HI countries
The Table summarizes the hypothesis investigated in this paper. ⇑ indicates an increase, while ⇓ indicates a decline.
"HI" indicates high-income countries.
(Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess 2017; International Labour Organization 2016).11 Both of these
aim to evaluate whether labour clauses suppress the trade-enhancing effect of trade liberalisation
provisions. They find no evidence that the inclusion of labour clauses reduces bilateral trade.
However, Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess (2017) find interesting heterogeneity. Consistent with the
demand-side hypothesis, they find that when a LABPTA is between an LMIC and a high-income
country, labour conditions have a positive effect on trade.
Although these studies make meaningful contributions, this paper aims to advance the existing
research in multiple ways. First, existing research has examined whether labour clauses have
reduced or increased trade between the signatory countries, whereas this paper examines how
LABPTAs affect exports towards all destinations. Arguably, if LABPTAs affect the comparative
advantage or the productivity of a developing country, not only they will impact exports towards the
LABPTA partner(s), they will also promote/harm bilateral trade towards all other destinations.
The next section will illustrate how it is possible to identify the effect of a country-level variable
such as having a LABPTA in the context of a structural gravity equation with exporter-year fixed
effects, drawing from recent advancements in gravity identification strategies (Heid, Larch, and
Yotov 2020; Beverelli et al. 2018).
Second, previous studies only examine the effects of LABPTAs on trade volumes, paying no
attention to the effects on export destinations (Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess 2017; International
Labour Organization 2016).12 Conversely, this paper researches how LABPTAs affect export
patterns. Arguably, the demand-side argument suggests LABPTAs shape a country’s export
profile by facilitating trade with specific destinations. Signatory countries can attract the demand
11See also Siroën (2017) and Hasnat (2002), which examine the impact of core labour standards (not LABPTAs) on
export.
12To be sure, Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess (2017) research whether LABPTAs between countries with different




of more socially concerned importers, while potentially losing competitiveness (if labour costs
increase) in more price-sensitive markets. In this regard, it must be noted that scholars have
recognised that there is variability in consumer preferences when it comes to labour conditions
in other countries. Scholars argue that demand from LMICs – where the income per capita is
lower – is characterised by an overwhelming consideration of price over quality and variety, while
the demand of high-income economies expects higher levels of quality and process standards
(Kaplinsky and Farooki 2011 at p. 14; Fold and Larsen 2011; Ponte et al. 2019; Gereffi 2014;
Horner 2016; Gamso 2017). For these reasons, this paper will empirically investigate whether
LABPTAs have a differential impact on exports towards high-income countries relative to exports
towards LMICs. I expect that a country with a LABPTA will trade significantly less with LMICs
than with high-income markets.
Third, the paper examines whether LABPTAs affect international trade flows and export
destinations of countries competing with the signatories of LABPTAs. Economists agree that
trade agreements have an impact on trade flows that goes beyond the effects on the parties
involved (Krugman 1995; Yotov et al. 2016). The idea is formalised by the structural gravity
equation of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), which illustrates how bilateral exports (also)
depend on multilateral resistance terms – which are the average trade barrier that every country
faces. Trade agreements reduce bilateral trade barriers among signatory countries, affecting the
multilateral resistance terms of excluded ones.13 It is, therefore, essential to evaluate the effects of
LABPTAs on competitors to have a comprehensive understanding of their trade effects.14 Table
3.1 summarises the three hypothesised effects that LABPTAs can have on competitor states.
If LABPTAs generate a productivity effect or a demand effect that increases the exports of the
signatory countries, competitors’ exports may decline. Indeed, a productivity gain for a LABPTA
country is a loss in comparative advantage for its competitors, which may erode their ability to
export, especially to high-income countries. On the other hand, competitor export volumes may
soar if LABPTAs lead to growing labour costs and a loss in comparative advantage for a signatory
country. Competing firms able to take advantage of their (relatively) lower labour costs could
increase trade, in particular with price-sensitive markets. In other words, even if the signatory
country gains privileged market access to the US or the EU, soaring labour costs will increase
13See Yotov et al. (2016) for an in-depth explanation.
14And ultimately on their effects on labour standards.
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the comparative advantage of its competitors to export cheap goods, creating the opportunity to
profit from new market niches. Finally, having competitors engaging in LABPTAs may favour
exports towards price-sensitive economies relative to exports towards high-income economies. As
previously discussed, LABPTAs signal good labour conditions and potentially increase labour
costs. If a LABPTA increases labour costs, countries outside the LABPTA will experience a rise
in exports towards price-sensitive markets. On the other hand, if high-income importers prefer
goods produced with (signalled) high labour standards, they will shift their demand from excluded
countries to LABPTA members. In both cases, this leads to an increase in exports towards emerg-
ing markets relative to high-income economies for non-signatory countries. All in all, there are
good theoretical reasons to believe that LABPTAs affect the export volumes and export patterns
of states competing with signatory countries; this paper attempts to examine these systemic effects.
This research is also noticeably different from previous work in its focus. In assessing the
effects of LABPTAs, existing studies look at all the trade agreements that have labour clauses,
whereas this research analyses exclusively the effects of LABPTAs with the EU and the US
(Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess 2017; International Labour Organization 2016). Moreover, this
paper analyses the effects of the LABPTA as a single policy instrument, not separating the impact
of labour clauses from the liberalisation effects of the agreement. The estimated coefficients will
capture both the effects of labour clauses and the impact of having bilateral liberalisation with
the EU/US, which (according to the logic of the California effect) could trigger improvements
in working conditions even of suppliers without labour clauses (Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash
2009).15 The reason for this approach is simple: since the 1990s, all trade agreements signed by
the US have labour clauses, and the same holds for the vast majority of trade agreements signed
by the EU. Hence, there is no real ‘control’ for the effects of a trade agreement of the US or the EU
without labour conditions.16 To identify the effects of labour conditions separately from those of
liberalisation, existing research pools data on trade agreements and LABPTAs across all countries.
It is argued, however, that this approach is likely to suffer from the ‘lack of common support’
problem. Causal inference scholars have noted that it is only possible to recover the average
treatment effect if there is a substantial overlap between the covariates of treatment and the control
15The latter element would occur even without the inclusion of labour provisions. As discussed, the estimates in the
model examine how LABPTAs affect exports towards all possible destinations. The next section will show how this
research controls for the bilateral trade-enhancing effect of these agreements.
16As noted, increasing demand from the EU and the US is characterised by higher levels of social concern than
from most countries around the world, triggering improvements in labour standards.
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group (‘common support’) (Hill and Su 2013; Lechner and Strittmatter 2017; Grady 2020). If this
is not the case, estimates depend on extrapolation and modelling assumptions about the structure
of the data, potentially leading to biased results. For LABPTAs, lack of common support appears
to be a severe problem as countries that sign trade agreements without labour clauses (control)
are very different from states that sign LABPTAs (treatment). According to Raess and Sari
(2018), over 75% of trade agreements between high-income economies have labour clauses, while
this percentage shrinks to 15% for trade agreements between developing countries.17 Moreover,
comparing trade agreements between developed and developing countries to those ratified by
the EU and the US does not appear to be the most conservative choice in terms of inference.
Even if trade agreements with the EU and the US were without labour conditions, they would
likely have a different impact than the trade agreements of other developed countries. Smaller
high-income markets may have limited assimilation capacity, providing insufficient incentives for
(a significant amount of) foreign suppliers to give up the production of goods with exploitative
working conditions (following the California effect logic). At the same time, the EU and the US are
the two largest markets in the world, and are therefore more likely to provide sufficient economic
incentives to upgrade labour standards.
In sum, it is argued that separating the impact of labour clauses from the liberalisation effects
of these agreements risks the lack of common support problem, potentially leading to false infer-
ences. Nevertheless, examining the effects of the LABPTA as a single policy instrument is still
claimed to be extremely relevant for scholars and policy-makers alike. To the extent that trade vol-
umes and export patters have consequences in terms of working conditions, economic development,
democratisation and geopolitical influence, it will be essential to assess the impact of LABPTAs
on international exports towards third countries, even if it is not possible to distinguish the effect
of a trade agreement itself from the effects of its labour clauses.
3.3 Empirical Approach
Over the past 50 years, gravity models have become the workhorse for cross-country empirical
analyses of international trade flows (Cf. Kepaptsoglou, Karlaftis, and Tsamboulas 2010). The
gravity model of trade implies that, just as two particles are attracted to one another with a
17Note that countries that sign one LABPTA are more likely to sign others. Hence, there is also the risk of
self-selection bias.
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force that is proportional to their masses and inversely proportional to their proximity, the flow of
commodities between two economies is proportional to the size of those economies and inversely
proportional to their distance from each other (Cf. Yotov et al. 2016; Ghosh and Yamarik 2004;
Deme and Ndrianasy 2017). Empirically, they gravity models have been so successful that scholars
argue that gravity in international trade is akin to the laws in natural sciences.18 Today, gravity-
like equations have strong theoretical foundations, and economists have shown that these models
are consistent with alternative microeconomic assumptions (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003;
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare 2012; Bergstrand 1985; Eaton and Kortum 2002; Chaney
2008; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein 2008; Anderson and Yotov
2016).19
3.3.1 Gravity model estimation
There are numerous modelling and econometric challenges to overcome in order to estimate the
effects of LABPTAs on export volumes and destinations. I start by discussing a rigorous approach
to estimating a standard gravity model, to later illustrate the identification strategy for LABPTAs’
effects.
To gauge the impact of trade agreements on bilateral trade flows, scholars routinely rely on the
PPML estimator with three-way fixed effects (e.g. Correia, Guimarães, and Zylkin 2020; Egger and
Staub 2016; Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov 2015; Anderson 2011; Olivero and Yotov 2012). The
PPML equation has the following form:
Tij,t = exp[αi,t + αj,t + αij + β1PTAij,t] + εij,t (3.1)
where Tij,t are bilateral export flows in nominal terms and αi,t and αj,t are exporter-year and
importer-year fixed effects that account for all the time-varying country-level characteristics that
affect trade flows. These include, for example, GDP, non-discriminatory trade policies, exchange
rates and institutional quality. Moreover, it is demonstrated that in panel settings, time-varying
importer and exporter fixed effects consistently account for the multilateral resistance terms
18Carrère et al. claim that gravity in is both a theory and a factsimilar to the theory of evolution for biology.
Krugman has gone even further, claiming that it is an instance of ‘social physics’ for its law-like predictive power
(1997; Head and Mayer 2014).
19The basic gravity formulation is Tij = λ yiyjDij , where Tij are bilateral trade flows, yi and yj represent the size




implied by theory (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003; Feenstra 2004; Olivero and Yotov 2012).20
αji are the dyadic fixed effects that address concerns about the endogeneity of policy variables.
As Baier and Bergstrand (2007) note, trade agreements are not an exogenous random variable.
Indeed, ‘countries are likely select endogenously into [free trade agreements], perhaps for reasons
unobservable to the econometrician and possibly correlated with the level of trade’ (Baier and
Bergstrand 2007 at p. 73). To address this bias, they argue that trade scholars can exploit
the panel structure of the data and include bilateral-pair (ij) fixed effects in the model. These
account for all the observed and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity that simultaneously
affects selection into a preferential trade agreement (PTA) and trade volumes hence controlling
for the potential endogeneity of PTAs (Baier and Bergstrand 2007, at p.89). Note that, PTAij,t
is a dummy, taking the value of one if the two countries i and j have a trade agreement, and zero
otherwise.
I follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) and use the
PPML estimator because it provides unbiased estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity and
(numerous) zeros in the data. Both of these issues are of well-known concern in trade data.21
Scholars have shown that alternative estimators such as linear-in-logs ordinary least squares, the
log of one plus exports and the Tobit model can be severely biased and inconsistent in such cases
(Head and Mayer 2014). The PPML estimator outperforms alternatives and, for this reason, is the
most common approach in the recent literature (e.g. Correia, Guimarães, and Zylkin 2020; Egger
and Staub 2016; Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov 2015; Anderson 2011; Olivero and Yotov 2012;
Baier, Bergstrand, and Clance 2018; Mattoo, Mulabdic, and Ruta 2019; Agnosteva, Anderson,
and Yotov 2019; De Soyres, Maire, and Sublet 2020).
Recent innovations in the discipline suggest using multi-way clustering of the standard
errors for robust inference. Egger and Tarlea (2015) and Larch et al. (2019) have criticised
the standard approach in gravity estimation, i.e. to cluster errors at the country-pair level.
They note that, in panel settings, errors are likely to be auto-correlated across time within
countries. Bilateral trade is likely to respond with inertia to short-run-to-long-run changes in
20The structural gravity equation formalises the idea that bilateral trade flows depend on the bilateral trade barriers
between two economies relative to the barriers they face with the rest of the world. The literature shows that
although these factors remain unobserved, it is possible to consistently account for them by including exporter-year
and importer-year fixed effects.
21According to Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess (2017), there is an average of 43% of zero trade flows in trade samples.
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local price. The above researchers show that not accounting for this form of autocorrelation in
the errors can lead to a false inference. Building on Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), Larch
et al. (2019) have developed an algorithm that allows clustering simultaneously across all the
dimensions of the panel (exporter, importer and time); I will employ this algorithm for inferences.22
Finally, this paper also uses data over non-consecutive years to help mitigate concerns about
the autocorrelation of the error term across time. Arguably, estimation pooled over consecutive
years is likely to show more autocorrelation than estimation over non-consecutive years (Yotov et
al. 2016). Additionally, intervals in the data allow better estimation of the effects of trade policies
(Yotov et al. 2016). As Cheng and Wall have argued, using the fixed effect over consecutive
years is problematic because the dependent variable cannot fully adjust in a single year (2005 at
p. 8). Today, it is common to estimate gravity equations over non-consecutive years, and Olivero
and Yotov (2012) have shown that estimation results are not sensitive to the use of different time
intervals (Cf. Trefler 2004; Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Baier2015; Yotov et al. 2016; Baier, Yotov,
and Zylkin 2019). In sum, estimating the PPML model in Equation (3.1), over non-consecutive
years, using three-way fixed and multi-way clustering for robust inference, allows the estimation
of the average treatment effect of trade agreements (PTAij,t) on bilateral trade. The next section
builds on this model to identify the effects of (CE)LABPTAs.
3.3.2 Identification strategy
The advantage of including three-way fixed effects is that it allows the estimation of a theo-
retically consistent structural gravity model that controls for any observable and unobservable
heterogeneity across countries. For instance, differences in institutions and in political systems
that could affect trade flows are captured and are not subject to data availability (Bigler and
Raess 2019). The drawback is clear, exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects absorb all
the coefficients of observable country-specific characteristics such as GDP, national policies and
exchange rates, which cannot be estimated. For our purposes, this means that is not possible to
include a simple dummy indicating whether the country has a LABPTA with the US or the EU
(LABPTAUS,i,t or LABPTAEU,i,t) and examine the coefficient to evaluate its effects on trade
22They develop the ppml_panel_sg Stata® command that implements multi-way clustering, although the estimates
reported in this study are calculated using the ppmlhdfe command of Correia, Guimarães, and Zylkin (2020) which
allows the same type of clustering.
72
CHAPTER 3 73
flows.23 LABPTAi,t would be perfectly collinear with the exporter-time fixed effects αi,t; hence
it would be unidentified in the context of this structural gravity framework. However, Heid,
Larch, and Yotov (2020) recently demonstrated that scholars can exploit the presence of data
on intra-national trade flows in gravity equations to ‘identify the country-specific variables even
in the presence of exporter and importer fixed effects’ (at p. 3). Provided that Tij also include
intra-national trade flows, it is possible to interact LABPTAi,t with an indicator variable INTLij
that is equal to one for international trade and set to zero for intra-national trade.24 Including this
interaction LABPTA_INTLij,t allows us to identify the impact of LABPTAs on international
exports relative to domestic trade. A positive coefficient on this variable would support the pro-
ductivity argument, indicating that, on average, countries with LABPTAs have more international
exports than domestic trade. In contrast, a negative coefficient would support the comparative
advantage argument, indicating that countries with LABPTAs become increasingly unable to
target foreign markets and have to rely on domestic commerce.25
A similar strategy allows estimation of the effects of LABPTAs on exports towards high-
income economies relative to other (emerging) economies. I interact LABPTAi,t with a
dummy variable LMICj identifying whether the importer is a lower- or a medium-income
country, defined according to the World Bank classification.26 The expectation is that
LABPTA_LMICij,t = LABPTAi,t × LMICj will be negative, indicating that, on average,
countries that have a LABPTA trade less with LMICs than with high-income countries. Note that
this identification strategy is only able to examine whether LABPTAs have a differential impact
on exports towards high-income countries relative to LMICs; it is not able to reveal whether this
differential impact is caused by an increase in exports towards higher-income economies or by a
decline in exports towards LMICs. Either of these causal mechanisms could explain a negative
coefficient of LABPTA_LMICij,t. To adjudicate between these arguments, one can interpret this
23Indeed, if LABPTAs have the cost, productivity or demand effect implied by the theory, the LABPTA can be
considered as a country-level variable affecting exports towards all destinations.
24Note that the trade literature is becoming increasingly aware of the importance of including intra-national trade
in structural gravity estimation (Yotov et al. 2016; Heid, Larch, and Yotov 2020; Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin 2019;
Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov 2015; Dai, Yotov, and Zylkin 2014). Scholars argue that examining only international
trade flows may bias PTA estimates downwards (Yotov et al. 2016).
25Cf. Heid, Larch, and Yotov (2020) and Beverelli et al. (2018) for proof of the fact that this variable is identified.
Note that this coefficient refers to the effect of LABPTAs on international trade relative to domestic trade as shown
by Beverelli et al. (2018).
26In the baseline model, I use the World Bank classification of 1995, which is the median year of the sample. I would
like to thank Prof. Marcelo Olarreaga for suggesting this identification strategy in one of the numerous conversations
we had.
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coefficient simultaneously with LABPTA_INTLij,t. Indeed, if a LABPTA has a positive effect
on international exports, it is likely that it is attracting demand from high-income economies. In
contrast, if a LABPTA harms international exports, it is likely that it is hurting exports to LMICs.27
The paper also aims to examine whether LABPTAs promote international trade and affect
export destinations of countries competing with signatory countries. With this aim, I create a new




Wiz,t × LABPTAz,t (3.2)
CELABPTAi,t is the sum of all LABPTAs signed by the competitors z of the country i,
weighted by the level of competition Wiz,t between the two countries at time t.28 The basic idea is
that the more two countries are close competitors, the more they will affect each other’s exports. If
two countries have very similar export profiles, changing the productivity/comparative advantage
of one of them will probably affect the exports of the other. At the same time, if they trade
completely different goods, this effect will be smaller or non-existent. To build the competition
weight, I follow Guler et al. (2002) and much of the subsequent literature and measure competition
by looking at countries’ sectoral-level export profiles (i.e. by looking at product similarities in their
export portfolios), with no discrimination on export destination (Chatagnier and Kavaklı 2017;
Wang 2017; Baccini and Koenig-Archibugi 2014; Cao 2010; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Elkins,
Guzman, and Simmons 2006; Polillo and Guillén 2005; Guler et al. 2002).29 The weighted sum
of competitors’ engagement varies at the country-year level i, t and, hence, like LABPTAsi,t, its
effects on export volumes and destinations can be identified interacting with an indicator variable
individuating international trade (INTLj) and with an indicator variable individuating LMICs
(LMICj). Note that the inclusion of the variable CELABPTA allows estimation of the general
27Note that this identification approach is, to my knowledge, the only one that can be estimated in a structural
gravity-consistent framework. To evaluate the effects of policy variables on export destination, scholars often simply
split the sample and look at the effects of LABPTAs on exports towards high-income countries and low-income
countries separately (Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess 2017). However, this approach does not overcome the issue that
LABPTAi,t is a country-level variable and hence not identified in the presence of exporter-year fixed effects.
28Note that in creating this weighted sum, I exclude all the US and all the EU countries from the sample of
competitors. In other words, when the competitor z is the EU or the US, Wiz,t is equal to zero.
29Product-level data is drawn from the United Nations (UN) Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).
The similarity in export profiles is measured at the three-digit level because most granular data for exported products
suffer from severe problems of missing observations for developing countries. I use different specifications of competition
as robustness checks. Note that, for endogeneity reasons, it is not possible to measure competition by looking at the
similarities in export destinations.
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equilibrium effects of LABPTAs in the context of a partial equilibrium model.
The baseline econometric specification we use to test the hypothesis of this paper is:
Tij,t =exp
[






where Tij,t are nominal trade flows, which include international and intra-national trade at non-
consecutive year t (Yotov et al. 2016); αi,t, αj,t and αij are the three-way fixed effects discussed
above; and PTAij,t is a dummy variable that controls for the existence of a trade agreement. It
is important to note that this measure includes all bilateral trade agreements, taking the value
of one for LABPTAs with the EU and the US. Hence, PTAij,t controls for the increase in bilat-
eral exports with the US and the EU that these agreements generate.30 LABPTA_INTLij,t and
LABPTA_LMICij,t capture the effects of LABPTAs on the international exports and destina-
tions of the signatory countries. CELABPTA_INTLij,t and CELABPTA_LMICij,t capture
the effects of competitors’ engagement with LABPTAs. The comparative advantage argument pre-
dicts that β1 will be negative because LABPTAs lead to increased labour costs, whereas β3 will
be positive because these rising costs promote competitors’ exports. Conversely, the productivity
argument predicts that β1 will be positive because LABPTAs will lead to increased productivity,
while β3 will be negative because competitors will suffer from a loss in their comparative advantage.
Finally, the demand-side argument predicts that β2 will be negative because LABPTAs attract the
demand from high-income economies while reducing demand from lower-income ones, whereas, for
specular reasons, β4 should be positive. Competitors with lower labour costs, unable to meet the
social standards required by the demand of high-income economies, will export more to emerging
markets. In sum, using an innovative identification strategy, Equation (4.5) allows the unbiased
estimation of the effects of LABPTAs and CELABPTAs on export flows and destinations in the
context of a structural gravity framework.31
30Hence, the coefficients on LABPTA variables will not be inflated by the bilateral trade-enhancing effects of these
agreements between signatory countries.
31The Annex discusses the issue of endogeneity in further detail.
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3.4 Data and Sources
I use the CEPII Trade, Production and Bilateral Protection Database (TradeProd) as the
principal trade data source (Sousa, Mayer, and Zignago 2012). }). It covers trade in manufac-
turing goods across 26 industrial sectors (which I aggregate at the country-year level) during the
period 1980–2006. Table 4.17 in the Annex lists and describes each sector. The data focus on
manufacturing because this is the only sector for which it is possible to measure intra-national
trade flows consistently. These are theoretically defined as apparent consumption: the difference
between the total gross production and total exports (Yotov et al. 2016). Although including trade
flows in non-manufacturing goods would be desirable, comparable domestic sales and expenditure
data is available only for manufacturing, and TradeProd is the most comprehensive and precise
database accounting for intra-national trade. Indeed, despite the limited time coverage, it is
routinely used in the gravity literature (Cf. Dai, Yotov, and Zylkin 2014; Bergstrand, Larch,
and Yotov 2015; Anderson and Yotov 2016; Beverelli et al. 2018; Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin
2019).32 Moreover, a focus on the manufacturing sector is appropriate to address the questions
regarding LABPTAs. Arguably, low-paid jobs and labour abuses often occur in manufacturing
(e.g. Anner 2019, 2020). In TradeProd, information on gross domestic production is drawn from
the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) data, and missing values are integrated
with the OECD STAN Industry Database.33 Raw data on international trade is drawn from the
UN’s COMTRADE, which is improved by applying the BACII methodology to deal with the
well-known inconsistencies of trade (Gaulier and Zignago 2010; Sousa, Mayer, and Zignago 2012).
In particular, TradeProd reconciles the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) values reported by the
importing countries with the free on board (FOB) values reported by the exporters (Anderson and
Yotov 2016).
For data on trade agreements I rely on the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database,
which is the most systematic comprehensive source of information on trade agreements, covering
over 1,179 PTAs signed between 1948 and 2018 (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014).34 Following much
32An alternative approach would be to use GDP data to measure total production (Mattoo, Mulabdic, and Ruta
2019). However, this approach is problematic since trade flows are a gross value, whereas GDP is calculated by looking
at the value added (Beverelli et al. 2018).
33Cf. Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) and especially Mayer, Paillacar, and Zignago (2010) for an accurate description
of the data.




of literature, I exclude from the sample partial scope, framework and services agreements, as they
could cause an attenuation bias on the PTA coefficients, given that these treaties have limited
scope or do not involve trade in manufacturing goods.35 Table 3.7 in the Annex provides the
complete list of the 201 agreements included in the sample. They are the PTAs signed by the 127
exporters in the model between 1985 and 2006.
I rely on the work of Lechner (2016) for information about labour provisions in trade agreements.
She has built a comprehensive dataset that covers over 663 trade agreements signed from 1948 to
2016, providing a precise measure of the level of ‘legalisation’ of non-trade issues (Cf. With W.
Abbott and Snidal 2000). This indexes are built weighting every non-trade issue provision by the
level of precision, obligation, and delegation in order to give more importance to more stringent
clauses. One of these measures, which focuses specifically on economic and social rights clauses in
trade agreements, directly measures labour rights clauses.36 Focusing on trade agreements with
the EU and the US, I create a dummy LABPTA, taking the value of one if the trade agreement
includes some form of labour provision, and zero otherwise. The final sample includes a total of
25 LABPTAs, 14 with the EU and 11 with the US. It is important to note that while the US
has signed LABPTAs with countries with all levels of income, the EU has only signed LABPTAs
with medium- and high-income countries. The Lome and Cotonou agreements are partial scope
agreements, where tariff reduction covers only certain products; these agreements are therefore
excluded from the sample (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014).37 The list of LABPTAs is included in
Table 3.7 in the Annex. CELABPTA is built as described in the previous section starting from
the LABPTA variable.
The final data consists of an unbalanced panel of around 100,000 observations. The sample covers
35The DESTA market access database provides classification. Accession agreements have been recorded to reflect
the depth of the base treaty (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014).
36Specifically, ‘economic and social rights cover the right to work, rights at work, the right to education, the right to
development, and the right to health’ (Lechner 2016, at p.866). The stringency of labour clauses in LABPTAs varies
varies from 0, when the non-trade issue is not legalized, to 18 (the Bahrain-US Agreement) when it is very stringent.
Note that I use the economic and social rights variable (esr_all_sum) as the indicator.
37In the full sample there are four low-income countries (Viet Nam, Lao, Honduras and Nicaragua), six lower-
middle-income countries (Jordan, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Morocco, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic), three
upper-middle-income countries (Mexico, Chile and Bahrain) and two high-income countries (Israel and Singapore) that
have signed trade agreements with the US. There are also twelve lower-middle-income countries (Romania, Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Poland, Tunisia, Bulgaria, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Morocco), five upper-middle-income
countries (Hungary, Malta, Chile, Mexico and Chile) and two high-income countries (Israel and Cyprus) that have
signed trade agreements with the EU.
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the period 1985–2006 and uses four-year intervals (1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006) to allow
for the phasing-in effects of trade policies (Trefler 2004; Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Baier2015;
Yotov et al. 2016; Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin 2019). The data includes manufacturing exports from
127 different exporters (the vast majority of which are developing countries) towards 227 importers,
for a total of 27,990 unidirectional dyads.38 Tables 3.4 and 3.5 in the Annex provide the full list of
the countries considered.39
3.5 Results and Discussion
All of the estimates in Table 3.2 were obtained using a three-way fixed effects PPML estimator.
Column (1) is the standard structural gravity presented in Equation (3.1). It estimates the effect
of PTAs on trade flows of manufactured commodities. The model shows a very good fit with the
data with a pseudo R2 of 0.996, in line with the typical results of three-way fixed-effects gravity
models. All else being equal, trade agreements increase exports between signatory countries
by about [exp(0.347) − 1] × 100 = 41.5%. The size of this effect is close to other estimates
in the trade literature (Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Dai, Yotov, and Zylkin 2014).40 However,
allowing for multi-way clustering of the errors, the effect is only significant at the 10% level
(p − value = 0.072).41 In line with Larch et al. (2019), this confirms that using multi-way
clustering of the errors leads to more conservative and robust inferences (Egger and Tarlea 2015).
Column (2) estimates Equation (4.5) on LABPTAs with the US. The first finding that stands
out is that, controlling for LABPTA and CELABPTA, the magnitude of the PTA effect shrinks
and is no longer significant. Perhaps this can be explained by the sample of developing countries
under consideration. Scholars have long argued that a lack of infrastructure, weak institutions
and an inefficient financial sector can harm the effectiveness of PTAs in lower-income economies,
38Note that 22 exporter countries in the analysis have no internal trade data due to a lack of information about
domestic production. These are included in the analysis because they allow the identification of the effects towards
northern countries. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with their exclusion from the sample. The ISO codes of
these countries are AGO, ATG, BRN, COD, COM, DJI, DMA, GIN, GNB, GRD, GUY, KNA, MDV, MLI, MRT,
PRK, SLB, STP, TCD, VCT, VUT and WSM.
39Some adjustments were made to the TradeProd data to make it compatible with other sources. BLX is recoded
as BEL and ET1 is recoded as ETH. To avoid duplicated entries, observations involving SRB and MNE before 2005
have been dropped as they were all zeros, while positive trade flows with SCG were reported. Data is hence consistent
with YUG (1985–1992), followed by SCG (1992–2004) and SRB and MNE (2005–2006). Also, observations with CSH
and BA1 as importers have been dropped.
40Studies that include intra-national trade tend to find higher effects of trade agreements.




in particular when agreements are between less developed countries (Venables 2003; Deme and
Ndrianasy 2017). In other words, controlling for LABPTAs with the US, the average effect of
trade agreements between developing countries is limited (Larch et al. 2019; Beverelli et al.
2018). With regard to the main variables of interests, three findings from Column (2) stand
out. First, I find no evidence that LABPTAs with the US generate a comparative advantage or
a productivity effect on signatory countries. Indeed, while LABPTAUS_INTLij,t is negative it
is not significant. Second, consistent with the demand-side hypothesis, the model suggests that
countries with LABPTAs with the US will trade significantly more with high-income economies
than with LMICs. LABPTAUS_LMICij,t suggests that a country with a LABPTA with the US
will, on average, trade 36.1% less with LMICs than with high-income countries.42 In line with the
theoretical expectations, this finding suggests that having a LABPTA with the US discourages
buyers from lower-income countries or attracts global buyers from high-income countries.43 Hence,
while LABTAs with the US do not appear to affect international exports in general, Column
(2) suggests that they have an impact on the export partners of developing countries. Third, the
model also finds that competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs (CELABPTAUS_INTLij,t) has a
strong and positive effect on international exports. This effect is large and statistically significant.
It predicts that a 1% increase in CELABPTA is associated with a 0.9% rise in international
exports relative to intra-national trade.44 An intuitive explanation is that CELABPTA can
increase the comparative advantage in excluded countries to export towards lower-end markets.
This idea, however, is only partially confirmed by CELABPTAUS_LMICij,t. The coefficient is
positive, suggesting that a surge in competitors’ engagement with LABPTAs is associated with
increasing trade towards LMICs compared to high-income economies.45 However, this coefficient
is not significant, suggesting that competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs is associated with rising
exports towards both higher- and lower-income economies. A possible explanation is that even
in higher-income economies there are lower-end markets that are overwhelmingly concerned by
price, and as LABPTAs (are expected to) increase labour costs, competitors can gain comparative
advantages in accessing these markets (Tully and Winer 2014).
42To calculate the average treatment effect of LAPBTAs: [exp(0.308) − 1] × 100 = 36.1%. By definition, the
coefficient on high-income countries is the opposite of the coefficient on LABPTAUS_LMICij,t given that the dummy
LMIC is LMIC = 1− high income.
43It is possible that we do not find a significant effect on LABPTAUS_INTLij,t because a decline in exports
towards LMICs balances the increase in exports towards high-income countries.
44To estimate the model I use the log of one plus CELABPTA =
∑
z 6=i WLABPTAi,t to allow interpretation of
the coefficient as trade elasticities.
45In particular a 1% growth in competitors’ engagement with LABPTAs leads to a 0.25% increase in exports towards
LMICs relative to exports towards high-income economies.
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Column (3) estimates Equation (4.5) on LABPTAs with the EU and shows results broadly in
line with those of Column (2). In particular, the model does not find that LABPTAs with the
EU create a comparative advantage or a productivity effect on exports of the signatory countries.
However, in line with the demand-side argument, it finds that having a LABPTA with the EU leads
to an increase in trade with rich countries relative to LMICs, of [exp(0.408) − 1] × 100 = 50.4%.
The model also confirms that competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs with the EU leads to a
substantial increase in international trade flows. This finding is in line with the idea that firms in
competing states will be able to exploit the increment in their comparative advantage from the
(expected) improvements in labour conditions of their competitors.
Column (4) estimates the effects of (CE)LABPTAs with both the EU and the US. Arguably, this
is the more robust and comprehensive specification that accounts for the possibility of an omitted
variable bias from not including both LABPTAs in the model; it is therefore used for further
comparisons. The results here are mostly consistent with those in columns (2) and (3). First,
confirming the demand-side argument, the models suggest that LABPTAs, regardless of whether
they are with the EU or the US, are associated with a significant increase in exports towards
high-income countries relative to LMICs. The impact of LABPTAs with the US is about 35%,
while the impact of LABPTA with the EU is about 44.5%.46 In other words, LABPTAs appear
to attract socially concerned buyers while alienating lower and medium-income ones.47 The model
also confirms that competitors’ engagement with LABPTAs – i.e. CELABPTAUS_INTLij,t
and CELABPTAEU_INTLij,t – has a large and significant impact on international trade flows.
This finding suggests that CELABPTA affects a country’s comparative advantage, opening up
new international market niches that competing countries can exploit. More precisely, the model
predicts that a 1% increase in competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs with the EU will lead to an
increase in international trade of 1.2% relative to domestic markets, while for the US, this growth
effect will be of about 0.9%. In the case of the EU, this increase in exports appears to be driven
by growing imports from LMICs. CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t suggests that a 1% increase in
CELABPTAs with the EU causes exports to LMICs to grow by 0.2% more than exports towards
46For LABPTAUS_LMICij,t the effect is [exp(0.301) − 1] × 100 = 35%, for LABPTAEU_LMICij,t it is
[exp(0.368)− 1]× 100 = 44.5%
47Note, however, that the coefficient of LABPTAUS_LMICij,t is robust using different assumptions on the
clustering of the errors, while LABPTAEU_LMICij,t is only significant at the 10% allowing for multi-way clustering.
80
CHAPTER 3 81
Table 3.2: The Systemic effects of LABPTAs
Dependent variable: bilateral exports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PTA 0.347 0.0286 0.00724 -0.0263
(0.088)∗∗∗ (0.073) (0.072) (0.070)



























Observations 78201 78201 78201 78201
pseudo-R-squared 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.997
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered
by exporter, importer, and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). Panels are
separated to facilitate interpretation of estimates that refer to (CE)LABPTAUS,i,t and those that refer to
(CE)LABPTAEU,i,t.
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high-income countries.48 Hence, CELABPTAs with the EU appear to favour international trade,
in particular towards LMICs.
There are also some differences between model (4) and previous specifications. First, in line
with the comparative advantage argument, labour clauses in trade agreements with the US appear
to have a negative and significant effect on international exports relative to intra-national trade.49
This finding suggests that labour conditions in these agreements may be creating a barrier to
international trade flows, discouraging potential buyers because of higher labour costs.50 On
the other hand, in line with the productivity argument, LABPTAs with the EU have a positive
and significant effect on international exports, in particular thanks to a growth in trade towards
high-income economies.51 A preliminary explanation of this divergence could relate to the design
of these LABPTAs. While LABPTAs with the US typically involve sanctions (such as withholding
trade privileges) to ensure the enforcement of labour standards, the EU relies on consultative
measures and dialogue with civil society to implement labour provisions, with no punishments
for failure to raise labour standards (Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014 at p. 925). It is possible that
while the sanction-based approach works, leading to increased labour costs and loss of comparative
advantage, the consultative approach does not. From this perspective, LABPTAs with the EU can
signal better labour conditions while not affecting the comparative advantage of exporting firms,
leaving them better off overall at the expense of workers’ rights. Conversely, the more effective
LABPTAs with the US can affect labour costs, harming the comparative advantage of suppliers
and leading to an overall decline in international trade. Another (complementary) possibility is
that, thanks to consultations and stakeholder engagements, LABPTAs with the EU are better
equipped to help suppliers improve productivity and efficiency, leading to an overall increase in
exports. A final possible explanation relates to the membership of these agreements. While the
US has signed LABPTAs with multiple low-income countries, the EU has only entered into trade
agreements with middle-income countries. The argument is that labour clauses are likely to have
a greater impact on lower-income countries, which rely almost exclusively on cheap labour for
competitiveness in manufacturing. At the same time, these agreements may not equally impact
flows of medium-income countries, where export competitiveness can also rely on other factors,
48Note that significance is only at the 10% level.
49The effect is a decline of almost [exp(0.688)− 1]× 100 = 99% relative to intra-national trade.
50Real or expected.
51Indeed, the coefficient on LABPTAEU_LMICij,t shows that exports towards high-income economies will grow
more rapidly than those to LMICs.
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such as infrastructure and higher human capital. This would explain why LABPTAs with the US
– which involve low-income countries – have a negative effect on export volumes and hence harm
the comparative advantage of the countries involved; while LABPTAs with the EU – which do
not include low-income countries – do not harm the competitiveness of their signatory countries
to the same extent.52 This hypothesis is further explored in the next paragraph. However, it
should be noted that while LABPTAUS_INTLij,t shows consistent results across a multitude of
robustness checks, the positive coefficient of LABPTAEU_INTLij,t is unstable; hence it should
be interpreted with caution.
As discussed, LABPTAs can have distinctive effects for countries with different income levels.
For instance, lower-income countries may be more affected by labour clauses as they rely more
on cheap labour as a form of comparative advantage in international exports (Kamata 2018).
To examine this hypothesis Table 3.3 reports the results of estimating Equation (4.5) on three
subsamples of exporters: low-income (LI), lower-middle-income (LMI) and upper-middle-income
(UMI) countries.53
For ease of interpretation, Column (1) reports the estimated coefficients for the entire sample
corresponding to Column (4) in Table 3.2. There many interesting findings. First, PTAs have
a large and statistically significant effect on bilateral trade on UMI countries, but do not affect
the other income groups. This finding reinforces the idea that PTAs are less consequential in
lower-income countries but have strong effects in more advanced economies (Venables 2003; Deme
and Ndrianasy 2017). Moreover, LI economies appear to explain most of the effects of LABPTAs
and CELABPTAs with the US in the full sample. For instance, comparing the coefficients of
LABPTAUS_INTLij,t across columns (2), (3) and (4), reveals that trade agreements with labour
conditions harm the comparative advantage of lower-income countries, but they have no effect
on UMI economies. Moreover, the effect of LABPTAUS_INTLij,ton LI countries is twice the
size of the impact on LMI countries. A reasonable explanation is that in lower-income countries,
where cheap labour is the primary source of comparative advantage, labour conditions alienate
52The demand-side effect of these agreements may trigger a positive coefficient on LABPTAEU_INTLij,t
53In Table 3.3 I use the World Bank classification in 1995, which is the median year of my sample. As the World
Bank country classifications change over time to represent the current income status of a country, it is necessary to
select a reference year to allow for consistent comparison across groups. Note that because some countries were not
classified by income group and some countries are high-income, a total of 6,945 observations are dropped in the split
samples estimates.
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Table 3.3: Heterogeneity in LABPTA and CELABPTA effects based on income
Dependent variable: bilateral exports (1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Low inc. Lower-middle inc. Higher-middle inc.
PTA -0.0263 -0.0344 0.119 0.294
(0.070) (0.085) (0.066)∗ (0.064)∗∗∗
[0.126] [0.097] [0.125] [0.103]∗∗∗
(CE)LABPTAUS,i,t
LABPTAUS_INTLij,t -0.688 -1.515 -0.736 -0.0452
(0.135)∗∗∗ (0.262)∗∗∗ (0.253)∗∗∗ (0.198)
[0.174]∗∗∗ [0.235]∗∗∗ [0.355]∗∗ [0.160]
LABPTAUS_LMICij,t -0.301 -0.685 -0.320 -0.197
(0.111)∗∗∗ (0.213)∗∗∗ (0.160)∗∗ (0.130)
[0.107]∗∗∗ [0.189]∗∗∗ [0.162]∗∗ [0.150]
CELABPTAUS_INTLij,t 0.337 0.202 0.355 -0.190
(0.057)∗∗∗ (0.161) (0.118)∗∗∗ (0.130)
[0.123]∗∗∗ [0.234] [0.136]∗∗∗ [0.144]
CELABPTAUS_LMICij,t -0.0651 -0.0267 -0.171 -0.226
(0.082) (0.180) (0.107) (0.152)
[0.150] [0.206] [0.148] [0.223]
(CE)LABPTAEU,i,t
LABPTAEU_INTLij,t 0.519 0.305 0.196
(0.128)∗∗∗ (0.411) (0.195)
[0.197]∗∗∗ [0.484] [0.224]
LABPTAEU_LMICij,t -0.368 -1.104 -0.346
(0.102)∗∗∗ (0.210)∗∗∗ (0.094)∗∗∗
[0.204]∗ [0.324]∗∗∗ [0.106]∗∗∗
CELABPTAEU_INTLij,t 1.047 1.448 0.856 1.131
(0.075)∗∗∗ (0.296)∗∗∗ (0.126)∗∗∗ (0.160)∗∗∗
[0.131]∗∗∗ [0.252]∗∗∗ [0.077]∗∗∗ [0.207]∗∗∗
CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t 0.234 -0.357 -0.117 0.251
(0.117)∗∗ (0.186)∗ (0.155) (0.137)∗
[0.134]∗ [0.286] [0.242] [0.193]
Observations 78201 29470 27297 14489
pseudo-R-squared 0.997 0.999 0.996 0.997
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered by exporter,
importer, and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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price-sensitive buyers. The coefficients of LABPTAUS_LMICij,t in columns (2) and (3) appear to
confirm these results, indicating that, on average, LABPTAs harm exports of LI and LMI countries
towards LMICs relative to exports to high-income countries. Hence, in line with the demand-side
argument, the overall decline in international exports revealed by LABPTAUS_INTLij,t can be
explained mainly by a reduction of trading towards more price-sensitive markets. Additionally,
it appears that CELABPTAs with the US have a positive effect on the international exports
of LI and LMI countries, while harming UMI exporters, again suggesting that lower-income
countries are better able to exploit the comparative advantage of lower labour costs to expand
international trade flows as competitors take part in LABPTAs. It is noticeable that the co-
efficient for LMI countries is larger than that for LI countries, and is the only significant one.
It predicts that for every 1% increase in CELABPTA, international exports will increase by 0.36%.54
The results of (CE)LABPTAs with the EU also show indicative patterns. First, the positive
and significant effect of LABPTAEU_INTLij,t in the full sample does not appear to depend
on any particular subgroup. Note that the lack of LABPTAs with low-income countries may
influence the finding in the full sample. In the case of the LABPTAs with the US, low-income
countries are the group that experiences the largest drop of exports on entering into a LABPTAs
with the US. The lack of LABPTAs with the EU for this group of countries could explain the
difference in the baseline findings.55 Second, consistent with the demand-side argument, the
increase in international exports (LABPTAEU_INTLij,t) appears to rely on increasing trade
with high-income economies. Indeed, LABPTAEU_LMICij,t is negative, large in magnitude
and highly significant for LMICs. This suggests that having a LABPTA will lead (on average)
to exports of 66% more with high-income countries than with LMICs.56 Again, lower-income
countries, which rely more on cheap labour, experience most of the differential impact. Third, the
positive effects of CELABPTAs on international exports are substantial, significant and consistent
across all three subsamples, confirming the hypothesis that as country competitors engage in
LABPTAs, new market niches open, which suppliers can exploit. This finding is consistent with the
idea that CELABPTAs affect the comparative advantage of competitors. Finally, CELABPTAs
54A potential explanation is that LMI countries have more advanced industrial sectors; hence, they can deliver
goods of better quality. From this perspective, they would be able to seize most of the gains from the change in
comparative advantage.
55LABPTAUS_INTLij,t has a negative and significant effect on international exports in low-income countries.
56This is the estimated effect of LABPTAEU_LMICij,t for UMI countries. In LMI countries, the estimated effect
is about three times larger.
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with the EU do not appear to significantly increase exports towards LMICs relative to high-income
markets in any of the subsamples, as the effect emerges only with the increased statistical power
of the full sample.
To gain further analytical insights and to determine the robustness of the results of the
baseline estimates, I run a battery of robustness checks that are thoroughly discussed in the
Annex. They include (among others): estimating Equation (4.5) using alternative specifications
of high-income economies and competition measures; testing for the phase-in effects of LABPTAs
and for reverse causality (Baier and Bergstrand 2007); employing the analytical bias correction for
PPML standard errors developed by Weidner and Zylkin (2020); and interacting the dyad fixed
effect αij with a time trend to account for the time-varying unobserved heterogeneity that may be
affecting the estimates (Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov 2015; Larch et al. 2019). Only some results
of the baseline specification – Column 4 of Table 3.2 – are consistent across all models. From the
rigorous robustness analysis, the following findings stand out.
LABPTAs with the US appear to be consistently associated with a decline in exports relative to
intra-national trade. This finding supports the comparative advantage argument, suggesting that
controlling for the effects of these agreements on trade towards the US, LABPTAs can harm the
comparative advantage of exporting firms in international exports. Conversely, LABPTAs with the
EU do not significantly affect trade volumes once we account for time-varying heterogeneity.57 As
previously discussed, this differential effect may be explained by the different design, the different
effectiveness or the different membership of the two different types of agreements.
Contrary to the expectations of the demand-side argument, it does not appear that LABPTAs
with the US and the EU promote imports from high-income countries relative to LMICs. However,
there is an interesting heterogeneity when one examines countries by level of income. In particular,
also accounting for time-varying heterogeneity (Table 3.16 in the Annex), it appears that lower-
income countries export significantly less to LMICs than to high-income countries when they enter
into LABPTAs with the US. This result supports the demand-side argument, suggesting that in
lower-income economies, which often rely overwhelmingly on cheap labour to be competitive in
exporting manufactured products internationally, improving labour standards can cause a decline
57Cf. Column 2 of Table 3.16.
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in demand from price-sensitive exporters.
The models find mixed evidence to support the idea that LABPTAs have systemic effects and
impact competitors’ exports. CELABPTAs with the US appear to increase export volumes in
most of the robustness checks; however, this impact is no longer significant when controlling for
time-varying heterogeneity.58 Moreover, while CELABPTAs – both with the EU and the US –
do not appear to affect competitors’ export destinations, CELABPTAs with the EU appear to
have a positive and significant impact on international export relative to domestic trade that
is consistent across multiple model specifications. This finding is in line with the comparative
advantage argument. It suggests that countries may benefit from competitors’ engagement in
LABPTAs with the EU, possibly because they are able to exploit market niches left open by
signatory countries.
59
It may be asked why LABPTAs with the US, which have a more stringent design and have direct
effects on the signatory countries, do not affect competitors’ exports, while LABPTAs with the EU
have a significant and robust effect on competitors. Moreover, it may be wondered why LABPTAs
with the EU affect competitors’ trade flows without having any discernible effect on the trade vol-
umes of the signatory countries.60 As noted above, a possible explanation relates to the fact that
there are no LABPTAs with the EU for lower-income countries. The literature acknowledges that
income is an essential predictor of labour conditions (Lim and Prakash 2017; Adolph, Quince, and
Prakash 2017). From this perspective, middle-income countries (and their competitors) may have
more possibilities to engage in intense exploitation of workers and compensate for a competitor’s
entry into a trade agreement with the EU. Conversely, lower-income countries (and their com-
petitors), which already rely overwhelmingly on cheap labour for exports and where the workforce
already enjoys limited labour rights, may have fewer possibilities to downgrade. Competitors’ down-
grading could explain their increased comparative advantage in producing cheap goods, and hence
58Cf. Column (2) of Table 3.16.
59Table 3.12 shows that CELABPTAEU leads to a significant increase in exports towards both developing countries
and high-income economies, although the effect on exports towards LMICs is significantly larger. This can be explained
by the fact that even in high-income economies, markets for socially unsustainable but cheap goods continue to exist
and thrive (Tully and Winer 2014).
60It is important to note that LABPTAs with the EU can affect competitors’ trade flows while not having any
discernible effect on the trade volumes of signatory countries. The reason is that CELABPTA is an aggregate measure
that sums up all of the competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs, while LABPTA looks only at the signatory-country
level. Insignificant changes at the signatory-country level may add up to significant changes at the aggregate level.
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the increasing volumes of international exports.61 Nevertheless, these estimates on the systemic
effects of LABPTAs with the EU should be interpreted with caution.62 This explanation is only
a hypothesis, and further qualitative and quantitative analysis is needed to understand precisely
how LABPTAs with the EU are able to affect competitors’ trade flows. In sum, while the model
suggests that CELABPTAs with the EU can have a positive effect on international trade, further
research is required to fully illustrate why this effect is different from the impact of LABPTAs.
3.6 Conclusion
Most of the scholarship examining LABPTAs has focused on the issue of compliance, examining
whether these agreements can improve working conditions in developing countries. Minimal
attention has been given to the trade effects of these agreements. Yet, according to both the ‘race
to the top’ and the ‘race to the bottom’ literature, the impact of LABPTAs on trade could lead to
substantial spill-overs to labour outcomes.
This paper contributes to the political economy literature, making an original attempt to
examine the effects of LABPTAs on the trade flows of signatory countries and their competitors. It
builds on the recent advancements in structural gravity estimation to find the unbiased estimates
of (CE)LABPTA effects on export volumes and destinations, testing the results with a battery of
robustness checks. It explores whether LABPTAs negatively affect the comparative advantage of
signatory countries, harming export volumes, or whether they boost international trade in a way
consistent with a productivity gain mechanism. Moreover, it examines whether LABPTAs that
signal better labour standards attract demand from high-income countries, where consumers are
more socially concerned. Finally, the paper examines the systemic effects of these agreements,
evaluating their impact on the trade of competitor states.
The main findings of the paper are the following. First, that LABPTAs with the US hurt
international trade with both higher- and lower-income countries relative to intra-national trade.
This suggests that labour provisions in these agreements can negatively affect the comparative
61Note that the lack of LABPTAs with low-income countries may also explain the fact that we do not find a direct
effect of LABPTAs with the EU. Indeed, low-income countries appear to be the group most affected by LABPTAs
with the US.
62In fact, the previous paper finds the opposite: that LABPTAs with the US generate downgrading, whereas those
with the EU do not.
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advantage of exporting firms, leading to less trade, not more. Second, in low-income countries,
LABPTAs have a differential impact on exports towards LMICs and high-income economies. On
average, a lower-income country with a LABPTA will trade 76% less with LMICs than with
high-income countries.63 This confirms the idea that for lower-income economies (which rely
overwhelmingly on cheap labour to be competitive in manufacturing exports), (a commitment to)
improving labour standards can cause a decline in demand from more price-sensitive importers.
Third, the models find that having more competitors engaging in trade agreements with the EU
leads to an increase in international exports relative to intra-national trade. This suggests that
these agreements enable competitors to take advantage of new market possibilities.
In conclusion, the findings of this paper suggest that LABPTAs can affect export volumes and
export destinations of signatory countries and their competitors. Further research should explore
in more detail why LABPTAs with the US and with the EU have differentiated effects.
63Estimate from Column (4) of Table 3.16.
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3.7 Annexes
3.7.1 Descriptive information
3.7.1.1 List of exporters and importers
Table 3.4: List of exporters
iso3c Exporter iso3c Exporter iso3c Exporter
AFG Afghanistan GMB Gambia NPL Nepal
AGO Angola GNB Guinea-Bissau OMN Oman
ALB Albania GNQ Equatorial Guinea PAK Pakistan
ARE United Arab Emirates GRD Grenada PAN Panama
ARG Argentina GTM Guatemala PER Peru
ATG Antigua and Barbuda GUY Guyana PHL Philippines
BDI Burundi HND Honduras PNG Papua New Guinea
BEN Benin HTI Haiti POL Poland
BFA Burkina Faso HUN Hungary PRK Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. of
BGD Bangladesh IDN Indonesia PRY Paraguay
BGR Bulgaria IND India QAT Qatar
BHR Bahrain IRN Iran ROU Romania
BHS Bahamas IRQ Iraq RWA Rwanda
BLZ Belize ISR Israel SAU Saudi Arabia
BOL Bolivia JAM Jamaica SDN Sudan
BRA Brazil JOR Jordan SEN Senegal
BRB Barbados KEN Kenya SGP Singapore
BRN Brunei Darussalam KHM Cambodia SLB Solomon Islands
BTN Bhutan KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis SLE Sierra Leone
CAF Central African Republic KOR Korea SLV El Salvador
CHL Chile KWT Kuwait SOM Somalia
CHN China LAO Lao People’s Democratic Republic STP Sao Tome and Principe
CIV Côte d’Ivoire LBN Lebanon SUR Suriname
CMR Cameroon LBR Liberia SYC Seychelles
COD Congo (Democratic Republic of the) LBY Libyan Arab Jamahiriya SYR Syrian Arab Republic
COG Congo LCA Saint Lucia TCD Chad
COL Colombia LKA Sri Lanka TGO Togo
COM Comoros MAR Morocco THA Thailand
CPV Cape Verde MDG Madagascar TTO Trinidad and Tobago
CRI Costa Rica MDV Maldives TUN Tunisia
CUB Cuba MEX Mexico TZA Tanzania, United Rep. of
CYP Cyprus MLI Mali UGA Uganda
DJI Djibouti MLT Malta URY Uruguay
DMA Dominica MMR Burma VCT Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
DOM Dominican Republic MNG Mongolia VEN Venezuela
DZA Algeria MOZ Mozambique VNM Viet Nam
ECU Ecuador MRT Mauritania VUT Vanuatu
EGY Egypt MUS Mauritius WSM Samoa
ETH Ethiopia MWI Malawi YEM Yemen
FJI Fiji MYS Malaysia ZMB Zambia
GAB Gabon NER Niger ZWE Zimbabwe
GHA Ghana NGA Nigeria
GIN Guinea NIC Nicaragua
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Table 3.5: List of importers
iso3c Importer iso3c Importer iso3c Importer
ABW Aruba GHA Ghana NRU Nauru
AFG Afghanistan GIB Gibraltar NZL New Zealand
AGO Angola GIN Guinea OMN Oman
AIA Anguilla GMB Gambia PAK Pakistan
ALB Albania GNB Guinea-Bissau PAN Panama
AND Andorra GNQ Equatorial Guinea PCN Pitcairn
ANT Netherland Antilles GRC Greece PER Peru
ARE United Arab Emirates GRD Grenada PHL Philippines
ARG Argentina GRL Greenland PLW Palau
ARM Armenia GTM Guatemala PNG Papua New Guinea
ASM American Samoa GUM Guam POL Poland
ATA Antarctica GUY Guyana PRK Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. of
ATF French Southern Antartic territories HKG Hong Kong PRT Portugal
ATG Antigua and Barbuda HMD Heard and Mcdonald Islands PRY Paraguay
AUS Australia HND Honduras PYF French Polynesia
AUT Austria HRV Croatia QAT Qatar
AZE Azerbaijan HTI Haiti ROU Romania
BDI Burundi HUN Hungary RUS Russian Federation
BEL Belgium IDN Indonesia RWA Rwanda
BEN Benin IND India SAU Saudi Arabia
BFA Burkina Faso IOT British Indian Ocean Territory SCG Serbia and Montenegro
BGD Bangladesh IRL Ireland SDN Sudan
BGR Bulgaria IRN Iran SEN Senegal
BHR Bahrain IRQ Iraq SGP Singapore
BHS Bahamas ISL Iceland SGS South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina ISR Israel SHN Saint Helena
BLR Belarus ITA Italy SLB Solomon Islands
BLZ Belize JAM Jamaica SLE Sierra Leone
BMU Bermuda JOR Jordan SLV El Salvador
BOL Bolivia JPN Japan SMR San Marino
BRA Brazil KAZ Kazakstan SOM Somalia
BRB Barbados KEN Kenya SPM St. Pierre and Miquelon
BRN Brunei Darussalam KGZ Kyrgyzstan SRB Serbia
BTN Bhutan KHM Cambodia STP Sao Tome and Principe
BVT Bouvet Island KIR Kiribati SUN USSR
CAF Central African Republic KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis SUR Suriname
CAN Canada KOR Korea SVK Slovakia
CCK Cocos (Keeling) Islands KWT Kuwait SVN Slovenia
CHE Switzerland LAO Lao People’s Democratic Republic SWE Sweden
CHL Chile LBN Lebanon SYC Seychelles
CHN China LBR Liberia SYR Syrian Arab Republic
CIV Côte d’Ivoire LBY Libyan Arab Jamahiriya TCA Turks and Caicos Islands
CMR Cameroon LCA Saint Lucia TCD Chad
COD Congo (Democratic Republic of the) LKA Sri Lanka TGO Togo
COG Congo LTU Lithuania THA Thailand
COK Cook Islands LVA Latvia TJK Tajikistan
COL Colombia MAC Macau (Aomen) TKL Tokelau
COM Comoros MAR Morocco TKM Turkmenistan
CPV Cape Verde MCO Monaco TLS East Timor
CRI Costa Rica MDA Moldova, Rep.of TON Tonga
CUB Cuba MDG Madagascar TTO Trinidad and Tobago
CXR Christmas Island MDV Maldives TUN Tunisia
CYM Cayman Islands MEX Mexico TUR Turkey
CYP Cyprus MHL Marshall Islands TUV Tuvalu
CZE Czech Republic MKD Macedonia TWN Taiwan
DEU Germany MLI Mali TZA Tanzania, United Rep. of
DJI Djibouti MLT Malta UGA Uganda
DMA Dominica MMR Burma UKR Ukraine
DNK Denmark MNE Montenegro UMI US Minor Outlying Islands
DOM Dominican Republic MNG Mongolia URY Uruguay
DZA Algeria MNP Northern Mariana Islands USA United States of America
ECU Ecuador MOZ Mozambique UZB Uzbekistan
EGY Egypt MRT Mauritania VAT Holy See
ERI Eritrea MSR Montserrat VCT Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
ESH Western Sahara MUS Mauritius VEN Venezuela
ESP Spain MWI Malawi VGB British Virgin Islands
EST Estonia MYS Malaysia VNM Viet Nam
ETH Ethiopia NCL New Caledonia VUT Vanuatu
FIN Finland NER Niger WLF Wallis and Futuna
FJI Fiji NFK Norfolk Island WSM Samoa
FLK Falkland Islands NGA Nigeria YEM Yemen
FRA France NIC Nicaragua YUG Yugoslavia
FSM Micronesia (Federated States of) NIU Niue ZAF South Africa
GAB Gabon NLD Netherlands ZMB Zambia
GBR United Kingdom NOR Norway ZWE Zimbabwe
GEO Georgia NPL Nepal
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3.7.1.2 List of ISIC sectors
Table 3.6: List of ISIC sectors included in the TradeProd data
isic Description
1 311 Food manufacturing
2 313 Beverage industries
3 314 Tobacco manufactures
4 321 Manufacture of textiles
5 322 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear
6 323 Manf. of leather, leather products, leather substitutes and fur, except footwear and wearing apparel
7 324 Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanized or moulded rubber or plastic footwear
8 331 Manufacture of wood and wood and cork products, except furniture
9 332 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal
10 341 Manufacture of paper and paper products
11 342 Printing, publishing and allied industries
12 351 Manufacture of industrial chemicals
13 352 Manufacture of other chemical products
14 353 Petroleum refineries
15 355 Manufacture of rubber products
16 356 Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere classified
17 361 Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware
18 362 Manufacture of glass and glass products
19 369 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
20 371 Iron and steel basic industries
21 372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries
22 381 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
23 382 Manufacture of machinery except electrical
24 383 Manufacture of electrical machinery apparatus, appliances and supplies
25 384 Manufacture of transport equipment
26 385 Manf. of photographic, optical, professional, scientific, measuring and controlling equipment & NES
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3.7.1.3 List of (LAB)PTAs
Table 3.7: List of (LAB)PTAs by year of signing and entry into force
PTA Signing Entry Into Force LABPTA
1 Israel US 1985 1985 Yes
2 Jordan Kuwait 1986 No
3 Algeria Morocco 1989 1989 No
4 Libya Morocco 1990 1990 No
5 Bhutan India 1990 No
6 African Economic Community 1991 1994 No
7 EC Hungary 1991 1994 Yes
8 EC Poland 1991 1994 Yes
9 MERCOSUR 1991 1991 No
10 El Salvador Guatemala 1991 No
11 Australia Papua New Guinea 1991 1991 No
12 CEFTA 1992 1993 No
13 EFTA Israel 1992 1993 No
14 EFTA Poland 1992 1993 No
15 EFTA Romania 1992 1993 No
16 Jordan Lebanon 1992 1993 No
17 Jordan Libya 1992 No
18 NAFTA 1992 1994 Yes
19 ASEAN 1992 1992 No
20 Cross Boarder Initiative 1992 No
21 Bulgaria EC 1993 1993 Yes
22 Bulgaria EFTA 1993 1993 No
23 COMESA 1993 1994 No
24 EC Romania 1993 1993 Yes
25 ECOWAS 1993 1993 No
26 EFTA Hungary 1993 1993 No
27 Bolivia Mexico 1994 1995 No
28 Costa Rica Mexico 1994 1995 No
29 CEMAC 1994 1999 No
30 Group of Three 1994 1995 No
31 Hungary Slovenia 1994 1995 No
32 Romania Slovakia 1994 1995 No
33 West African Economic and Monetary Union 1994 1994 No
34 Honduras Mexico 1994 No
35 Colombia Mexico Venezuela 1994 1995 No
36 Czech Republic Romania 1994 1995 No
37 Israel PLO 1994 1994 No
38 Moldova Romania 1994 1995 No
39 Bulgaria Czech Republic 1995 1996 No
40 Bulgaria Slovakia 1995 1996 No
41 EC Israel Euro-Med Association Agreement 1995 2000 Yes
42 EC Tunisia Euro-Med Association Agreement 1995 1998 Yes
43 Fiji Tonga 1995 No
44 Armenia Cyprus 1995 No
45 Jordan PLO 1995 No
46 Bolivia MERCOSUR 1996 1997 No
47 Bulgaria Slovenia 1996 1997 No
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PTA Signing Entry Into Force LABPTA
48 Chile MERCOSUR 1996 1996 No
49 EC Morocco Euro-Med Association Agreement 1996 2000 Yes
50 Egypt Jordan 1996 1998 No
51 Israel Slovakia 1996 1997 No
52 Israel Turkey 1996 1997 No
53 Canada Chile 1996 1997 No
54 Canada Israel 1996 1997 No
55 Czech Republic Israel 1996 1997 No
56 Lithuania Poland 1996 1997 No
57 Algeria Jordan 1997 1999 No
58 EC Jordan Euro-Med Association Agreement 1997 2002 Yes
59 EFTA Morocco 1997 1999 No
60 Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement 1997 1998 No
61 Hungary Israel 1997 1998 No
62 Hungary Turkey 1997 1998 No
63 Israel Poland 1997 1998 No
64 Mexico Nicaragua 1997 1998 No
65 Romania Turkey 1997 1998 No
66 Latvia Poland 1997 1999 No
67 Bulgaria Turkey 1998 1999 No
68 Central America Dominican Republic 1998 2001 No
69 Chile Mexico 1998 1999 No
70 Chile Peru 1998 1998 No
71 Egypt Jordan 1998 1999 No
72 Egypt Tunisia 1998 2007 No
73 Hungary Lithuania 1998 2000 No
74 India Sri Lanka 1998 2001 No
75 Israel Slovenia 1998 1998 No
76 Jordan Morocco 1998 1999 No
77 Jordan Tunisia 1998 1999 No
78 Ecuador Peru 1998 No
79 Estonia Hungary 1998 2001 No
80 Faroe Islands Poland 1998 1998 No
81 Estonia Poland 1998 2002 No
82 Bulgaria Macedonia 1999 2000 No
83 Hungary Latvia 1999 2000 No
84 Morocco Tunisia 1999 1999 No
85 Poland Turkey 1999 2000 No
86 Egypt Saudi Arabia 1999 No
87 East African Community (EAC) 1999 2000 No
88 EC Mexico 2000 2000 Yes
89 EFTA Mexico 2000 2001 No
90 Israel Mexico 2000 2000 No
91 Jordan UAE 2000 2001 No
92 Jordan US 2000 2001 Yes
93 Lebanon UAE 2000 No
94 Mexico Northern Triangle 2000 2001 No
95 Syria UAE 2000 2001 No
96 New Zealand Singapore 2000 2001 No
97 Bulgaria Estonia 2001 2002 No
98 Bulgaria Israel 2001 2002 No
99 Bulgaria Lithuania 2001 2002 No
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PTA Signing Entry Into Force LABPTA
100 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) revised 2001 2006 No
101 Croatia Hungary 2001 2001 No
102 EC Egypt Euro-Med Association Agreement 2001 2004 Yes
103 EFTA Jordan 2001 2002 No
104 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 2001 2003 No
105 Iraq Tunisia 2001 No
106 Iraq UAE 2001 No
107 Israel Romania 2001 2001 No
108 Jordan Kuwait 2001 2005 No
109 Jordan Syria 2001 2002 No
110 Libya Tunisia 2001 No
111 Morocco UAE 2001 2003 No
112 Pacific Isl. Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) 2001 2003 No
113 Algeria Iraq 2001 No
114 Iraq Libya 2001 No
115 Iraq Syria 2001 No
116 Iraq Yemen 2001 No
117 Saudi Arabia Syria 2001 No
118 Bahrain Jordan 2001 2005 No
119 Canada Costa Rica 2001 2002 No
120 Albania Macedonia 2002 2002 No
121 Bulgaria Latvia 2002 2003 No
122 Algeria EC Euro-Med Association Agreement 2002 2005 Yes
123 Central America Panama 2002 2003 No
124 Chile EC 2002 2003 Yes
125 EC Lebanon Euro-Med Association Agreement 2002 2006 Yes
126 EFTA Singapore 2002 2003 No
127 Jordan Lebanon 2002 2003 No
128 Pakistan Sri Lanka 2002 2005 No
129 Syria Tunisia 2002 2005 No
130 Bahrain Iraq 2002 No
131 Iraq Jordan 2002 No
132 Iraq Lebanon 2002 No
133 Iraq Qatar 2002 No
134 Iraq Sudan 2002 No
135 Japan Singapore 2002 2002 No
136 Albania Croatia 2002 2003 No
137 Albania Kosovo 2003 2003 No
138 Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria 2003 2004 No
139 Albania Romania 2003 2004 No
140 Bosnia and Herzegovina Romania 2003 2003 No
141 Bulgaria Serbia 2003 2004 No
142 Chile EFTA 2003 2004 No
143 Chile Korea 2003 2004 No
144 Chile US 2003 2004 Yes
145 China Hong Kong 2003 2004 No
146 China Macao 2003 2004 No
147 Egypt Libya 2003 2007 No
148 Jordan Sudan 2003 2003 No
149 Macedonia Romania 2003 2004 No
150 Albania Bulgaria 2003 2003 No
151 Romania Serbia 2003 2004 No
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PTA Signing Entry Into Force LABPTA
152 Singapore US 2003 2004 Yes
153 Albania Moldova 2003 2004 No
154 Albania Serbia 2003 2004 No
155 Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 2004 No
156 Panama Taiwan 2003 2004 No
157 Australia Singapore 2003 2003 No
158 Bulgaria Moldova 2004 2004 No
159 CAFTA & Dominican Republic 2004 2006 Yes
160 ECCAS-CEEAC 2004 No
161 EFTA Lebanon 2004 2007 No
162 Agadir Agreement 2004 2006 No
163 EFTA Tunisia 2004 2005 No
164 Israel Jordan 2004 No
165 Jordan Singapore 2004 2005 No
166 Mexico Uruguay 2004 2004 No
167 Morocco Turkey 2004 2006 No
168 Morocco US 2004 2006 Yes
169 SAFTA 2004 2006 No
170 Association of Southeast Asian Nations China 2004 2005 No
171 Syria Turkey 2004 2007 No
172 Tunisia Turkey 2004 2005 No
173 Bahrain US 2004 2006 Yes
174 Japan Mexico 2004 2005 No
175 MERCOSUR - SACU 2004 No
176 Australia Thailand 2004 2005 No
177 Paraguay Taiwan 2004 No
178 Chile China 2005 2006 No
179 EFTA Korea 2005 2006 No
180 India Singapore 2005 2005 No
181 Korea Singapore 2005 2006 No
182 Trans Pacific Strategic EPA 2005 2006 No
183 Egypt Turkey 2005 2007 No
184 Guatemala Taiwan 2005 2006 No
185 Japan Malaysia 2005 2006 No
186 New Zealand Thailand 2005 2005 No
187 Bhutan India 2006 2006 No
188 Chile Colombia 2006 2009 No
189 Chile Panama 2006 2008 No
190 China Pakistan 2006 2007 No
191 Colombia US 2006 2012 Yes
192 Oman US 2006 2009 Yes
193 Panama Singapore 2006 2006 No
194 Peru US 2006 2009 Yes
195 Chile Peru 2006 2009 No
196 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Korea 2006 2010 No
197 Malawi Zimbabwe 2006 No
198 Albania EC SAA 2006 2009 Yes
199 Albania Turkey 2006 2008 No
200 Japan Philippines 2006 2008 No




It is important to address some clear concerns. First, LABPTA_INTLij,t and LABPTA_LMICij,t
are likely to be endogenous. There may be unobserved heterogeneity in trade flow determinants
between i and j associated with the likelihood of the country i signing a LABPTA. Paraphrasing
Baier and Bergstrand, unobserved stringent labour regulations in country i may support exports
towards the northern market j and favour selection into LABTAs (2007). Arguably, the inclusion
of dyadic fixed effects αij accounts for this kind of endogeneity for the same reasons discussed in
Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
Second, endogeneity may also be affecting the estimates of CELABPTA_INTLij,t and
CELABPTA_LMICij,t. It is argued that the inclusion of αij and αi,t should account for much
of this concern. Indeed, CELABPTA_LMICij,t and CELABPTA_INTLij,t are endogenous if
there are unobserved dyadic characteristics that affect both trade flows between i and j and the
likelihood of its competitors z signing LABPTAs. For example, if the exporter i and the importer
j have a wide difference in relative factor endowments, trade between them is likely to be higher.
These same characteristics are likely to be positively correlated with the probability of i signing
a trade agreement with a high-income economy and negatively correlated with its likelihood of
signing a trade agreement with the competitor z. Negotiating a trade agreement is a long and
costly process, and policymakers are likely to prioritise more welfare-enhancing agreements over
less profitable ones.64 To the extent that endogeneity comes from unobserved dyadic characteristics
between i and j, such as in the example above, the inclusion of dyadic fixed effects αij addresses
the issue (Baier and Bergstrand 2007).
Another concern is whether unobserved characteristics relating to an exporter and its com-
petitors z may be causing endogeneity. Some considerations have to be made in this regard.
Competitors do not enter into the model individually, but only in aggregate form as
∑
z 6=iWiz,t ×
LABPTAz,t. Hence, endogeneity occurs if there are unobserved characteristics that affect both
exports of i to j and the average likelihood of competitors z entering into a trade agreement. In
Equation (4.5), these concerns are limited. Indeed, the αi,t controls for the average likelihood of
competitors z entering into a trade agreement, if this depends on the distance of i - in terms of
regulation, factor endowments, language, etc. - from the average of its competitors.65 Consider
64Along this line of reasoning, it should not come as a surprise that the US first signed a trade agreement with
Mexico, and only later started negotiating trade agreements with other Central American countries such as the
CAFTA.
65Arguably, the problem would be substantial if the model was examining exporter–competitor dyads. Building on
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the following example where the exporter i has stringent labour regulations relative to the aver-
age of its competitors. These regulations may be positively correlated with i exports towards the
high-income country j, while reasonably reducing the likelihood of the competitor z of signing a
LABPTA. Socially concerned consumers will import more from a country with adequate labour
regulations than with its competitors, and policymakers may prefer to sign a trade agreement with
a country with good working conditions.66 Conversely, if the labour regulations of i are in line with
the average of its competitors, it is unlikely that this will significantly improve its exports towards
the northern country j or it will reduce the average likelihood of any of its competitors z of signing
a LABPTA. Indeed, i will not have any particular advantage (or disadvantage) compared to its
competitors in the eyes of foreign consumers and policymakers. In other words: the endogeneity is
caused by unobserved characteristics separating i from the average of its competitors rather than
by the unobserved heterogeneity between individual i–z dyads. The good news is that αi,t already
controls for the unobserved characteristics that separate i from the average of its competitors. In-
deed, just as it controls for the unobserved average trade barrier (multilateral resistance term) of
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), it also controls for the unobserved average distance of i from
its competitors z which may be causing this form of endogeneity.
In sum, it is argued that (4.5) allows the estimation of unbiased coefficient estimates of the
effects of LABPTAs and CELABPTAs on international exports and export destinations in the
context of a structural gravity estimation.
the example given previously: differences in relative factor endowments between i and z are likely to affect both on
the trade between i and j and the selection of z and i into a LABPTA.
66The contrary is also possible: policymakers aiming to improve labour conditions in supplier countries may engage
in negotiating LABPTAs with countries with loose labour regulations to address the issue. While this matters in
terms of the expected direction of the bias, it is irrelevant in terms of the existence of the bias.
98
CHAPTER 3 99
3.7.3 Robustness checks: Discussion and Tables
To make sure of the robustness of the findings of the main specification, a series of sensitivity
checks were run. The results are discussed below.
First, I examine the effects of stringency of labour provisions in LABPTAs. Arguably, more
‘legalised’ LABPTAs provide credible signals to importers while raising compliance costs for de-
veloping countries. From this perspective, I expect that increased stringency will lead to more
substantial effects. In Table 3.8, I explore this possibility, comparing the results of the baseline
model, in Column (1), to a model accounting for the stringency of LABPTAs, in Column (2).
Stringency is measured using Lechner’s esr_all_sum variable (2016). To illustrate the difference:
in Column (1), both NAFTA and the US–Jordan LABPTA take a value of one because they are
LABPTAs. However, in Column (2), the US–Jordan PTA has a value of 6 and NAFTA has a value
of 16, to account for the different levels of legalisation of labour provisions in these agreements
(cf. Lechner 2016). The results are almost identical in terms of sign and significance of the coef-
ficients. The only exception is the effect of competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs with the EU,
which, accounting for stringency, no longer significantly affects trade with LMICs. In sum, the
results of Column (2) indicate that more legalised agreements lead to more substantial effects, in
line with the theoretical expectations.
Second, I checked whether results are consistent when using a different specification for LMICs.
The World Bank classification of countries by income is dynamic and changes every year to reflect
each country’s current status. To make sure that the results presented in Table 3.2 are not de-
pendent on the specific group of high-income economies selected, Table 3.9 compares the models
using different definitions of LMICs.67 Column (1) replicates the results of Table 3.2. For ease
of comparison, column (2) and (3) re-estimate the same model using a definition of high-income
economies at the beginning (1987) and end of the sample (2006).68 The results are almost identical
in terms of magnitude and significance for the first three columns, suggesting that the particular
composition of the high-income group does not bias the estimates. The only difference is on the
effect of CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t, which is no longer significant with alternative specifications.
This robustness check shows that the coefficient on CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t is unstable; it is
therefore wise to advise against drawing inferences from this result. Finally, Column (4) uses a com-
67In the main model I consider high-income economies all of the countries that are LMICs in the median year of the
sample, 1995.
68The first year for which this classification is available is 1987.
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pletely different approach and defines emerging economies as non-OECD countries.69 Results on
the effects of LABPTA and CELABPTA on international trade are unchanged. Moreover, consis-
tent with other specifications, LABPTAEU_LMICij,t appears to have a negative effect on exports
towards LMICs relative to high-income economies. The most relevant difference is that Column
(4) finds that LABPTAs with the US do not significantly favour trade towards OECD countries
(LABPTAUS_LMICij,t (NON-OECD)), over trade towards emerging economies. While this is an
interesting finding, it should be interpreted with caution; it is likely that income, rather than mem-
bership of an international organisation, explains different importing behaviours in international
markets.
Third, Table 4.11 directly examines whether the results for the main specification depend on
the competition measure selected. In the main specification of Column (1), I consider all goods
exported in order to measure similarity in export profiles. In Column (2), I measure competition
by looking only at the similarity in exports of manufacturing goods, which are the exports included
in the dependent variable. The results are almost identical to those for the main specification in
terms of sign and significance. Only CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t is no longer significant with this
alternative competition measure. All in all, Table 4.11 reinforces confidence in the robustness of the
sign and the significance of (CE)LABPTA effects, which do not appear to depend on the specific
measure of the competition selected.
Fourth, one might suspect that the differential impact of (CE)LABPTAs on trade towards
EMEs relative to high-income economies can be explained by the increase in exports towards
LABPTA countries.70 Trade flows towards LMICs may decline relative to those towards high-
income destinations because exporters will benefit from LABPTAs with the EU or the US, and not
because LABPTAs will have an impact on third-party countries. In Table 3.11, I run the models
of the main specification removing the observations that report trade flows between members of
LABPTAs.71 If the differential impact is explained simply by the effect on signatory countries,
LABPTAUS_LMICij,t and LABPTAEU_LMICij,t should no longer be significant. The results
in models (2), and (4) and (6) of Table 3.11 are almost identical to the baseline models. They
show that although removing trade flows with the EU and the US slightly reduces in magnitude
the effects of (CE)LABPTAs, the differential impact on trade towards LMICs and high-income
69The reference year for OECD membership is 1995, the median year of the sample.
70In particular, the increase in exports towards the EU and the US.
71I.e. all the observations where a country has a LABPTA with the US (or the EU) and where the US (or the EU)
is the export destination.
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economies is explained by changing trade patterns with third parties.
Fifth, Table 3.12 examines in greater detail how (CE)LABPTAs affect trade patterns. The
main specification, reported in Column (1), examines the effects of (CE)LABPTAs on interna-
tional trade relative to intra-national trade and on trading with high-income importers relative
to trading with low-income importers. However, these categories are partially overlapping. In
fact, (CE)LABPTA_INTL captures international exports towards both high and lower-income
countries. Similarly, (CE)LABPTA_LMIC captures both international and intra-national trade
towards LMIC markets. It is possible to gain further insights on how (CE)LABPTAs affect in-
ternational trade creating mutually exclusive categories. In this vein I interact LABPTA and
CELABPTA with three variables, SMCYij , ILMICj and IHIj where SMCYij is a dummy vari-
able indicating intra-national trade, ILMICj indicates international trade with LMICs and IHIj
indicates international trade with high-income economies. Of course, due to collinearity, it is not
possible to include all of these interactions in a single model. In Column (2), I exclude the inter-
actions with SMCYij ; all results have therefore to be interpreted as the difference in the impact of
(CE)LABPTAs relative to intra-national trade. For ease of comparison, Column (3) estimates the
model excluding the interactions with IHIij . Here, all results can be interpreted as the difference
in the impact of (CE)LABPTAs relative to international exports towards high-income economies.
Many interesting findings stand out. Column (2) reveals that LABPTAs with the US have a neg-
ative effect on international trade with both high-income countries and LMICs. Additionally, the
comparison with Column (3) reveals that the decline in international exports towards LMICs is
significantly larger than the decline towards high-income countries, consistent with the hypothesis
that LABPTAs hurt the comparative advantage of developing countries, in particular harming trade
with lower-income economies. Moreover, while Column (1) reveals that CELABPTAs with the US
have a positive impact on international trade in general, only international trade towards LMICs
is significantly larger than intra-national trade.72 This suggests that it is especially lower-income
countries, importing less from LABPTA members, which will revert towards countries with rising
CELABPTAs. Looking at LABPTAs with the EU, Column (2) shows that although trade with
both high-income and lower-income economies increases significantly relative to domestic trade, the
effect on exports towards high-income economies is larger in magnitude. However, Column (3) fur-
ther reveals that the effect is not significantly smaller for LMICs than for high-income economies.
72According to Column (2), a 1% increase in competitors’ engagement leads to a 3% rise in trade towards LMICs
relative to domestic trade.
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Finally, columns (2) and (3) confirm that CELABPTAs promote international exports towards
high- and lower-income economies relative to domestic trade. Moreover, the effect on the rise in
international exports towards LMICs is significantly larger than the effect on trade towards high-
income countries. Note that the differential impact of (CE)LABPTAs with the EU on exports
towards high-income economies relative to lower-income economies is of the expected sign. How-
ever, it is necessary to discuss why LABPTAs have a positive effect on exports towards LMICs,
while CELABPTAs (also) have a positive impact on exports towards high-income economies. One
possible explanation is that although using by-income country classification is a useful proxy to
reveal the underlying phenomena, the situation on the ground is likely to be more complex. In
emerging economies, there is a rising middle class that may be socially concerned; in high-income
economies, markets for socially unsustainable but cheap goods continue to exist and thrive. From
this perspective, it is possible that although socially concerned businesses and consumers from both
high-income and lower-income countries displace trade towards LABPTA countries, firms from both
developed countries and LMICs targeting the lower segments of the market will instead increase
imports from competitors.
Sixth, scholars have argued that estimates of PPML high-dimensional fixed effects may be biased
and that standard errors might be too narrow (Jochmans 2017; Pfaffermayr 2019; Egger and Staub
2016). To address these issues, Table 3.13 presents the estimates of the baseline models with
the bias correction proposed by Weidner and Zylkin (2020). Results of the baseline specifications
appear to be robust to this correction across all models. The main difference is that, after the
correction, the positive and coefficient CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t is only significant at the 10%
level. All in all, these estimates suggest that the main model does not suffer from a significant
incidental parameter problem. Note, however, that the results only consider error clustered at the
country-dyad level, since multi-way clustering is not available for the command.73
Seventh, it is possible that trade adjusts to the signing of LABPTAs slowly, rather than all at
once. In the main specification, I use four-year intervals to deal with this concern. An additional way
to control for the sluggish adjustments of exports to trade policies is to include lags of explanatory
variables (cf. Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Larch et al. 2019; Brandi et al. 2020). Table 3.14
estimates Equation (4.5) adding lagged explanatory variables to explicitly capture the phasing-
in effect of LABPTA and CELABPTA.74 The main finding that stands out from the results in
73To date, the ppml_fe_bias Stata® command is unable to compute the bias correction allowing for multi-way
clustering of the standard errors.
74Note that, given the use of four-year interval data, in this specification lags correspond to t-4 and t-8. Three year
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columns (2) and (3) is that there is no significant phase-in effect observable in the vast majority
of cases, suggesting that the main specification gives unbiased results while allowing the use of the
full sample.75 There are three noticeable exceptions. First, Column (3) suggests that PTAs have
a positive and significant effect on trade that occurs within a four-year lag. Second, columns (2)
and (3) suggest that countries adjust sluggishly to competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs with the
US and that international trade will increase after four years.76 Third, the effect coefficient on
CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t−1 suggests a non linear relationship between competitors’ engagement
in LABPTAs and increasing exports towards LMICs. As confirmed by other robustness checks, the
coefficient on this variable appears model-dependent, and the reader should be careful in drawing
inferences from its results. Lastly, Column (4) of Table 3.14 includes the leads (t+1) of all variables.
The coefficient on lead variables can be interpreted as a test for the ‘strict exogeneity’ or reverse
causality of the regressors in the model. If LABPTAs and CELABPTAs are strictly exogenous to
changes in trade flow, leads on these variables should be uncorrelated with the concurrent level
of trade flows (Baier and Bergstrand 2007). Alternatively, these coefficients can be interpreted as
anticipatory effects. In the main specification, I consider LABPTAs and CELABPTAs of trade
agreements that have entered into force. It is well known that trade agreements take years to
negotiate, and, even once they are signed, it can take time before they enter into force. Firms
may start adapting to the changing international trade landscape before the agreements are fully
in force. Column (4) shows that none of the coefficients in the leads is significant, except for
LABPTAEU_INTLij,t. While this is good news for the model, it raises some questions over how
to interpret the LABPTAEU_INTLij,t coefficient, for which both lags and leads in Column (4)
appear large, positive and significant. Arguably, given the lengthy negotiation periods of trade deals
with the EU, it is possible that this captures an anticipatory effect; however, the reader should be
careful in giving a causal interpretation to this coefficient.
Eighth, to further examine whether the main model has endogeneity problems, or rather cap-
tures anticipatory behaviours, I estimate the model using the year the (CE)LABPTA was signed
rather than the year of its entry into force. Arguably, a significant coefficient coinciding with the
signing date would suggest anticipatory behaviours. Table 3.15 investigates this hypothesis, reveal-
ing interesting patterns. Column (2) estimates the Equation (4.5) considering only (CE)LABPTA
lags were also tested, but the results were always insignificant at the conventional levels.
75The lack of significance of the main regressors after the inclusion of the lags is likely to depend on the increased
multicollinearity of the model.
76The *L.CELABPTAUS_INTLij,t coefficients are large – 1.461 and 1.326 in columns (2) and (3), respectively –
and significant.
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signing date. The results are almost identical to those of the baseline model presented in Col-
umn (1), suggesting that firms respond in anticipation to the (CE)LABPTA, not waiting for the
agreement to enter into force. To gain further insight, Column (3) examines the effects of signing
of (CE)LABPTAs, controlling for their entry into force. For our purposes, the main finding of
interest is that the differential effects in exports towards LMICs of LABPTAUS_LMICij,t and
CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t appear to be explained by signing date. This suggests that firms in
high-income (emerging) economies start to reorient their supply lines in anticipation of the entry
into force of a LABPTA. A possible explanation is that sometimes the improvement of labour stan-
dards has been made a condition for signing of the agreement. For instance, the 2006 US–Morocco
trade agreement required reinforcement of the protection against anti-union discrimination before
its ratification (International Labour Organization (ILO) 2013).
Ninth, a potential concern with the model estimated so far is that there might be bilateral
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity affecting our estimates. The inclusion of bilateral fixed
effects (αij) in the main models only captures bilateral time-invariant heterogeneity, and is unable
to control for characteristics changing over time. Aiming to capture bilateral unobservables more
flexibly, in Table 3.16, I follow Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov (2015) and Larch et al. (2019)
and interact the pair fixed effects (αij) with a time trend (Trend). For comparison, I report the
results of Table 3.3 in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) respectively. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)
re-estimate the model including the αij × Trend interaction.77 The results for the full sample –
columns (1) and (2) – suggest that part of the (CE)LABPTA effects in the baseline model captures
common changes in bilateral unobserved heterogeneity (Larch et al. 2019 at p. 507). Hence,
one should be cautious in drawing g strong inferences based on this main specification. Indeed,
only LABPTAUS_INTLij,t and LABPTAEU_INTLij,t remain significant when controlling for
time-varying heterogeneity. On the other hand, the results for the lower-income groups presented in
columns (3) and (4) largely confirm the estimates of the main specification. Additionally, controlling
for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, LABPTAs with the US harm international trade, an
effect that is mostly driven by a drop in imports from LMICs..78 Model (4) also confirms the positive
effect of CELABPTAs with the EU on international trade. Finally, controlling for unobserved
time-varying heterogeneity, it appears that CELABTA/EU_LMIC has a negative effect on exports
77Note that the sample size slightly shrinks with the inclusion of αij × Trend; the reason is that more observations
are dropped because they are separated by a fixed effect.




towards developing countries relative to high-income economies. In line with other robustness
checks, this confirms that the coefficient for this variable is extremely model-dependent. Column
(6) examines LMICs and reveals that with the inclusion of αij ×Trend the estimates are no longer
significant for this subgroup. Finally, Model (8) examines the results for UMI countries. The model
shows results in line with the lower-income group, suggesting that LABPTAs with the US are
associated with waning international exports, explained in particular by a decline in trade towards
LMICs, and that competitors’ engagement with LABPTAs with the EU leads to rising international
exports. The model also finds that in UMI countries, CELABPTAs with the US favour exports
towards high-income countries over exports towards LMICs. This finding is surprising and against
the theoretical expectations; however, it should be viewed with caution as it is the only result of its
kind across many different specifications. All in all, the results of Table 3.16 show that we should
be careful not to generalise all the findings of the baseline model, as accounting for time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity appears to explain some of the effects seen. However, many results are
consistent under alternative specifications, suggesting that some of the mechanisms described in
the theory are occurring.
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3.7.3.1 Controlling for stringency of (CE)LABPTAs
Table 3.8: The effects of LABPTA and CELABPTA accounting for stringency























































Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Robust
standard errors clustered by exporter, importer, and year in squared brackets
(* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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3.7.3.2 Alternative Developing Countries
Table 3.9: Alternative operalizations of developing countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WB 95 WB 87 WB 06 OECD 95
PTA -0.0263 -0.0274 -0.0265 0.0139
(0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.054)
[0.126] [0.123] [0.125] [0.098]
LABPTAUS_INTLij,t -0.688 -0.678 -0.664 -0.619
(0.135)∗∗∗ (0.135)∗∗∗ (0.142)∗∗∗ (0.161)∗∗∗
[0.174]∗∗∗ [0.186]∗∗∗ [0.187]∗∗∗ [0.206]∗∗∗
CELABPTAUS_INTLij,t 0.337 0.345 0.350 0.274
(0.057)∗∗∗ (0.060)∗∗∗ (0.059)∗∗∗ (0.056)∗∗∗
[0.123]∗∗∗ [0.115]∗∗∗ [0.117]∗∗∗ [0.102]∗∗∗
LABPTAEU_INTLij,t 0.519 0.529 0.525 0.733
(0.128)∗∗∗ (0.127)∗∗∗ (0.130)∗∗∗ (0.110)∗∗∗
[0.197]∗∗∗ [0.206]∗∗ [0.204]∗∗ [0.165]∗∗∗
CELABPTAEU_INTLij,t 1.047 1.047 1.030 1.076
(0.075)∗∗∗ (0.075)∗∗∗ (0.075)∗∗∗ (0.073)∗∗∗
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(1) (2) (3) (4)












Observations 78201 78201 78201 78201
pseudo-R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered by exporter,
importer, and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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3.7.3.3 Alternative Competition Measure
Table 3.10: Alternative competition measures
(1) (2)









































Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Standard errors clustered
by exporter, importer, and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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3.7.3.4 Without EU and US as destinations
Table 3.11: LABPTA & CELABPTA without EU and US as destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample No-USA Full Sample No-EU Full Sample No-EU&US
PTA 0.0286 0.0268 0.00724 0.0288 -0.0263 -0.00549
(0.073) (0.069) (0.072) (0.070) (0.070) (0.068)
[0.143] [0.123] [0.112] [0.105] [0.126] [0.113]
LABPTAUS_INTLij,t -0.110 -0.166 -0.688 -0.706
(0.164) (0.112) (0.135)∗∗∗ (0.121)∗∗∗
[0.229] [0.199] [0.174]∗∗∗ [0.190]∗∗∗
LABPTAUS_LMICij,t -0.308 -0.287 -0.301 -0.320
(0.108)∗∗∗ (0.099)∗∗∗ (0.111)∗∗∗ (0.115)∗∗∗
[0.119]∗∗∗ [0.122]∗∗ [0.107]∗∗∗ [0.100]∗∗∗
CELABPTAUS_INTLij,t 0.917 0.862 0.337 0.298
(0.051)∗∗∗ (0.053)∗∗∗ (0.057)∗∗∗ (0.062)∗∗∗
[0.193]∗∗∗ [0.189]∗∗∗ [0.123]∗∗∗ [0.120]∗∗
CELABPTAUS_LMICij,t 0.250 0.213 -0.0651 -0.0404
(0.088)∗∗∗ (0.098)∗∗ (0.082) (0.095)
[0.164] [0.200] [0.150] [0.175]
LABPTAEU_INTLij,t 0.272 0.227 0.519 0.517
(0.142)∗ (0.139) (0.128)∗∗∗ (0.124)∗∗∗
[0.169] [0.110]∗∗ [0.197]∗∗∗ [0.140]∗∗∗
LABPTAEU_LMICij,t -0.408 -0.291 -0.368 -0.203
(0.101)∗∗∗ (0.112)∗∗∗ (0.102)∗∗∗ (0.116)∗
[0.176]∗∗ [0.176]∗ [0.204]∗ [0.194]
CELABPTAEU_INTLij,t 1.259 1.211 1.047 1.054
(0.118)∗∗∗ (0.116)∗∗∗ (0.075)∗∗∗ (0.074)∗∗∗
[0.199]∗∗∗ [0.208]∗∗∗ [0.131]∗∗∗ [0.133]∗∗∗
CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t 0.279 0.245 0.234 0.242
(0.160)∗ (0.159) (0.117)∗∗ (0.117)∗∗
[0.195] [0.196] [0.134]∗ [0.128]∗
Observations 78201 76239 78201 76239 78201 76239
pseudo-R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered by exporter, importer, and year in
squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). In Colum (2), (4) and (6) I drop the observations when the importer is the EU or the
US, and the exporter has a LABPTA with the EU or the US respectively.
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3.7.3.5 Further export destinations
Table 3.12: LABPTA & CELABPTA effects on domestic, LMICs and high-income export destina-
tions
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline model Ref. intra-national Ref. high-income














































Observations 78201 78201 78201
pseudo-R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by exporter, importer, and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). The model report in bold the variable of interest and below the dummy
used for the interaction. These dummies, depend on the characteristics of the destination
country and are thus defined. INTL: 1 for international trade, 0 otherwise. LMIC: 1 for
export destination not a high-income country, 0 otherwise. IHI: 1 for international trade
and export destination is a high-income country, 0 otherwise. ILMICs: 1 for international
trade and export destination is a **not** a high-income country, 0 otherwise. SMCY : 1 for
intra-national trade, 0 otherwise. All variables are included in current values (t).
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3.7.3.7 Lags and Leads
Table 3.14: Estimations with lags and lead of explanatory variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Lag two lag Lags and lead
PTAij,t -0.026 -0.070 -0.124 -0.032
[0.070] [0.117] [0.103] [0.063]






LABPTAUS_INTLij,t -0.688 -0.302 -0.127 0.224
[0.135]∗∗∗ [0.173]∗ [0.125] [0.724]






LABPTAUS_LMICij,t -0.301 -0.193 -0.076 -1.547
[0.111]∗∗∗ [0.100]∗ [0.096] [0.361]∗∗∗






CELABPTAUS_INTLij,t 0.337 0.111 0.148 0.465
[0.057]∗∗∗ [0.072] [0.133] [0.636]






CELABPTAUS_LMICij,t -0.065 0.073 0.142 -0.143
[0.082] [0.149] [0.184] [0.380]






LABPTAEU_INTLij,t 0.519 0.505 0.534 2.595
[0.128]∗∗∗ [0.182]∗∗∗ [0.234]∗∗ [0.852]∗∗∗






LABPTAEU_LMICij,t -0.368 -0.176 -0.382 0.000
[0.102]∗∗∗ [0.192] [0.184]∗∗ [.]





(1) (2) (3) (4)




CELABPTAEU_INTLij,t 1.047 0.453 -0.145 0.120
[0.075]∗∗∗ [0.241]∗ [0.251] [0.801]






CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t 0.234 0.354 0.229 0.487
[0.117]∗∗ [0.157]∗∗ [0.126]∗ [0.243]∗∗






Observations 78201 56738 33417 19399
pseudo-R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.998
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by exporter, importer, and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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3.7.3.8 Signing vs Entry into Force of (CE)LABPTAs
Table 3.15: Signing vs Entry into Force of (CE)LABPTAs
(1) (2) (3)
Entry into Force Ratification EIF & Ratification
PTA -0.026 0.199
[0.070] [0.095]∗∗
































CELABPTAEU_LMICij,t ratif. 0.315 0.475
[0.122]∗∗∗ [0.220]∗∗
Observations 78201 78201 78201
pseudo-R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes




3.7.3.9 Controlling for unboserved dyad heterogeneity
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The Impact of the China Shock on
Brazil’s Efforts to Combat Child Labour
4.1 Introduction
A global consensus exists about the need to eradicate child labour (CL) (Sahin and Ghosh
2016 at p. 27). Indeed, Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour recently became
the first Convention in ILO history to achieve universal ratification (ILO 2020).1 Moreover, the
eradication of child labour is one of the UN sustainable development goals (8.7). Thanks to
multilateral efforts, economic growth and national legislations, the world has made substantial
progress towards reaching this objective (Chatterjee and Ray 2016; Guedes Vieira 2018; Tariq and
Ab-Rahim 2020). According to ILO estimates, there were almost “134 million fewer children in
employment in 2016 than in 2000” (International Labour Organization 2017 at p. 11). However,
despite this progress, the incidence of child labour remains a disturbing feature of many emerging
economies harming the welfare, health and socio-economic opportunities of millions of children,
while also damaging the long term development of these countries (Chatterjee and Ray 2016; Sahin
and Ghosh 2016; Guedes Vieira 2018). Recent global estimates suggest that in 2015, there were
over 152 million children and adolescents working (International Labour Organization 2017).2
Scholars have studied in depth the multiple economic, social and cultural elements causing
1In August 2020.
2Age 5 to 17.
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this phenomenon (Guedes Vieira 2018 at p. 10).3 The focus of political economists has been the
impact of globalization on working children (Tariq and Ab-Rahim 2020; Fors 2012a). In particular,
existing empirical studies investigate the effects of increasing trade openness on child labour. Most
results suggest that liberalizations are associated with a decline of children working (Neumayer
and De Soysa 2005; Eric V. Edmonds and Pavcnik 2006a; Davies and Voy 2009; Edmonds 2016).
The idea is that trade improves incomes and living standards of poor households hence reducing
the supply of child labour (Ab-Rahim and Tariq 2016 at p. 18).
Looking at federative state-level data on child labour (age 5-14) from Brazil, this paper aims
to contribute to this literature further examining the complicated relationship that links child
labour to international trade.4 Drawing insights from the scholarship examining the relationship
between trade and collective labour standards, we contend that existing studies might have
overestimated the positive effects of trade openness on the employment of children. Academics
have argued extensively that the influence of trade on labour standards does not depend on the
overall level of trade openness. Rather it is affected by the labour standards of trading partners
(Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009 at p. 699). Some scholars contend that trade can engender a
“California effect”, whereby firms exporting to destinations with higher levels of labour standards
are incentivized to improve working conditions (Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Vogel 1995).
Recently, however, some studies found evidence of a “Shanghai Effect” whereby, as China rises as
a major export destination at the expense of other importers, developing countries start to reflect
the lower labour standards of China (Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017; Gamso 2017; Newman
et al. 2018; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018). According to this literature, the increasing salience of
Chinese imports may generate different incentives when it comes to labour rights. While exporting
to countries with high labour standards can create “artificial” stimuli to ameliorate working
conditions, Chinese purchases may create downward pressure on workers rights. This impact is
attributable to multiple causes: China’s stated policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs
of political and economic partners (Jacobs 2011); its own history of violation of core labour rights;
the intense price competition that Chinese firms experience combined with limited accountability
mechanisms such as the restricted presence of labour activists, independent unions, or a free press in
the country (Eccles, Newquist, and Schatz 2007; Estlund 2017; Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017).
3Cfr. with Fors (2012b) for a literature review of all the micro and macroeconomic factors affecting child labour.
4From now on the word “state” will exclusively be used to refer to the federative units of Brazil. In contrast, the
word “country” is used to refer to nations in general.
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Aiming to contribute to this debate, this paper examines whether the rise of China as the largest
destination for Brazilian exports affected child labour incidence in the country. We argue that
despite the general downward trend, which can be explained by economic growth and the success
of national policies such as the Bolsa Família, the rise of China as a major export destination
may have slowed progress in preventing children from joining the workforce. Moreover, we engage
with the literature examining the spatial dynamics that trade competition generates to assess
whether increasing export shares towards China affect labour standards of competitors states
(Mosley 2017b; Koenig-Archibugi 2017; Mosley and Uno 2007). The race to the bottom literature
would suggest that states can competitively increase the number of children in the workforce to
reduce production costs and attract Chinese buyers (cfr. Davies and Vadlamannati 2013; Olney
2013). Conversely, other scholars contend that trade competition can trigger divergent strategic
behaviours. In this perspective, some states specialize in targeting the Chinese market experiencing
a rise (or a slower decline) in child labour incidence. At the same time, their competitors can
decide to specialize in targeting higher-end markets, promoting a faster decline in the number of
children working (cfr. Koenig-Archibugi 2017; Baland and Duprez 2009).
To test whether the growing relevance of China as a major export destination increases the
number of children in the workforce of the state and whether this affects child labour incidence
in competitor states, we employ a Spatially Lagged Autoregressive model (SLX) using OLS and a
shift-share instrumental approach to account for the potential endogeneity of our findings (Bastos,
Silva, and Verhoogen 2018). Our results are consistent with the “Shanghai Effect” hypothesis
showing that states that rely more on China for exports have higher child labour incidence.
However, they also reveal that more child labour in a state reduces the frequency of children in the
workforce of its competitors. This result suggests that Brazilian states engage in divergent forms
of strategic interactions. Rather than downgrading in parallel with their competitors to exploit
the rise of Chinese markets, they experience a decline in the share of children in the workforce that
(should) facilitate trade towards more socially concerned nations (cfr. Koenig-Archibugi 2017;
Baland and Duprez 2009).
We also explore the trade-CL link from the opposite perspective and examine if having more
children in the workforce enhances exports towards China relative to other destinations. Indeed,
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we contend that the relationship between trade and child labour can go in both directions. While
exporting more to China may lead to an increasing number of children working, it is also possible
that having more child labour promotes exports towards China. For the same reasons discussed
above, importers from China may be more willing to purchase cheaper goods even if this price
advantage comes at the expense of workers’ welfare. Finally, we also examine if a state engagement
in child labour shapes its competitors’ export profile. The idea is that if states where more
children are employed have a comparative advantage in exporting to China, their competitors may
struggle to target the Chinese market and will have to rely more on alternative importers. In other
words, child labour in competing states may depress exports towards China and favour exports to
alternative destinations. To test these hypotheses, we use a Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood
estimator (PPML) on a structural gravity equation with three-way fixed effects and multi-way
clustering of the errors (Correia, Guimarães, and Zylkin 2020; Larch et al. 2019; Anderson and
Van Wincoop 2003; Baier and Bergstrand 2007). We adopt an innovative identification strategy
that allows us to identify the effect of a country-level variable in the context of three-way fixed
effects interacting the variable of interest with a dummy for Chinese exports (Beverelli et al. 2018;
Heid, Larch, and Yotov 2020). Controlling for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, we find that
having more children in the workforce has a positive impact on exports towards China relative to
the rest of the world. On the other hand, we do not find (consistent) evidence suggesting that
child labour impact export destinations of competitor states. These effects are consistent across a
series of robustness checks.
The next section of this paper reviews the relevant literature and introduces the main hypotheses
examined. The third section presents the data and the variables of interest. Section four and five
discuss the model specification and the main results of the analysis. The final section concludes.
4.2 Literature review, historical and theoretical context
4.2.1 The relationship between trade openness and child labour
Child labour has many causes, which include economic, social and cultural elements. Scholars
argue that difficult access to quality public education, insufficient socio-economic policies, cultural
influences that have an “exclusively positive view of work as a means of social advancement”
and, most importantly, poverty are among the most relevant (Cfr. Guedes Vieira 2018 at p. 10;
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Edmonds 2016; Tariq and Ab-Rahim 2020; Banerjee and Nag 2013; Fors 2012a). International
trade is also considered a prominent channel that can affect the incidence of child labour (Fors
2012a). Theoretical models predict that trade openness can both increase or reduce the incidence
of child work (cfr. Basu and Van 1998; Cigno and Rosati 2005; Doepke and Zilibotti 2010; Sahin
and Ghosh 2016; Tariq and Ab-Rahim 2020). Generally speaking, pessimistic views argue that
trade openness induces firms and governments seeking to retain and attract export opportunities
to ‘weaken their labour standards in an effort to reduce their production costs’ (Gamso 2017 at
p. 4). Provided that children have lower wages than adults, trade liberalization may induce firms
aiming to gain a comparative advantage to employ more children (Singh and Zammit 2004; Davies
and Vadlamannati 2013). Pessimists also argue that, even if trade openness positively impacts the
wages of unskilled workers, it could increase the number of children in the workforce. Growing
returns for unskilled child labour reduce the relative returns from education hence incentivizing
children to work (cfr. Neumayer and De Soysa 2005; Doepke and Zilibotti 2010). Conversely,
more optimistic studies contend that trade openness can reduce the number of children in the
workforce. Liberalizations increment the value of exported goods, which may increase the real
wages in the exporting sectors (Davies and Voy 2009; Tariq and Ab-Rahim 2020). The rising
income of unskilled labour will reduce poverty, allowing parents to invest in the education of their
children rather than sending them to work (Basu and Van 1998; Neumayer and De Soysa 2005;
Tariq and Ab-Rahim 2020).
The empirical literature confirms more optimistic views. Using cross-country data, many
scholars found that trade openness and FDI are negatively correlated with child labour (Neumayer
and De Soysa 2005; Davies and Voy 2009; Eric V. Edmonds and Pavcnik 2006a; Edmonds 2016;
Ab-Rahim and Tariq 2016). According to these scholars, the dominant channel through which
trade influences child labour is by improving living standards in developing countries (Edmonds
2010). Hence, it is thanks to the effect of trade openness on income that liberalization reduces
the rate of children working (Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005; Eric V. Edmonds and Pavcnik 2006b;
Edmonds and Schady 2012). It is important to note that these studies share a collective focus on
the supply-side of child labour while by-and-large ignoring the demand-side. Indeed, as Dinopoulos
and Laixun (2007) stress, while the supply-side effect of trade liberalization can be normatively
positive, in that it can alleviate pressure felt by parents to have their children involved in market
activities, the demand-side effect requires further attention. Estevez (2010) finds that, when facing
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competition from more advanced firms in other countries, Southern firms increase their demand
for child labour leading to more children working. Moreover, as French and Wokutch (2005) note,
benevolent parents are not the only actors in the supply-side story. In fact, in some areas of Brazil
where the production of low-skill manufactured exports (such as shoes) make up a large part of
the local economy, children sometimes want to work, alone or alongside their parents, whether for
personal spending money or to contribute to their household. In light of this research, it appears
that an exclusive focus on parents’ choices and in general on the supply of child labour may
conceal heterogeneity in the effects of trade. This research aims to contribute to this literature
and examine how changes in importers’ demand affect child labour.
The debate that examines the relationship between child labour and trade liberalization is
embedded in a broader discussion on the effects of globalization and labour standards (Caraway
2009). In this domain, scholars examining how international trade affects freedom of association
and bargaining rights moved from merely looking at how much a country trades to examine with
whom a country trades (Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Gamso 2017; Mosley 2017a). They
argued that what triggered improvements in labour standards was not trade per se, but bilateral
exports with countries with high labour conditions. Looking at over 90 developing countries for
15 years, Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash (2009) found that producer countries improved their
protection of collective labour rights when the export destination countries had stringent labour
laws. They adopted the term “California Effect” to describe how states with strong labour laws
facilitated the diffusion of decent working standards in other jurisdictions.5 Bilateral trade flows
with developed countries can contribute to improving labour conditions in numerous ways. For
instance, the United States and European Union (EU) often promote improvements in labour
conditions through political pressure, conditioning market access to labour reforms and stringent
monitoring (Hafner-Burton, Mosley, and Galantucci 2019; Gamso 2017; Hafner-Burton 2005;
Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014). Moreover, multinational corporations from advanced economies
- facing pressures from trade unions, NGOs and human rights groups – often adopt private
regulations to ensure that their suppliers respect basic human and labour rights (Adolph, Quince,
5The insight is drawn from the environmental literature. Vogel illustrated that trade relations with highly regulated
markets, such as California, facilitated the diffusion of environmental standards to other countries (Vogel 1995;
Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009). He introduced the term ‘California effect’ to illustrate how the introduction




and Prakash 2017; Mosley 2017a).6 For companies, this is a self-interested behaviour, given that
international scandals can affect long term profits (cfr. Eccles, Newquist, and Schatz 2007; Lin-Hi
and Blumberg 2011).
Recently, scholars started to examine the effect of the rise of emerging economies as major
export destination countries. Adolph, Quince, and Prakash (2017) finds that African countries
start to reflect the lower labour standards of emerging markets as exports to China increase
significantly at the expense of Northern destinations. This “Shangai effect” occurs as the results of
the different characteristics of South-South trade. Contrary to traditional trading partners, China
tends to highly value the principle of non-interference into the domestic affairs of other coun-
tries. Moreover, in contrast to developed countries, multinational “firms in developing countries
perceive relatively little pressure from the public with regards to corporate social responsibility
disclosure” (Ali, Frynas, and Mahmood 2017 at p. 273). The argument of the “Shanghai Effect”
is that Chinese multinationals may not value to the same extent as Northern multinationals the
process-standards of their suppliers, and hence may create a downward pressure in labour standards.
To the best of our knowledge, the child labour literature has remained focused on looking at
trade openness per se, with no attention to the possible heterogeneous effects of different export
destinations. Building on the insights of the aforementioned trade-labour scholarship, we argue
that child labour scholars may have overestimated the positive impact of liberalization on children
working. Indeed, most of the studies examining the liberalization-CL link focused on a period
when the largest importers had on average superior labour standards compared to the developing
countries and had strong sentiments against child employment (cfr. Neumayer and De Soysa 2005;
Davies and Voy 2009; Eric V. Edmonds and Pavcnik 2006a). This may have created incentives
for suppliers to not engage in child labour. The rise of emerging economies as a major export
destination could have changed the incentive structures for developing countries to tackle child
labour, potentially triggering an increase in child labour incidence. To be sure, we do not question
that growth and development can lead to a reduction of child labour in the long run. Rather, we
argue that when the major export destination are countries with high labour standards, they can
create additional incentives to avoid child labour, that might be no longer there as other importers
6A recent study by Distelhorst and Locke corroborated this idea. Looking at firm-level data – rather than
country-level – they showed that retailers in the north consistently reward suppliers employing higher standards, with
increasing purchases (Distelhorst and Locke 2018).
125
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW, HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT CHAPTER 4
rise to prominence. The aim is hence to expand the understanding of the CL-trade link exploring
the effects of different demands.
4.2.2 The rise of China as a significant import destination for Brazilian exports
It is hard to overstate the importance of China in the global economy. Since the country joined
the WTO in 2001, it experienced a spectacular rise in both exports and imports, and in 2013 it
became the world’s leading trading nation (Jenkins 2019, 2012).7 This has had major impacts on
Brazil, that is China’s most significant partner in Latin America.
Brazil started to unilaterally liberalize, engaging in global trade, in the early 1990s (Dix-
Carneiro, Soares, and Ulyssea 2018 at p. 159). After difficult periods of adjustment, which
included extremely high rates of inflation (reaching 2.781% in 1993) and widespread hollowing
out of de facto labour standards, the economy began to stabilize following the implementation of
the Real Plan in the mid-1990s and rapid growth in inward foreign investment and exports, in
particular investment from and exports to the United States and European countries (Fleury and
Humphrey 1993; Ferraz, Kupfer, and Serrano 1999; Matesco and Hasenclever 2000). However,
the export profile of the country significantly changed at the turn of the millennium. Between
2001 and 2015, Brazil’s exports to China increased almost twenty-fold, and imports have grown
almost twenty-four-fold (Sturgeon et al. 2013).8 Since 2010, China is the single largest im-
porter of Brazilian products. Figure 4.1 compares export shares and export volumes of the
four largest importers of Brazilian goods between 2001 and 2015. China imports accounted
for only 3.5% of the total in 2001, while today it accounts for almost 20% of the total. The
figure also reveals that while China becomes increasingly important as an export destination,
the shares of exports going to the United States and the European Union have constantly declined.9.
7Including imports and exports.
8Figures from authors calculations using COMEX data. Do note that Brazil has a positive trade balance with
China.
9To note that this rise of China as an economic and political partner of Brazil is not only the consequence of
Chinese economic growth but also the results of strategic considerations. Indeed, after Lula became president in 2003,
developing relations with China became part of a government strategy to diversify the country’s foreign relations
(Jenkins 2019). The global financial crisis further boosted economic relations, and in 2012, China-Brazil relations
became part of a Strategic Global Partnership (Jenkins 2019 at p. 300). To note, however, that Worker’s Party (PT)




Figure 4.1: Import share and import volumes from the largest importers
The rise of China changed Brazil’s role in the global economy, leading to the so-called
“primarization” of Brazilian exports (Sturgeon et al. 2013; Mortatti, Miranda, and Bacchi 2011;
Jenkins 2015; De Freitas 2020). On the one hand, the country benefited from the massive demand
of China for primary products and the constant rise of commodity prices.10 On the other hand,
Brazil struggled to challenge the competitiveness of Chinese manufacturing products, increasingly
relying on imports for technological goods going through an early de-industrialization process
(Callegari, Melo, and Carvalho 2018; Da Costa Oreiro, Agostini, and Gala 2020). This process
harmed the domestic manufacturing sector that lost market shares in the USA, the EU, and
Latin America (Jenkins 2014; Callegari, Melo, and Carvalho 2018). Indeed, Chinese imports are
characterized by the demand of goods with a low level of processing, creating new challenges for the
country to upgrade towards higher added value activities (Zhang and Schimanski 2014; Callegari,
Melo, and Carvalho 2018; Sturgeon et al. 2013). For instance, soybeans are the most crucial
export to China; in 2015, they accounted for over 45% of the total exports to the country. Less
than 1% of this value was from processed soybeans.11 This phenomenon is partially explained by
10Especially until 2011 (Callegari, Melo, and Carvalho 2018).
11Result from authors’ calculations. But this is a well-know phenomenon that Brazil hardly exports any soybean
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China’s policy of imposing tariff measures to favour domestic producers (Jenkins 2012 at p. 28-29).12
Scholars are starting to examine the impact of the Chinese rise and the “primarization” of
exports on Brazil. Some attention has been on investigating its economic impact or the shocks it
had on the labour market.13 To our knowledge, this is the first paper that empirically examines if
the China Shock has affected child labour (cfr. Costa, Garred, and Pessoa 2016; Paz 2016; Jenkins
2019, 2015). A preliminary analysis of the data shows that, in the past three decades, Brazil made
tremendous progress towards the eradication of child labour. Between 1995 and 2013, the number
of children working declined by nearly 60%, which corresponds to about 4.5 million children, as
illustrated by Figure 4.2.14 Reducing children in the workforce has been a priority in the agenda
and the policies of the Brazilian government. The administration of President Lula implemented
the Bolsa Família program, which provides a stipend to needy families for each of up to 3 children
that they keep in school (Brauw et al. 2015). The program has been generally very successful at
inadvertently reducing the supply of child labour and has received praise within and without Brazil
(The World Bank 2008). Moreover, since the 1990s, Brazil increased the focus of labour inspection
on the identification and eradication of child labour which De Almeida and Kassouf (2016) find
has had a substantial and significant impact on the rate of child labour in Brazil. These efforts,
together with significant economic growth, undoubtedly played an essential role in tackling this
issue.
4.2.3 Hypotheses
In this paper, we ask whether the rise of China as a significant export destination has facilitated
or delayed these improvements. Building on Adolph, Quince, and Prakash (2017), we argue that
China’s rising trade salience may have partially harmed efforts to eradicate child labour in the
country. The fundamental idea is that exporting to China generates different competitive pressures
when it comes to child labour compared to other major trading partners (Gamso 2017). Several
meal, flour, or oil to China (Jenkins 2019).
12Indeed China imposes 9% tariffs on processed soybeans while only a 3% tariff on unprocessed ones (cfr. Sturgeon
et al. 2013).
13It is important to keep in mind that many indicators have improved significantly in the past two decades.
Unemployment managed to hit a record low in 2014, Brazil was finally removed from the UN Hunger Map, and the
percentage of people living in extreme poverty (under $5 per day) declined from 40% in 2002 to a low of 18% in 2014




Figure 4.2: Million of Child Workers in Brazil, age 5-17, 1992-2014
arguments can be made in support of this claim.
First, there are reasons to believe that Chinese firms and consumers will be less concerned with
child labour than companies from other countries. Indeed, labour standards in China are markedly
lower than in other major importers and are much worse than in Brazil (Kucera and Sari 2018).
Child labour itself is widely diffused in China. Some estimates suggest that about 7.7% of all
Chinese children aged 10-15 are working (Tang, Zhao, and Zhao 2018). Importers that do not
need to worry about child labour or decent labour standard at home are not likely to incentivise
suppliers abroad to reduce the number of children working. Moreover, Chinese firms are less likely
to face severe scrutiny from NGOs, activist groups, trade unions and media when it comes to
labour conditions in their suppliers (Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017; Jenkins 2019). This lack
of scrutiny could create incentives to turn a blind eye to child labour for Chinese importers. Along
these lines, recent evidence suggests that Chinese penetration discourages unionisation or private
regulation involvement in other developing countries (Newman et al. 2018; Isaksson and Kotsadam
2018).
Second, Chinese firms generate intense price competition for suppliers that is likely to increase
the incidence of child labour. In Brazil, child labour is a source of comparative advantage when it
comes to labour cost.15 It is estimated that on average, children earn 72% of the minimum salary.
15It may be argued that though children are cheaper they are also less productive, hence child labour does not
necessarily provide a comparative advantage. Qualitative evidence, however, suggests the contrary. For instance, a
recent study from the Cocoa supply chain in Brazil finds that low salaries are “one of the determining factors for the
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In the agricultural sector the situation is even worse as children are paid 60% of the minimum
salary (Dias 2016, at p.28).16 Aiming to remain competitive and take full advantage of Chinese
growth, producers in Brazil may try to cut labour costs, employing children. To be sure, importers
from other countries also fiercely pursue price advantages. However, the reduced concern for child
labour and most importantly, the limited scrutiny of Chinese firms, may result in more children
working when China is the main importer.
Third, exports to China are more likely to come from rural areas of the country, given that they
are concentrated in the agricultural and mineral sector. Both of these elements could have an impact
on the incidence of children employment. Agriculture accounts for the largest share of children
working in Brazil (International Labour Organization 2017). In 2015, 56.4% of the estimated 618800
children (age 5-14) working was employed in the agricultural sector (Sholl Cintra, Bobadilla, and
Gauto 2017). Moreover, agriculture is by far the sector where children are more intensively involved
in the production of traded goods (Edmonds 2010).17 Hence, there is the concrete possibility
that increasing demand for cheap agricultural labour in rural areas, will incentivise child labour.
Moreover, even if children do not work directly for the exporting companies, Chinese imports may
increase the demand for child labour provided that they are employed in a sector, formal or informal,
“which supplies inputs to the export sector” (Neumayer and De Soysa 2005 at p. 45; Maskus 1997;
Ab-Rahim and Tariq 2016). Again, this is more likely to occur in rural areas of the country, where
child labour is embedded in cultural habits. For instance, Salzburger (2010) argues that in the
Northern region of the country, “most of the people who are parents today started working before
they were eight years old” (at p. 2).
Finally, evidence from coffee production in the country suggests that, in Brazil, increases in
worker wages may be positively associated with child labour and negatively associated with school
attendance (Kruger 2007). In this vein, Kruger (2007) argues that growth in the value of labour’s
output, may incentivise parents to take advantage of higher wages sending children to work. Hence,
even if Costa, Garred, and Pessoa (2016) finds that in Brazil, locations benefiting from rising
Chinese commodity demand experienced faster wage growth this may not have had a positive
existence of child labour” and that “there is a direct relationship between child labour and the low price paid for
cocoa” (Picolotto et al. 2018, at p.34). Moreover, evidence suggests that children are often employed in activities
where they are likely to be as productive as adults. For instance, in the Cocoa Supply chain, they are employed to use
their “small hands” to remove the seed from the cocoa pod (Picolotto et al. 2018, at p.30).
16Estimates are for children age 10-17; younger children are likely to be paid even less.
17As Edmonds (2010) notices, children often work in sectors that are not involved directly in international trade.
For instance, in the manufacturing sector, exporting firms tend to be relatively more “skill-intensive” and scarcely




impact on the number of children working. We hence hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 1: The more China becomes a salient importer, the more children will be
employed.
In this paper, we also aim to contribute to the literature examining how competitive dynamics
triggered by international trade can shape labour outcomes (Davies and Vadlamannati 2013; Olney
2013; Barrientos et al. 2016). Scholars argued that globalisation could trigger a race to the bottom
in labour standards (Mosley 2017b). The idea is that in order to diminish production costs, attract
more investment, and remain competitive in global exports, countries may competitively undercut
labour standards. In this perspective, the more a firm’s competitors are able to target the Chinese
market, the more it might face pressure to reduce costs to take full advantage of the Chinese rise.
In other words, to remain attractive for Chinese importers and avoid losing (relative) access to
this market, firms may decide to downgrade in parallel with their peers (convergent competition).
Alternatively, scholars have recently hypothesised that firms can also engage in divergent patters of
strategic competition (Koenig-Archibugi 2017; Duprez 2012; Baland and Duprez 2009). The idea
is that rather competing for the same end market, firms could decide to exploit the market niche
left open by their competitor specialisation targeting exporters with dissimilar preferences when it
comes to labour standards.18 In this view, the more a firm has competitors exporting to China,
the less it will employ children in order to be able to target more child labour conscious markets.
Building from these insights, we also explore the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.1 (Convergent competition): The more a state’s competitors export
to China, the more it will employ children.
and
Hypothesis 2.2 (Divergent competition): The more a state’s competitors export to
China, the less it will employ children.
Finally, we aim to expand the literature on child labour, examining how having children in
the workforce affects trade patterns. To our knowledge, this is the first paper examining this
18Do note that this theory was postulated to examine if labour policies aiming at improving labour standards may
displace these abuses to competitors (cfr. Koenig-Archibugi 2017; Duprez 2012; Baland and Duprez 2009). The idea
is that as some suppliers focus on targeting socially concerned buyers, others may decide to specialise in targeting the
more price-sensitive segment of the market. We argue that there is no economic or theoretical reason to believe that
this form of strategic competition may not be occurring in the opposite direction as well. In other words, the more
competitors export to China, the more a state will have incentives to improve its labour standards.
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relationship.19 We argue that there are good reasons to believe that the China-CL link runs in
both directions. As previously discussed, increasing exports towards China can create incentives to
employ more children. However, it is also possible that having more children working may attract
more Chinese buyers in the first place. Indeed, the same reasons that explain why exporting more to
China could lead to increasing children working could also explain the phenomenon in the opposite
direction. Price sensitive Chinese importers facing little scrutiny on the labour conditions of their
suppliers abroad might be more willing to purchase from suppliers that, directly or indirectly,
employ children. Some empirical evidence seems to support the idea that Chinese firms may be
more inclined to turn a blind eye to questionable behaviours. Indeed, Grauwe, Houssa, and Piccillo
(2012) found that China is more likely to import from African countries with authoritarian and
corrupt regimes than other significant importers. Finally, we also examine if the effects of child
labour on export patterns exhibit spatial dynamics. We hypothesize that the more a firm will
employ child labour, the less its competitors trade with China. Indeed, if hiring more children
is a source of comparative advantage thanks to lower labour costs, having competitors employing
children will, all else equal, cause a decline in exports towards China.20 Hence we also test the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3 : The more a state has a high child labour incidence, the more it will
export to China relative to other importers.
Hypothesis 4 : The more a state has competitors engaging in child labour the less it
will export to China relative to other importers.
4.3 Data and Summary Statistics
While it would be extremely interesting to test our hypothesis on firm-level, in this study,
we use data measured at the state-sector-year level. The reason is that firm-level data on child
labour is not available. We note, however, that it is not uncommon to construct measures of
trade exposure or competition and labour outcomes at regional levels when analysing changes in
collective demand, such as in this study where we are exploring the inter-relationship between trade
competition and exports to China and the collective demand for child labour (see, for example,
19Previous studies showed that reducing child labour can increase international trade (Siroën 2017).
20This effect is going to be particularly large if using child labour is also a source of loss of comparative advantage
in exporting to more socially concerned markets. If this is the case, not only having competitors engaging in child
labour will alienate Chinese buyers, but it will also attract alternative importers.
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Gaddis and Pieters 2012). Moreover, we argue that using state-level data may also have some
benefits. In particular, in our analysis, we can capture the effect of the China Shock on children
that may not be directly employed by exporting firms, but that formally or informally supply
inputs to the export sector. We would not be able to capture this effect using more granular data.
We rely on two primary sources for our data: the COMEXSTAT and the IBGE. The former,
a trade statistics portal maintained by the Brazilian Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria,
Comércio Exterior e Serviços (MDIC), provides regularly updated bilateral import and export
statistics at the national, regional, state and municipal level in Brazil. This data is further dis-
aggregated by international trade partners, product type (according to a variety of international,
regional, and national product classification codes) and measured in dollar amount. From here, we
drew the primary export statistics that we also use to create our trade competition W matrix.
Figure 4.3: Exports towards China as a share of the state GDP: 2001-2015 comparison
The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), is the Brazilian government’s statis-
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tics institute which is responsible for collection and maintenance of official economic, demographic,
and geographic data. One of their main data products is the Pesquisa Nacional da Amostra Domi-
ciliar, or PNAD, an annual household survey conducted across Brazil. It contains information on
individuals’ socio-economic, political, educational, demographic characteristics and other informa-
tion. The PNAD survey is run every year except for those years in which the decennial Censo
Demografico occurs (such as in 2010). This means that to construct a full panel across the years
of our study, 2001-2015, we supplement the PNAD survey data with that of the decennial census.
This is not problematic because, due to the stratified sampling procedure of PNAD, it is represen-
tative at the state level, the level at which we run our analysis, making the data supplementary
(Silva, Pessoa, and Lila 2002; IBGE 2007). Of particular interest for us are responses contained
in the census and survey microdata concerning whether a respondent had worked that week for
pay or non-wage remuneration and their age. Using these answers, we constructed our child labour
indicator. We measure the Child labour Rate as:
CLik,t = ΣChildEmpik,t/ΣChildi,t (4.1)
That is, the proportion of children, aged 5-14, employed in state i, sector k, at time t of all
children in state i and time t.21 An alternative measure could have been the absolute number of
children as employed in a given state and sector at any given year, but this would ignore variation
in the sampling as well as variation in influential factors such as variation in population over time
and across states. In addition to this child labour variable, we utilized responses concerning the
level of education, race and ethnicity, sex, and informal employment in order to create state-level
controls for the rate of primary school completion, the proportion of people of colour, proportion
of the population that is female, and the rate of informal employment. It is important to note that
as we merge sectoral level data on child labour with sectoral level trade data, we only include in
our sample those children that work for sectors involved in exports. Excluding, for instance, those
that work in retail, services or constructions. We matched the sectoral trade and child labour data
by converting the existing sectoral classifications in the COMEX and PNAD/Census data using
concordance tables (modified where necessary) available online from the IBGE.22
21We choose the age group 5-14 because the ILO defines child labour in Convention 138 as including children up to
the age of 15. To be sure, the Convention allows for developing countries to set to 14 the minimum working age for
children, and indeed, the Brazilian constitution prohibits work all children under the age of 14. However, we include
children aged 14 in our sample because in Brazil this is the last year of compulsory schooling, and hence working
during this time could affect their educational and mental development of young persons.
22Original tables available at: https://concla.ibge.gov.br/classificacoes/correspondencias/atividades-economicas.h
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We also rely on multiple secondary data sources for various controls. The IBGE provides
macroeconomic, political, and population data at the state level; the Instituto de Pesquisa
Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), a government-led, policy-oriented research institute headquartered
in Rio de Janeiro and Brasília; and the Repositório de Dados Eleitorais of the Tribual Superior
Eleitoral (TSE) from which we draw recent gubernatorial election data. From the IBGE and IPEA,
we take measures for the GDP per capita and GDP growth per state, as well as the estimated
population for each state in each year. Each of these macro-level controls allows us to proxy
for state-level economic and demographic growth. We also include a dichotomous variable that
indicates whether there is a Worker’s Party (PT) governor in each state and year. Feierherd (2017)
finds that local PT governments can have a strong influence over labour-related outcomes in Brazil
given their outspoken dedication to protecting workers and the weak or defenceless and their ties
to local labour inspection offices and officers. Our main dependent and independent variables are
measured at the state-sector-year level while our other controls are measured at the state-year level.
Figure 4.3 and 4.4 help to visualize state-level evolution of export to China. Two elements
stand out. First, that export to China as a share of GDP went from being close to 0 for most
Brazilian states to become an important part of their GDP, particularly in the more rural areas
of the country. Second, Figure 4.4 shows that the states that rely more on China for exports are
located in the Center-West or the Northeast, while traditionally more export-oriented regions of the
South and Southeast seem to rely less on China for their exports. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate the
evolution of the distribution of child labour rates in Brazil from 2001-2015. It is clear by looking
at the graphs, that the rate of child labour has declined markedly over the years throughout much
of the country. This is most striking in some of the northeastern states such as Maranhão and
Piauí, with more modest decreases in the South, Southeast, and Center-West. Toward the end of
the period, there appears to be a general equalization of the spread of child labour across the states
and regions, as those states in which child labour was more widespread saw drastic reductions.
According to Dias (2016), using data from PNAD, child labour in Brazil decreased 57.1% between
1992 and 2014 in absolute terms, representing 4.4 million children. What is troubling is that at the
tail end of this period, there has been a regressive increase in child labour. For instance, despite




in the majority of Brazilian states.23. It is worth noticing that, given the general trends in exports
towards China and child labour, if our model is misspecified, we are more likely to find a negative,
rather than a positive association between the two.
Figure 4.5: Child labour in Brazil 2001 and 2015
4.4 Model Specification
4.4.1 Constructing spatial weight matrix
An important component of spatial econometric models is the spatial weights matrix. It is
a non-random matrix that specifies the spatial relationship between observations exogenously.
Hence, the spatial weights matrix W specifies what constitutes a neighbourhood and how and
whether potential neighbours interact. There are many possible ways to define the spatial weight
matrix. There are (queen and rook) contiguity matrices, inverted distance, nearest neighbours, k
nearest neighbours, economically interactive, and on. While there is an ongoing discussion as to
how best to determine empirically what is the correct matrix (which has led to some scepticism
regarding the use of spatial econometrics in general) we side with a theory-driven approach
advanced by the likes of Corrado and Fingleton (2012) and Cook, An, and Favero (2019).
23This is likely due in part to the persistent, sequential economic crises the country has endured amid economic
restructuring characterized by rapid de-industrialization and a return to a focus on production and exports of
commodities following the China Shock in the early 2000s (Jenkins and De Freitas Barbosa 2012; Millar 2014; Jenkins
2015; Da Costa Oreiro, Agostini, and Gala 2020).
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Figure 4.6: Child labour in Regions of Brazil 2001-2015
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We use two main spatial weights matrices. The first examines spatial dynamics looking at
patterns of export competition. In this vein, international political economists have long noted
that spatial dynamics often transcend simple geography (Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006).
The fundamental idea is that, in the global market, companies and geographic units such as states
compete with other producers of similar goods around the world, regardless of where they are
located. In building our competition weight (W ) we follow Guler et al. (2002) and much of the
succeeding literature, measuring similarity in export portfolios. This measure captures the simili-
tude of states’ sector-level export profiles – i.e. looking at product similarities in exports portfolios
with no discrimination on export destinations (Chatagnier and Kavaklı 2017; Wang 2017; Baccini
and Koenig-Archibugi 2014; Cao 2010; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons
2006; Polillo and Guillén 2005; Guler et al. 2002).24 We used exported good product classification
based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC)
rev. 3. In the baseline specification, we look at similarity in exported goods at two digits of the
ISIC rev. 3 (United Nations 1990).25 The result is a WISIC,iz,t matrix that measures the Pearson
correlation (similarity) of exported goods between state i and competitor z at time t.26 There are
practical reasons to prefer ISIC to the HS product classification. Most importantly, we can match
child labour data to the specific ISIC sector in which children are working. At the same time, it
is not possible to achieve similar concordance using the HS classification. Second, we believe that
looking at similarity in exported goods by the economic activity that produced them allows to
24It must be said that the recent scholarship has developed an alternative approach that measures competition taking
into account the similarity in export destination (Kim, Liao, and Imai 2020). While this is a welcomed advancement,
these measures are inadequate to address the questions of this paper. Including export destination as a measure of
similarity - beyond being the main dependent variable - would be theoretically inconsistent. For instance, two states
with completely different export destinations would not be competing even if they export the same goods. Hence,
changes in child labour in one state would not affect the other. This is hardly justifiable theoretically. For instance, if
a state that widely adopts child labour and trades exclusively with China starts implementing policies that reduce
child labour, it may favour its competitors’ (at the sector-level) access to the Chinese market, even if initially they
had no access to it. Hence, competition should focus on similarity of products or the productive industries rather
than at the current export destination.
25The complete list of sectors at the two and the three-digit level of the ISIC rev.3 is presented in Table 4.6 in the
Annexes. While it is possible to measure competition at the fourth digit and the first digit of the ISIC classification,
these alternatives have problems. The first digit appears to be very broad, grouping together all manufacturing
and all agriculture production, hence it is arguably a less precise measure of competition. Conversely, the fourth
digit is very detailed. However, in developing countries, refined granular data for exported products suffer from
severe problems of missing observations; this may be particularly true for the poorer states of Brazil. Hence, using
fine-grained product-level measures risks creating a systematic bias as poorer states would regularly have a less precise
measure of competition. Using a more accurate, yet, less detailed measure of the product specification is a compromise
between the precision of the measure and the risk of bias.
26For computational reasons, in estimating the Spatial Durbin Model we average this matrix across all of the years
creating a Wiz matrix. We also follow Cao and Prakash (2011) in replacing Wiz,t with 0 if Wiz,t < 0, therefore
assuming that countries with very dissimilar export profiles are not competing with each other - i.e. are not neighbours.
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account for some degree of elasticity of the productive sector.27
The second is the traditional WGEO,iz matrix based on geography that accounts for the pos-
sibility that geographical distance has frictional effects on market activity.28 Workers, including
child workers, prefer to find jobs in their local environment because commuting and moving entails
monetary and psychological costs. Moreover, practices arguably diffuse between locations that are
geographically proximate through processes of learning and emulation. For these reasons, we also
employ a row-normalized queen contiguity matrix.29 This means that neighbours are defined solely
by whether states share a border. We then take the initial contiguity matrices and construct sparse
block-diagonal matrices in which the diagonals are the original neighbour matrix surrounded by
zero matrices on the off-diagonal blocks. This allows for relatively easier creation of spatially lagged
variables and neighbour lists, given the multidimensional (state-sector-year) data being used. These
block diagonal neighbour matrices are then used to construct neighbour lists in R to test for spatial
dependence with the Moran’s I Test using first the ISIC 2-digit competition W matrix and then
the geographic W matrix.30 As this test is not specified for a particular spatial process, it can be
applied directly to the data. The results are reported in 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1: Moran’s I Tests with ISIC 2dgt Competition W
Moran I statistic SD Moran I statistic Variance P-Value
Export Share to China 10.271 0.197 0.000 0.000
Child labour Rate 14.433 0.278 0.000 0.000
Table 4.2: Moran’s I Tests with Geo W
Moran I statistic SD Moran I statistic Variance P-Value
Export Share to China 10.82 0.421 0.002 0.000
Child labour Rate 13.545 0.528 0.002 0.000
A positive value for Moran’s I indicate positive spatial autocorrelation, that is, units near one
another or with non-geographic ‘spatial’ dependence are similar with regards to either export share
27For instance, facilities producing textiles may be able to adapt to market demand in producing different goods.
28Do note, hence, that we use the word “competitor” to identify both neighbours and competitors in export profiles.
29Instead the ISIC W matrix is not row standardized. The reason for this difference is that the overall export
competition that a state faces is not always the same. Some states may export a lot of goods that other states export
as well, while other states may be alone in exporting their goods. Arguably the former states will face overall more
pressure than their competitors when it comes to trade competition. On the other hand, looking at geography, we do
not believe that we can make any assumption about the total export competition they face based on the number of
borders they share with others. Hence, we row-normalize the data.
30For more information on this test, see, for example, Cook, An, and Favero (2019)
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or child labour rates. A negative Moran’s I indicates the opposite, that geographically (or otherwise)
related units are highly dissimilar. In the case of both export share to China and child labour rate,
the test results reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that there is significant (p-values well below
0.001) and strong (Moran’s I standard deviate of 10 and greater) positive spatial dependence.
4.4.2 Testing for spatial dependence in child labour incidence between states
The Spatially Lagged Dependent Variable (SLX) Model has gained popularity in spatial econo-
metrics in recent years for its simplicity, flexibility, and ease of identification (Halleck Vega and
Elhorst 2015; Ward and Gleditsch 2019). The SLX model can use a variety of estimators, can
parameterize the W matrix in the case of prior theoretical ambiguity, and can more easily test
for and overcome questions of endogeneity that frequently accompany spatial econometric mod-
elling (Elhorst and Vega 2017). Moreover, the SLX (and its extensions in the Spatial Durbin and
Spatial Durbin Error Models) explicitly model local as opposed to global spillovers, meaning the
specific local effect of an explanatory variable on some outcome, rather than the average spillover
of the outcome across all units (as modelled by in the Spatial Autoregressive Model) or unmea-
sured/immeasurable spatial dependence (as in the Spatial Error Model). Furthermore, Lesage and
Pace (2014) argues that, in point of fact, global spillovers are rarer than local spillovers, which
further motivates the use of the SLX model for our main specification (though we do include SDM
models as a test of the robustness of our results). A cross-sectional SLX model can be written as:





Where W is the weight matrix and y, X, and ε are the dependent and independent variables
and the error term, respectively. This is, in fact, an unrestricted version of multiple alternatives,
nested models. Restricting θ=0 reduces the SLX to linear least squares model and adding spatially
lagged dependent variable or errors leads to the SDM and SDEM models. The cross-sectional SLX
is extended to panel data applications by indexing the data and, in our case, including time, sector,
and spatial fixed effects which are allowed to be correlated with the regressors (Beer and Riedl
2012).
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The panel SLX is written as:





Ω = ΣN ⊗ ωT
(4.3)
where the fixed effects are collected in Ψ. The weight matrix is expanded by taking the Kronecker
product of a cross-sectional weight matrix and identity matrix IT where T is the number of time
periods, assuming time invariance in the spatial relationship. As Beer and Riedl (2012) point out,
an AR(1) process and heteroscedasticity are assumed and are accounted for during estimation in
the block-diagonal variance-covariance matrix Ω’s component matrices, ΣN and ωT .
To identify the impact of the rising salience of china as a trade partner on child labour, we
employ the following baseline SLX specification is:
CLikt = ExpShareChnikt−1β + WExpShareChnikt−2θ +Xit−1γ + Zitδ + Ψ + ε (4.4)
where CLikt is the child labour rate in state i, sector k, year t; ExpShareChnikt−1 is the
temporally lagged share of exports to China in state i, sector k; WExpShareChnikt−1 is the
spatio-temporally lagged share of exports to China in state i, sector k; X are temporally lagged
economic control variables; Z are the contemporary (i.e. non-lagged) sociodemographic control
variables; and Ψ contains the state, sector, and time fixed effects. We estimate this model via
Maximum-Likelihood using the two different W matrices to test whether the results are robust to
multiple measures of competition and geographic based spatial dependence.
According to the Hypothesis 1 and to the logic of the “Shanghai Effect” we expect β to
be positive. This implies that as the export share to China increases, so does the child labour
rate. The effects of the competitors’ (or neighbours’) exports share to China is more ambiguous,
as it could go one of two ways. If suppliers engage in forms of convergent competition, having
competitors exporting more to China could trigger an increase in the number of children working,
and θ will be positive (Hypothesis 2.1 ). Conversely, θ will be negative if states engage in forms
of divergent competition. In this perspective, the more a state competitor will export towards
China, the less it will engage in child labour in order to attract other importers where goods
produced with the use of child labour are less desirable (Hypothesis 2.2 ).
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We initially estimate our SLX models by OLS with state and year clustered standard errors.
Recognizing that, given the bi-directionality of our analysis, we are explicitly studying an endoge-
nous relationship, we also re-estimate our models using an instrumental variables approach to test
the robustness of the initial OLS estimates. We develop an instrument that is an adaptation of the
approach in Bastos, Silva, and Verhoogen (2018) and Beitrand (2004), which resembles a shift-share
instrument. This approach harnesses cross-sectional, time-invariant variation in one variable and
time-varying, cross-sectionally invariant variation in another and produces an instrument through
the interaction of the two that varies across time and space that is plausibly exogenous from the
outcome. In this case, we take the export share to China at the beginning of our analysis for
each state and interact it with the change in the exchange rate between the Brazilian Real and
US Dollar in each year, exploiting the respective cross-sectional and temporal variation contained
in each separate variable to create a variable that is exogenous to our child labour variable. This
arguably has an impact on the changing composition of Brazil’s importers as Brazil’s trade with a
given trade partner in a given year (here, China) is dependent on trade in previous years and the
strength or weakness of the local currency against the currency of major importers in the contem-
porary period. It is arguably exogenous to child labour as Brazil’s trade with China in 2001 as well
as its exchange rate evolution across a period of relative stability that saw overall decreases in child
labour are unlikely to have a direct impact on child labour outcomes across the period of analysis.
Weak instrument diagnostics and Wu-Hausman Tests confirm the validity of the instrument (results
included in Table 4.3).
4.4.3 A gravity model to identify the effects of child labour on exports towards
China
Structural gravity models are the workhorse of empirical trade literature. They have strong
theoretical foundations, a remarkable fit with the data, and they have been widely used by the
applied literature to explain bilateral trade flows (Heid, Larch, and Yotov 2020; Carrère, Mrázová,
and Neary 2020; Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare 2012). They were initially developed
as an intuitive way to understand trade flows (Tinbergen 1962; Shepherd 2016). The basic idea is
that trade between country i and j directly depend on the size of their economies and inversely
dependent on their distance - i.e. the costs of trading.
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In recent years, scholars have developed a wide range of econometric practices allowing to con-
sistently identifying the determinants of international trade in the framework of theory consistent
structural gravity equation (cfr. Larch et al. 2019; Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003). We adopt
most of these techniques, including a Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimation to address
issues of heteroscedasticity and zeros in trade data (cfr. Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006, 2011;
Head and Mayer 2014); three-way fixed effects to control for changes in the multilateral resistance’
term and to address endogeneity concerns regarding the variables of interest (Anderson and Van
Wincoop 2003; Feenstra 2004; Baier and Bergstrand 2007) and interacting bilateral fixed effects
with a trend term to account for bilateral unobserved time-varying heterogeneity (Larch et al. 2019;
Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov 2015). Moreover, we employ a wide range of robustness checks, in-
cluding phase-ins of agreements, reverse causality, and country-selection biases. Finally, we base
our inferences on standard errors that are clustered by all the dimension of the panel: exporter,
importer, and time (multi-way clustering). Indeed, while the standard approach has been to cluster
errors at the country pair level, Egger and Nigai (2015) and Larch et al. (2019) have demonstrated
that in panel settings, not accounting for the possible auto-correlation of the errors across time
within countries can lead to false inferences. The baseline specification we adopt to estimate the
effects of child labour on exports towards China is the following:
Tij,t = exp
[
β0 + β1CLi,t × CHNj + β2
∑
z 6=i
WCLi,t × CHNj + αi,t + αj,t + αij
]
+ εij,t (4.5)
Where Tij,t are nominal exports flows, between a state i and a country j in a given year
t. αi,t, αj,t are exporter-year importer-year fixed effects. They control for all the time-varying
characteristics of the importer and the exporter, such as GDP or exchange rates, and for the
multilateral resistance terms described by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003; Feenstra 2004;
Carrère, Olarreaga, and Raess 2017). αij are state-county pair fixed effects that account for all
the time-invariant bilateral characteristics that may affect export patters, such as geographical
distance, or common colonial ties. Three-way fixed is the standard approach used in the literature
to identify the causal impact of policy variables on bilateral trade flows (cfr. Yotov et al. 2016;
Anderson, Larch, and Yotov 2019). Indeed, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) demonstrated that
bilateral fixed effect could address most of the endogeneity concerns.
Using three-way fixed effects is considered a theory-consistent and endogeneity-robust approach
to gravity estimation. The issue, however, is that these fixed effects do not allow to estimate
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the effects of any country/state level variables - such as child labour - on bilateral exports.
Indeed, state-level variables are perfectly collinear with the exporter-year importer-year fixed
effects. To overcome this issue and examine the effects of child labour on exports, we build on
two recent papers. Beverelli et al. (2018) and Heid, Larch, and Yotov (2020) demonstrated
that it is possible to identify the effects of country-level variables in the context of a structural
gravity model with three-way fixed effects interacting the state-level variable of interest with a
dummy identifying the importer.31 Equation 4.5 follows the same logic interacting the share
of children working in the state (CLi,t) with a dummy identifying if the importer is China
(CHNj).32 This interaction varies on the i, j and t dimension and it is hence identified in the
presence of three-way fixed effects. β1 will capture the differential impact that child labour
has on exports towards China relative to the rest of the world. We expect this coefficient
to be positive, indicating that having more children working favours exports towards China
(Hypothesis 3 ). The idea is that on average in Chinese companies may reward states with lower
production costs, even if this comes at the price of having more children involved in the production.
To examine the spatial effects of child labour, we adopt a similar strategy. β2 estimates
the effects of increasing child labour in competitors states. It is the result of the interaction
between the Chinese dummy CHNj and
∑
z 6=iWCLi,t. More precisely, this variable captures the
spatially weighted sum of competitors states (z) engagement in child labour. More analytically




z 6=iWiz,t × CLz,t, where the share of children working
in the competitor CLz,t is weighted by the level of competition between i and z (Wiz,t). If
Hypothesis 4 is correct β2 should be negative, indicating that, all else equal, the more a state
has close competitors engaging with child labour the less the state will target the Chinese market.33
A potential concern with Equation 4.5 is that there might be bilateral time-varying unobserved
heterogeneity affecting our estimates. The inclusion of bilateral fixed effects (αij) only captures
bilateral time-invariant heterogeneity, but it is unable to control for state-country pair character-
istics changing over time. For instance, qualitative evidence suggests that bilateral transportation
costs changed over-time. According to a recent study by United Nations Conference on Trade and
31Their focus is to understand the effects of institutional quality and non-discriminatory trade policies on international
trade; hence they interact the exporter-level variables with a dummy identifying intra-national trade.
32The dummy takes the value of 1 if the importer is China and 0 otherwise.
33To note that to ease the interpretation in the context of a PPML, we take the natural logarithm of this variable
to use it in the model (cfr. Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006).
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Development (UNCTAD) (2019), between 2010 and 2015 freight rates of shipping cargo between
Santos (Sao Paulo) and Shanghai declined by over 79%. This decline positively impacts trade from
all over Brazil; however, it favours particularly exports from states where large international ports
are based. International shipping expenses account for almost the entirety of the transportation
expenses for these states, but for cerrado regions domestic carrying costs remain extremely high.
For instance, the domestic transportation costs of soybeans harvested in Mato Grosso is estimated
to be 25–30% of the soybeans’ total cost at the port (United States International Trade Commission
(USITC) 2012 at p. XXIV). Since there have been limited improvements in the Brazilian trans-
port infrastructure, bilateral transportation costs have changed at different rates for coastal states
compared to more remote regions of Brazil (Confederação Nacional do Transporte - CNT 2015).34
Given that bilateral transportation costs changed over time, not accounting for them creates an
omitted variable bias, that is likely to downward bias our estimates (Wooldridge 2010). Indeed,
(larger) declines in transportation costs are likely to be associated with an increase in exports to-
wards China and negatively associated with child labour. States facing a loss in competitiveness
due to a slower decline in transportation costs (remote regions), may look for alternative ways to
remain competitive resisting the reduction of children working. Aiming to capture bilateral unob-
servable more flexibly, we follow Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov (2015) and Larch et al. (2019) in
interacting the pair fixed effects (αij) with a time trend (Trend). This approach allows accounting
for all the pair specific heterogeneity that trends over time, including time-varying transportation
costs. Hence, the alternative model specification we use is:
Tij,t = exp
[
β0 + β1CLi,t × CHNj + β2
∑
z 6=i
WCLi,t × CHNj + αi,t + αj,t + (αij × trend)
]
+ εij,t (4.6)
34Indeed, improvements in the transport infrastructure of the country are not comparable to improvements in
international shipping. According to United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (2012), the lack of these
infrastructures is one of the main causes negatively affecting the competitiveness of Brazil in international exports.
For instance, the paved highways in Brazil are only 15% of the network, and according to some review, over 69% of
these paved roads had problems (Araújo, Campos, and Bandeira 2013). Moreover, also the waterway and the railway
network are scarcely developed and mostly concentrated in the southern regions of the country (cfr. United States
International Trade Commission (USITC) 2012).
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4.5 Results and discussion
4.5.1 SLX model results
Our main spatial econometric results are presented in Table 4.3. The first two columns
report the results from the OLS estimations using our preferred W matrix: one that measures
competition based on ISIC 2-digit export similarity as the interstate weights, and the other using
the geographic contiguity matrix. Looking at our preferred specification, Column (1), we see that
there is a statistically and substantively significant positive impact of export share to China and
the child labour rate in a given state, sector, and year in Brazil. We find that a 1% increase in the
share of exports to China out of the total exports leads to an average increase in the child labour
rate of nearly 0.1%. While this may seem negligible, when applied to the estimated numbers of
child labourers in Brazil this can be an absolute increase of thousands of child workers.35 This
finding is in line with the expectation set out in Hypothesis 1 . If we look to Column (2), where
we report the findings from the SLX models using the geographic contiguity matrix we can see
that the results for the direct effect of increasing export share to China hold up and are nearly
identical.
The models also find that a 1% increase in the share of exports going to competing states
actually leads to a similar and larger (up to 0.5%) decrease in the share of child labour. What
this appears to show is that, on average, as exports to China in a given state increase, there
is a subsequent increase in the child labour rate; yet as exports to China in competitor (or
neighbouring) states increase, the incidence of child labour will actually decline. This finding is
in line with Hypothesis 2.2 (Divergent competition) suggesting that rather than triggering
a race to the bottom, the competitors’ ability to target the Chinese market creates incentives
to reduce the number of children in the workforce targeting high-end markets. In other words,
competing or neighbouring exporters are less likely to engage in child labour as they aim at
targeting the other main export destinations (i.e. the US, EU, Argentina and Japan) which are
less amenable to the use of child labour.
35Do note that in the period analysed the export share to China increased by almost 17% and that the number of
children working in 2015 was over 600.000. Hence, this effect may have had an impact on the life of tens of thousands
of children.
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In the third and fourth columns of Table 4.3, we report the estimates from the SLX-IV models,
along with the IV diagnostics. Here we find our initial findings not only supported but, in fact,
inflated, suggesting that endogeneity in the OLS estimates was downwardly biasing our coefficients.
Here we see that an increase of exports shares to China by 1%, in fact, is associated with a roughly
0.5% increase in the child labour rate and that the indirect effect of competitors’ exports to China
is in fact much larger than that of neighbouring states.
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Table 4.3: SLX Results
SLX w/Comp W SLX w/Geo W SLX-IV w/Comp W SLX-IV w/Geo W
Export Share to China 0.093∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗
(0.043) (0.045) (0.139) (0.205)
W.Export Share to China −0.099∗∗∗ −0.449∗∗∗ −0.829∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.149) (0.008) (0.187)
Education Rate −0.004∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Race/Ethnicity (non-white) 0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female Population −0.003 −0.003 −0.001 −0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
PT Government −0.008 −0.007 −0.011 −0.011
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Informality −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln. UF Population −0.078 0.017 −0.108∗ −0.183
(0.097) (0.068) (0.099) (0.101)
Ln. UF GDPpc −0.177∗∗ −0.184∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.085) (0.025) (0.025)
DeltaUF GDP −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Weak Instrument 248.493∗∗∗ 414.197∗∗∗
Wu-Hausman 4.499∗∗ 8.007∗∗∗
R2 0.557 0.544 0.542 0.555
Adj. R2 0.554 0.541 0.539 0.552
Num. obs. 12285 12285 12285 12285
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
By and large, the controls either function as expected or simply show no discernible or
significant correlation with the child labour outcome. Education is understandably negatively and
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significantly correlated with the child labour rate, since it represents the inverse, for many children,
of the choice to work (excluding idle children) and likely captures the effect of public programs
such as the Bolsa Familia in Brazil. The proportion of female residents in the state population is
negative though not significantly correlated with the child labour rate, and the logarithm of GDP
per capita is negatively and highly significantly correlated with the child labour rate, as one might
expect with such a proxy for local development.
As Cook, An, and Favero (2019) point out, when using spatial econometrics, researchers are
rarely interested solely in the reported coefficients, which “contain a wealth of information on
relationships among the observations” (LeSage and Pace 2009 at p. 33). Within the reported
coefficients in a spatial models, which represent pre-spatial effects within a given unit, are contained
the direct and indirect (spillover) effects which we capture in the Export Share and W.Export
Share variables in Table 4.3 which provide insight into the complex interrelationships between
international economic activity, the changing global economy, and important social sustainability
outcomes such as child labour.
If, as expected, exports to China and the “primaritization” of the Brazilian economy are having
the perverse effect we hypothesise and the results in Table 4.3 support, we should expect the
strongest impact to occur in export sectors such as mining, agriculture, and low skill manufacturing.
In order to test this, we re-estimate the above equations and interact the export share to China
variables with a categorical sector identifier at the ISIC rev.3 sector level (i.e. 1-digit sector codes).
The results are displayed in Table 4.4. The significant effects are in the agricultural, hunting,
forestry, and manufacturing sectors with the strongest effect being in manufacturing. By and large,
this fits well within theoretical expectations concerning the “Shanghai Effect”. Chinese import
may change the incentives structure of developing country triggering lower levels of regulatory
enforcement. However, Table 4.4 also reveals important sectoral differences. We do not find a
significant effect on the mining sector. This is in line with qualitative evidence that shows that
in Latin America, Chinese mining companies have been sensitive to international criticism, and
adopted a series of best practices to ensure that decent labour standard was ensured to employees
(Kotschwar, Moran, and Muir 2012).
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Table 4.4: Within Sector Effect of Export Share to China
Effect of Export Share to China




Mining and Quarrying 0.002
(0.001)
AIC (Spatial model) −18906.663
LR test: statistic 113.380
LR test: p-value 0.000
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
We also conduct a number of alternative model specifications to test the robustness of these
results. The tables can be found in the Appendix, although we provide an overview here. First,
as reflected in the Moran’s I statistic tests conducted earlier, there is a significant degree of spatial
dependence in child labour rates between states. Motivated by this and the concern that this
omitted source of spatial dependence is driving our SLX results, we estimate Spatial Durbin Models
using MLE, which include the spatially lagged dependent variable (i.e. the global spillover effect
mentioned before). Second, we added state-year and sector-year fixed effects (by interacting state
and year dummies) to our original SLX specification along with the standalone state and year fixed
effects to control for unmeasured or immeasurable time-varying omitted variables along with those
that are constant within states or years. These results are reported in Table 4.8. Third, given
that there may be an autoregressive pattern in the year to year evolution of child labour rates,
we further added time-lagged child labour rate and these results are reported in Table 4.9. Our
original results are robust to each of these supplementary analyses.
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4.5.2 Gravity estimation results
Table 4.5 presents the results of estimating Equations 4.5 and 4.6 using the WISIC spatial
weight matrix.36 Column (1) uses the controls for endogeneity using dyadic fixed effects (αij).
Child labour appears to have a positive effect on exports towards China. Conversely, competitor
engagement in child labour (CELC) appears to have a negative and significant effect on the capac-
ity of a state to export towards China confirming the finding of the SLX about the existence of
divergent competition patterns. The model predicts that a 1% increase in competitor engagement
in child labour, will lead to a 0.061% decline in exports towards China relative to the rest of the
world. This result is significant at the 10% level (p = 0.055). While these coefficients are of the
expected sign, not accounting for time-varying unobserved dyadic heterogeneity may downward
bias on the estimates of child labour. To address this issue Column (2) uses the alternative and
arguably preferable approach of Equation 4.6 that interacts the dyadic fixed effects with a trend
term (αij × trend) (cfr. Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov 2015; Larch et al. 2019). Controlling for
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, child labour appears to have a positive and significant effect
on exports towards China. The model predicts that a 1% growth in the share of children working
in the state leads to an increase in exports towards China of approximately 0.026% relative to the
rest of the world. Conversely, the effect of competitor engagement in child labour, while it remains
negative, is no longer significant. A possible explanation is that part of the effect of competitor
engagement in child labour reflects common changes in bilateral unobserved heterogeneity, rather
than the indirect effect of child labour. In sum, once we account for time-varying unobserved
heterogeneity, the model confirms Hypothesis 3 , while we do not find evidence for the existence
of competitive behaviours.37
We run a battery of sensitivity checks to test the robustness of the results of Table 4.5. By and
large, every time that we control for unobserved time-varying heterogeneity the robustness check
confirms the results of model 2, while not controlling for α × trend results are model-dependent.
This finding further supports our confidence that model 2 is correctly specified. Some of the
robustness tests we run are: including an alternative sample of relevant importers, alternative
specification of the competition measure, phase-in effects of child labour, reverse causality and
examination of disaggregated data. While the Tables are reported in the Annex, we here briefly
36We use the Stata ® command ppmlhdfe, from Correia, Guimarães, and Zylkin (2020), to estimate our models.
37Hence we reject Hypothesis 4 .
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Table 4.5: The effects of child labour on exports towards China
αij αij × trend
(1) (2)
CLi,t × CHNj 0.001 0.026
(0.027) (0.019)
[0.009] [0.002]∗∗∗





Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by exporter, importer,
and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01). Fixed effects estimates are not reported for
brevity.
present relevant results.
First, Table 4.10, examines whether the main results are driven by the specific set of importers
selected. In the main analysis, we examine export to 241 different importers, many of which are
small and remote countries with most entries that are 0. To be sure, Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2011) demonstrated that PPML provides consistent estimates in the presence of a large number
of 0s, we estimate the model including 85 importers accounting for 98% of the total volume of
exports (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2011). While looking exclusively at the largest importers risk
to create a selection bias, the idea of this test is to show that the results are not explained by a
rise in Chinese exports relative to small importers.38 Results are consistent and strikingly similar
to the baseline specification using this different sample of importers.
Second, we examine if the results are driven by the specific competition measure we selected.
Table 4.11 presents the results using three different W matrices. The baseline is WISIC2,ijt which
measures competition in terms of similarity of export portfolios at the ISIC rev 3, two-digit level,
WGEO,ij that is the traditional spatial matrix based on geography and WISIC3,ijt that uses the
three-digit level to measure similarity in export portfolios. The results overlap with the main
specification in terms of sign and significance of the relevant coefficients.
38For computational reasons, many gravity articles only feature a reduced set of importers, (cfr. Dai, Yotov, and
Zylkin 2014; Egger and Tarlea 2015).
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Third, the results presented in the main specification could plausibly be over/underestimating
the effects of child labour on exports towards China. This could be because exports sluggishly
adjust to changes in child labour rather than all at once, or because child labour has a non-linear
effect on export destination over time. To examine these possibilities Columns 2 to 4 of Tables
4.12 and 4.13 expand the baseline model, including lags of the variable of interests. The use
of lags to account for the sluggish adjustment of trade to policy changes is a standard practice
in the trade literature (cfr. Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Heid, Larch, and Yotov 2020; Brandi
et al. 2020). Table 4.12 examine the baseline model with simple αij fixed effects: two results
are worth mentioning. First, it does not appear that child labour has a phase in effect in
affecting exports towards China. Indeed lags are never significant. On the other hand, competitor
engagement in child labour is significant and positive at the third lag, suggesting that the
indirect effects of child labour on export destination may be non-linear. The effects of competitor
engagement in child labour appear to have inconsistent patterns. Hence, these results should
be interpreted with some caution. Columns 2 to 4 of Table 4.13 account for time-varying pair
heterogeneity. None of the lags is ever significant, confirming that using current variables provides
unbiased results in this model (Brandi et al. 2020). Column (5) of both Tables include a lead
variable. This test is known as the test for strict exogeneity (Baier and Bergstrand 2007). If
the lead variable was significant, it would mean that our model failed to properly capture the
exogeneity of the child labour. This test is particularly important considering the results of the
spatial model that show a positive effect of export shares towards china on child labour. None of
the lead variables is significant, suggesting that the model correctly addresses endogeneity concerns.
Fourth, an alternative way to test if trade sluggishly adjusts to changes in child labour is
using data over non-consecutive years. Cheng and Wall (2005) argued that in the context of
a fixed-effects model, using data over consecutive years may fail to capture the effects of trade
policies given that trade flows may require some time to adjust. The standard practice in the
literature is to use data with four years intervals (Baier, Bergstrand, and Clance 2018; Heid,
Larch, and Yotov 2020; Yotov et al. 2016). Column (2) and (5) of Table 4.14 report results
using quadrennial data. None of the variables of interest appears to be significant. One possible
explanation is that the effect of child labour on exports towards China over time fades away.
Another possibility is that the coefficient is no longer significant because of the reduction of the
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sample size. In Column (5), that estimates the model with four-year intervals, the effect of child
labour on exports towards China is six-time larger that in the estimation over consecutive years
Column (4). Hence, we suspect that the lack of significance may be caused by the increase in the
standard errors resulting from the loss of observations, rather than by a decline in the coefficient.
To examine this hypothesis, Model (3) and (6) estimate the model using biannual data. These
models provide interesting insights. First, Column (6) confirms the positive and significant effect
of child labour on exports towards China. The main coefficient of interest (child labour) is larger
than the baseline specification and significant at the 1% level. Second, the effect of competitor
engagement in child labour estimated over Equation 4.5 is positive and significant but is of the
opposite sign compared to the main specification. Once more, the effects of child labour on
competitors’ exports appear to be model dependent, and hence inference should be avoided.
Fifth, to increase our analytical depth, Tables 4.15 and 4.16 examine the effects of child labour
across different Brazilian regions. In both tables, Column (1) presents the results of the baseline
specification to ease interpretation. Table 4.15, uses the specification of Equation 4.5. Results
suggest that child labour significantly favours exports towards China for the Norte Este and the
Centro Oeste regions; hinting that these regions that are poor or particularly remote tend to avoid
reducing child labour in order to fully exploit the rise of China as the main importer destination.
Similarly, competitor engagement in child labour is only significant for the Norte, which is
another remote and poor region. Table 4.16 partially confirms these results, suggesting that
increase (slower decline) of child labour in the North Este is what drives the national aggregates.
Conversely, competitor engagement in child labour appears to have inconsistent patterns across
different regions. Given the lack of a clear theoretical explanation, these results suggest avoiding
inferences on the indirect effects of child labour.
Finally, Tables 4.17 and 4.18 exploit the availability of data on child labour to examine if child
labour has heterogeneous effects across sectors.39 The results of Table 4.17 that do not account for
time-varying heterogeneity are insignificant.40 Conversely, Table 4.18 reveals significant sectoral
level heterogeneity. It appears that the results of the baseline specification are largely driven
39Do note that while in the main analysis our time frame is 2001-2015, we only have data on child labour at the
sectoral level from 2002. Hence there is a drop in the total number of observations.
40Results for both tables were estimated using the ppml_panel_sg Stata ® command developed by Larch et al.
(2019).
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by the agricultural sector. Given that agriculture is by far the sector with the largest share of
children working and accounts for the majority of exports towards China, this result increases our
confidence in our findings. On the other hand, it appears that child labour in the manufacturing
sectors harms exports towards China. We suspect that this is because China is mostly an importer
of primary goods, while it can rely on domestic and regional supply chains for cheap manufacturing
(Jenkins 2015). To the extent it imports manufactured products from Brazil, this may be driven
by the specific product qualities or the local expertise rather than price. To note that this is
not necessarily in contrast with the findings of 4.4. Indeed, while Chinese firms may initially
decide to import from Brazilian firms because of specific product qualities, they may incentivize a
cost-cutting culture that over time leads to more children employed.
4.5.3 Discussion
We argue that the results of the SLX and the gravity equations are interesting under many
different perspectives. First, the paper shows that child labour and exports destinations have
a two-way causal relationship. On the one hand, the SLX results suggest that exporting more
to China can increase child labour incidence in Brazilian states. This is a novel finding in the
context of the child labour literature that so far has not examined the effects of different export
destinations. On the other hand, accounting for time-varying heterogeneity, the gravity equations
suggest that having more children in the workforce promotes exporting towards China relative to
other potential buyers in the first place. In sum, results confirm Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis
3 suggesting that child labour and exports toward China are in a mutually reinforcing relationship.
Second, we examine the spatial dynamics involved in the process. On the one hand, we find
that rather than triggering a race to the bottom, having competitors exporting more to China
leads to reducing child labour. This suggests that states that are unable or unwilling to target
the Chinese market, reduce their share of children working to address the demand of other major
importers. On the other hand, we do not find (consistent) evidence showing the existence of
a spatial relationship between competitor engagement in child labour and export destinations.
While having competitors that export more to China affects state’s willingness to engage in child
labour, having competitors engaging in child labour not necessarily affects the ability of a state to
target the Chinese market. In sum, our finding support Hypothesis 2.2 but we do not find any
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evidence in support of Hypothesis 4 .
Third, our results show that there is a sectoral level heterogeneity. The agricultural sector
seems to explain the finding in our baseline analysis. This should not come as a surprise given
that agriculture is by far the sector employing more children as well as the industry with more
imports from China. Conversely, the data does not suggest that exports to China favour child
labour (and vice-versa) in the mining sector. This seems to support qualitative studies finding
that Chinese mining companies in South America have gone at great length to improve working
conditions (Kotschwar, Moran, and Muir 2011). Further research could investigate what drives
these sectoral differences.
Finally, we believe that our results should be interpreted in light of the general trends. In our
time frame, child labour has declined significantly in Brazil, while exports to China have massively
increased. Hence, rather than interpreting the coefficients of Table 4.3 as indicating an increase in
child labour, we believe that they reveal that states exporting more to China experienced slower
declines in child labour rates compared to others. Similarly, the coefficient of Table 4.5 shows that
those states with lower declines in child labour were better able to take advantage of the rising
Chinese demand.
4.6 Conclusions
This paper examined the complex relations linking child labour with international trade,
investigating if and how the rise of China as the leading trade partner of Brazil has affected
child labour incidence in the country. Theoretically, we argued that there might be a two-way
relationship between child labour and exports towards China. On the one hand, having more
children in the workforce could facilitate exporting to China. Chinese firms are cost-conscious and
subject to relatively less scrutiny when it comes to labour standards in supplier firms abroad. In
this perspective, they are more likely to turn a blind eye to labour abuses if it provides an economic
advantage. On the other, we argued in line with the “Shangai effect” that the rise of China as the
leading trade partner of Brazil may create downward pressure on labour outcomes leading to more
children working. Using an SLX model with a shift-share instrument and state-of-the-art gravity
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equation techniques, we find evidence suggesting that this is a two-way causal relationship.41
Child labour leads to more exports towards China relative to other destinations, and the more a
state exports towards China (relative to other destinations), the higher the incidence of child labour.
Moreover, the paper investigated the spatial dynamics involved in this relationship. We try to
evaluate if competitors engagement in child labour affects exports towards China, and if having
competitors’ exporting more to China affects child labour. We find no evidence that more child
labour in competitor states impact the supplier ability to export towards China. However, the SLX
model suggests that the more a state has competitors with high Chinese export shares, the less
it will have children in the workforce. In contrast with the “race to the bottom” hypothesis this
finding suggests that states and firms may engage in divergent patterns of strategic competition,
whereby rather than downgrading in parallel with their competitors they attempt to reduce the
number of children in the workforce to facilitate trade with more socially concerned countries.
It is essential to keep in mind, however, that this study comes with some caveats. In particular,
due to data limitation, our study focus on a state-level analysis. This could create some aggregation
bias as it captures both the direct and indirect effects of trading with China. Arguably a preferable
approach would require more granular data that, unfortunately, is not available for child labour.
Qualitative studies on the topic could corroborate our findings or reveal unexpected aggregation
bias. Second, these results are not at odds with the possibility that in the long run, exports to
China may lead to a decline in child labour. Indeed, in our models, we “control” for income to
identify the effect of export destination. In this way, we show the different effect that exporting
to China has on child labour relative to other destinations. However, to the extent that rising
exports lead to increased incomes, they may, in the long run, reduce child labour incidence.
In spite of these limitations, we believe that our paper makes significant contributions to the
literature. With regards to child labour, we show that not only it is crucial to examine the effects
of trade openness but that it is worth investigating whether different trading patterns may have
heterogeneous effects. Moreover, the paper shows that child labour can be a source of comparative
advantage in targeting the Chinese markets. Finally, the paper reveals that states (and firms) may
engage in patterns of competitive interactions that are at odds with the expectations of “race to the
41In the context of the CL-export to China link, only if we account for time-varying heterogeneity.
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bottom” literature. Hopefully, these results will renew interest in these topics, a new qualitative
and quantitative research will address the many open questions relating to the relationship between
child labour and trade.
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4.7.1 Classification of goods
Table 4.6: ISIC classification of exported goods
Code Description
1 A Agriculture, hunting and forestry
2 01 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities
3 011 Growing of crops; market gardening; horticulture
4 012 Farming of animals
5 02 Forestry, logging and related service activities
6 020 Forestry, logging and related service activities
7 B Fishing
8 05 Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; service activities incidental to fishing
9 050 Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; service activities incidental to fishing
10 C Mining and quarrying
11 10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
12 101 Mining and agglomeration of hard coal
13 102 Mining and agglomeration of lignite
14 103 Extraction and agglomeration of peat
15 11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas
16 111 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
17 13 Mining of metal ores
18 131 Mining of iron ores
19 132 Mining of non-ferrous metal ores, except uranium and thorium ores
20 14 Other mining and quarrying
21 141 Quarrying of stone, sand and clay
22 142 Mining and quarrying n.e.c.
23 D Manufacturing
24 15 Manuf. of food products and beverages
25 151 Production, processing and preservation of meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats
26 152 Manuf. of dairy products
27 153 Manuf. of grain mill products, starches and starch products, and prepared animal feeds
28 154 Manuf. of other food products
29 155 Manuf. of beverages
30 16 Manuf. of tobacco products
31 160 Manuf. of tobacco products
32 17 Manuf. of textiles
33 171 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles
34 172 Manuf. of other textiles
35 173 Manuf. of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles
36 18 Manuf. of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
37 181 Manuf. of wearing apparel, except fur apparel
38 182 Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur
39 19 Tanning and dressing of leather
40 191 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness
41 192 Manuf. of footwear
42 20 Manuf. of wood except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
43 201 Sawmilling and planing of wood
44 202 Manuf. of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials
45 21 Manuf. of paper and paper products
46 210 Manuf. of paper and paper products
47 22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
48 221 Publishing
49 222 Printing and service activities related to printing
50 23 Manuf. of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
51 231 Manuf. of coke oven products
52 232 Manuf. of refined petroleum products
53 233 Processing of nuclear fuel
54 24 Manuf. of chemicals and chemical products
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55 241 Manuf. of basic chemicals
56 242 Manuf. of other chemical products
57 243 Manuf. of man-made fibres
58 25 Manuf. of rubber and plastics products
59 251 Manuf. of rubber products
60 252 Manuf. of plastics products
61 26 Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products
62 261 Manuf. of glass and glass products
63 269 Manuf. of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.
64 27 Manuf. of basic metals
65 271 Manuf. of basic iron and steel
66 272 Manuf. of basic precious and non-ferrous metals
67 28 Manuf. of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
68 281 Manuf. of structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs and steam generators
69 289 Manuf. of other fabricated metal products; metal working service activities
70 29 Manuf. of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
71 291 Manuf. of general purpose machinery
72 292 Manuf. of special purpose machinery
73 293 Manuf. of domestic appliances n.e.c.
74 30 Manuf. of office, accounting and computing machinery
75 300 Manuf. of office, accounting and computing machinery
76 31 Manuf. of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
77 311 Manuf. of electric motors, generators and transformers
78 312 Manuf. of electricity distribution and control apparatus
79 313 Manuf. of insulated wire and cable
80 314 Manuf. of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries
81 315 Manuf. of electric lamps and lighting equipment
82 319 Manuf. of other electrical equipment n.e.c.
83 32 Manuf. of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
84 321 Manuf. of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components
85 322 Manuf. of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy
86 323 Manuf. of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus
87 33 Manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
88 331 Manuf. of medical appliances and instruments and appliances, except optical instruments
89 332 Manuf. of optical instruments and photographic equipment
90 333 Manuf. of watches and clocks
91 34 Manuf. of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
92 341 Manuf. of motor vehicles
93 342 Manuf. of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers
94 343 Manuf. of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines
95 35 Manuf. of other transport equipment
96 351 Building and repairing of ships and boats
97 352 Manuf. of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock
98 353 Manuf. of aircraft and spacecraft
99 359 Manuf. of transport equipment n.e.c.
100 36 Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
101 361 Manuf. of furniture
102 369 Manufacturing n.e.c.
103 E Electricity, gas and water supply
104 40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
105 401 Production, collection and distribution of electricity
106 402 Manuf. of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains
107 K Real estate, renting and business activities
108 74 Other business activities
109 742 Architectural, engineering and other technical activities
110 749 Business activities n.e.c.
111 O Other community, social and personal service activities
112 92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
113 921 Motion picture, radio, television and other entertainment activities
114 93 Other service activities
115 930 Other service activities
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4.7.2 Spatial Durbin Model Results
Table 4.7: SDM Results
Geo W TS2 Comp W
Export Share to China 0.040∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022)
W. Export Share to China −0.213∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.00)
W. Child labour 0.623∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.014)
State FE Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Num. obs. 12285 12285
AIC (Spatial model) −100642.4912 −98678.0444
LR test: statistic 3765.1423 1435.5237
LR test: p-value 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
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4.7.3 Four-Way FE SLX Models
Table 4.8: Four-way FE SLX Results
SLX w/Comp W SLX w/Geo W SLX-IV w/Comp W SLX-IV w/Geo W
Export Share to China 0.092∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.047∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.026) (0.030) (0.025) (0.028)
W.Export Share to China −0.109∗∗∗ −0.464∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.052) (0.005) (0.048)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes
R2 0.561 0.547 0.634 0.631
Adj. R2 0.545 0.531 0.619 0.616
Num. obs. 12285 12285 12285 12285
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
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4.7.4 Four-Way FEs with Lagged Dependent Variable
Table 4.9: SLX w/Temporally Lagged DV
SLX w/Comp W SLX w/Geo W
Export Share to China 0.091∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.030)
W.Export Share to China −0.110∗∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.052)
Lagged Child labour Rate −1.292 0.993
(0.890) (0.898)
State FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes
R2 0.561 0.547
Adj. R2 0.545 0.531
Num. obs. 12285 12285
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
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4.7.5 Only using top 98% importers
Table 4.10: The effects of child labour on exports towards China (largest 85 importers)
αij αij × trend
All importers Top 85 importers All importers Top 85 importers
CLi,t × CHNj 0.001 0.001 0.026 0.025
(0.027) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019)
[0.009] [0.009] [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗
CECLi,t × CHNj -0.061 -0.059 -0.052 -0.051
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
[0.032]∗ [0.031]∗ [0.034] [0.033]
Observations 61477 31575 61477 31306
pseudo-R-squared 0.977 0.973 0.986 0.983
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by exporter, importer,
and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). Fixed effects estimates are not reported for brevity.
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4.7.6 Alternative competition measures
Table 4.11: The effects of child labour on exports towards China: alternative competition measures
αij αij × trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WISIC2,ijt WGEO,ij WISIC3,ijt WISIC2,ijt WGEO,ij WISIC3,ijt
CLi,t × CHNj 0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.026 0.027 0.026
(0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
[0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.003]∗∗∗ [0.003]∗∗∗
CECLi,t × CHNj -0.061 -0.052
(0.054) (0.054)
[0.032]∗ [0.034]
WGEO,ijCLi,t × CHNj -0.100 -0.034
(0.138) (0.139)
[0.083] [0.083]
CE(TS3)CLi,t × CHNj -0.052 -0.043
(0.081) (0.072)
[0.024]∗∗ [0.039]
Observations 61477 61477 61477 61477 61477 61477
pseudo-R-squared 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.986 0.986 0.986
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by exporter, importer,
and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). Fixed effects estimates are not reported for brevity.
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4.7.7 Lags and leads
Table 4.12: The effects of child labour on exports towards China: lags and leads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Value Value Value Value Value
Child labour
CLi,t × CHNj 0.001 0.005 0.010 0.014 0.024
[0.009] [0.011] [0.016] [0.016] [0.013]∗
CLi,t−1 × CHNj 0.002 0.012 0.017 0.013
[0.016] [0.018] [0.020] [0.024]
CLi,t−2 × CHNj -0.015 0.001 -0.002
[0.016] [0.017] [0.018]
CLi,t−3 × CHNj -0.009 0.014
[0.022] [0.020]
CLi,t+1 × CHNj -0.041
[0.031]
Competitor engagement in child labour
CECLi,t × CHNj -0.061 -0.054 -0.034 -0.002 -0.021
[0.032]∗ [0.036] [0.026] [0.029] [0.032]
CECLi,t−1 × CHNj -0.005 -0.043 -0.027 -0.007
[0.053] [0.031] [0.045] [0.050]
CECLi,t−2 × CHNj 0.045 -0.038 -0.065
[0.041] [0.071] [0.078]
CECLi,t−3 × CHNj 0.087 0.065
[0.044]∗∗ [0.058]
CECLi,t+1 × CHNj -0.032
[0.036]
Observations 61477 57040 52563 48097 43200
pseudo-R-squared 0.977 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.980
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Table 4.13: The effects of child labour on exports towards China: lags and leads (αi,j × trend)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Value Value Value Value Value
Child labour
CLi,t × CHNj 0.026 0.028 0.027 0.018 0.007
[0.002]∗∗∗ [0.004]∗∗∗ [0.009]∗∗∗ [0.014] [0.026]
CLi,t−1 × CHNj 0.015 0.020 0.013 -0.008
[0.011] [0.021] [0.026] [0.030]
CLi,t−2 × CHNj -0.006 -0.003 -0.030
[0.020] [0.028] [0.028]
CLi,t−3 × CHNj -0.015 -0.017
[0.024] [0.019]
CLi,t+1 × CHNj -0.047
[0.029]
Competitor engagement in child labour
CECLi,t × CHNj -0.052 -0.062 -0.037 -0.016 -0.023
[0.034] [0.054] [0.037] [0.041] [0.029]
CECLi,t−1 × CHNj 0.014 -0.026 -0.007 0.020
[0.058] [0.034] [0.045] [0.040]
CECLi,t−2 × CHNj 0.045 -0.035 -0.065
[0.053] [0.073] [0.069]
CECLi,t−3 × CHNj 0.090 0.048
[0.056] [0.052]
CECLi,t+1 × CHNj 0.013
[0.045]
Observations 61477 57040 52563 48097 43200
pseudo-R-squared 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.987 0.988
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
αi,j × trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by exporter, importer, and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01)
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4.7.9 Effects on different Regions
Table 4.15: The effects of child labour on exports towards China: reginal differences (αij)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Regions Nord Este Centro Oeste Norte SUl & Sudeste
CLi,t × CHNj 0.001 0.063 0.111 0.014 -0.008
(0.027) (0.040) (0.030)∗∗∗ (0.092) (0.049)
[0.009] [0.029]∗∗ [0.028]∗∗∗ [0.126] [0.026]
CECLi,t × CHNj -0.061 -0.212 0.695 -0.517 -0.063
(0.054) (0.585) (0.633) (0.540) (0.059)
[0.032]∗ [0.344] [0.896] [0.244]∗∗ [0.044]
Observations 61477 17111 8757.000 9340 21239
pseudo-R-squared 0.977 0.966 0.985 0.986 0.981
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by exporter, importer,
and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
Table 4.16: The effects of child labour on exports towards China: reginal differences (αij × trend)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Regions Nord Este Centro Oeste Norte SUl & Sudeste
CLi,t × CHNj 0.026 0.033 -0.055 0.052 0.012
(0.019) (0.027) (0.092) (0.034) (0.033)
[0.002]∗∗∗ [0.010]∗∗∗ [0.135] [0.045] [0.016]
CECLi,t × CHNj -0.052 0.819 -0.707 2.033 -0.060
(0.054) (0.392)∗∗ (0.373)∗ (0.510)∗∗∗ (0.057)
[0.034] [0.163]∗∗∗ [0.369]∗ [1.031]∗∗ [0.040]
Observations 61477 17111 9340 8757 21239
pseudo-R-squared 0.986 0.978 0.991 0.988 0.988
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by exporter, importer,
and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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4.7.10 Sectoral level estimation
Table 4.17: The effects of child labour on exports towards China by sector α_ij
(1) (2) (3)
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing
CL1_i, t× CHN_j 0.007 -6.505 -0.183
(0.065) (7.791) (0.247)
[0.072] [7.262] [0.122]
CECL1_i, t× CHN_j 0.080 -9.147 -0.063
(0.407) (6.037) (0.292)
[0.367] [7.336] [0.145]
Observations 27150 14094 55981
pseudo-R-squared 0.984 0.988 0.981
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered by exporter, importer, and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 4.18: The effects of child labour on exports towards China by sector α_ij × Trend
(1) (3) (4)
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing
CL1_i, t× CHN_j 0.093 -8.999 -0.281
(0.037)∗∗ (6.203) (0.243)
[0.056]∗ [8.152] [0.110]∗∗
CECL1_i, t× CHN_j 0.592 -7.717 -0.170
(0.216)∗∗∗ (5.343) (0.253)
[0.172]∗∗∗ [5.509] [0.117]
Observations 27150 14094 55981
pseudo-R-squared 0.990 0.993 0.989
Three-way Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors, clustered by country-pair, in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered by exporter, importer, and year in squared brackets (* p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Critical Discussion and Conclusions
This thesis explores the complex system of relationships that links global labour governance
(GLG), exports and working standards. Motivated by theories and empirical evidence from the
spatial interaction literature, it argues that prior scholarship has largely ignored the effects that a
shock in one country (or firm) can have on competitors. The main argument of this work is that
researchers should take a systemic approach in order to explore how competitive dynamics interact
with trade, labour governance and working conditions and come together to shape outcomes for
a target country (or firm) and its competitors. The body of the thesis consists of three empiri-
cal papers exploring these systemic effects. Chapter 2 analyses the impact of preferential trade
agreements with labour clauses (LABPTAs) on labour outcomes; Chapter 3 studies the effects of
LABPTAs on trade flows and export destinations; and Chapter 4 examines the relationship between
the rise of China as a major export destination and child labour incidence in Brazil. Through these
papers, the thesis contributes to addressing the following overarching research questions:
1) What is the impact of global labour governance on working conditions? (Chapter 2)
2) What is the impact of global labour governance on export flows? (Chapter 3)
3) What is the impact of trade on labour standards? (Chapter 4)
The main findings can be summarised as follows. In the paper titled “The Systemic Effects
of Trade Agreements with Labour Clauses: Diffusion or Displacement?” I examine whether
LABPTAs with the US and the EU affect the working standards of signatory countries and their
competitors. Following insights from the theoretical literature, I hypothesise that LABPTAs
can trigger a displacement effect whereby the promotion of decent working conditions in a given
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country, results in increased labour abuses elsewhere (Koenig-Archibugi 2017; Baland and Duprez
2009). A testable implication of this argument is that the more a given country’s competitors
engage in LABPTAs, the more its own labour standards will decline. Using a dynamic generalised
methods of moment estimator, I find that competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs with the US is
negatively associated with respect (in practice) of freedom of association and collective bargaining
(FACB) rights. I do not find evidence that LABPTAs with the EU have effects on competitors’
labour conditions. The results also show that LABPTAs with neither the US nor the EU have a
significant impact on the working conditions of the signatory countries.
The systemic effects of LABPTAs are further explored in the third chapter, which analyses
their impact on trade volumes and export destinations. Using a structural gravity methodology,
the paper finds that the more a country has competitors engaging in LABPTAs with the EU, the
more its international export volumes will increase relative to domestic trade. This finding suggests
that countries can benefit from competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs, possibly because they are
able to exploit new market niches for price-sensitive goods. Conversely, the paper does not find
that LABPTAs with the US generate a systemic effect, given they do not have a significant impact
on competitors’ trade flows. Nevertheless, consistent with the comparative advantage argument
the paper discovers that controlling for the trade-enhancing effect of liberalisation with the US,
these LABPTAs reduce international exports relative to domestic trade of the signatory countries.
This effect appears to be larger for lower-income countries, where cheap labour is more likely to
be a source of comparative advantage in the export of manufacturing goods. This group of states
will also trade significantly less with low- and medium-income countries than with high-income
economies once they enter into LABPTAs with the US.
In the paper “The Impact of the China Shock on Brazil’s Efforts to Combat Child Labour”
we address the last question and examine the trade–labour link using a systemic approach. The
research focuses on child labour in Brazil and how it has been affected by the rise of Chinese
imports. Consistent with the ‘Shanghai effect’ argument, we find that as China rises as a major
import destination at the expense of alternative buyers, child labour incidence grows in Brazil’s
federal states. However, our results also show that increasing exports to China triggers patterns
of divergent strategic competition among competitors. We find that the more a state exports to
China, the less its competitors will employ children in the workforce. This suggests that, rather
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than competing for the same end market, firms in competitor states have incentives to reduce child
labour to try to target exporters with different preferences on labour standards. The paper also
finds evidence of a two-way relationship between child labour and exports. Our gravity results show
that the more a state has children in the workforce, the more it will attract Chinese importers. How-
ever, the paper does not find evidence that child labour in one state affects its competitors’ exports.
While the findings outlined above suggest that LABPTAs and international trade can generate
significant effects on competitors, they also reveal interesting heterogeneity. First, the papers find
that LABPTAs with the EU and with the US have different effects. The thesis discusses multiple
factors that can explain this difference. One possibility relates to their LABPTA design. Indeed,
LABPTAs with the US tend to be more stringent, and labour clauses are often linked to relevant
enforcement mechanisms. More rigorous LABPTAs may be better able to signal (to buyers and
competitors alike) a credible commitment to improving working standards, hence triggering the
displacement effects. Another possibility relates to the membership of these agreements. In the
period under investigation, while the US signed LABPTAs with several low-income countries,
the EU did not.1 Given that for lower-income countries (and their competitors), labour costs
are likely to be the primary source of comparative advantage, LABPTAs may have a greater
impact on this group. Hence, the lack of effects of LABPTAs with the EU is possibly explained
by the different membership. Along these lines, evidence from Chapter 3 suggests that the trade
effects of LABPTAs are larger for lower-income countries than for states in other income groups.
Finally, it is also possible that the difference in the systemic effects of these agreements has to do
with the way in which the measure of competitors’ engagement in trade agreements with the EU
(WLABPTAEU,i,t) is built. Chapter 2 discusses the inherent difficulties of creating this measure
given the continuous wave of enlargement of this institution. While I stand by the approach taken
in the paper, there is no clear solution to the issue, and alternative strategies could be taken
leading to (or explaining) different results.
Second, the effects of these agreements across trade and working standards appear to be hetero-
geneous as illustrated by Table 5.1. LABPTAs with the US have a significant effect on the trade
flows of signatory countries, but they do not affect their labour conditions. A possible explanation




Table 5.1: The effects of LABPTAs on trade and labour standards
Labour Standards effects Trade Effects
Signatory Competitors Signatory Competitors
LABPTAUS % " " %
LABPTAEU % % % "
is that although LABPTAs with the US are not able to improve working standards of signatory
states in general, they have a positive impact on the least-developed countries. Indeed, Chapter
3 illustrates that trade-wise, low-income countries are the group most affected by LABPTAs with
the US, driving the average trade effect. A similar phenomenon may occur with labour conditions.
This would clarify why this thesis finds no labour effect on signatory countries, while finding a
trade effect.
Likewise, the systemic effects of these agreements on trade and working standards are hetero-
geneous. LABPTAs with the US appear to lead to deteriorating labour conditions in competitor
states, even if they do not have any observable impact on competitors’ trade flows. A possible
explanation has been discussed within the papers. Countries and firms may strategically act in
anticipation of the consequences of their competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs, not waiting for
their impact to materialise. Indeed, competitive dynamics can be triggered by the reputational
effect of LABPTAs. The findings of this dissertation strongly suggest that this signalling function
is critical to explaining the systemic effects of LABPTAs. The results in Chapter 2 show that
LABPTAs affect competitors’ working conditions when they are signed, before the agreements
enter into force. Similarly, as a robustness check of Chapter 3, I also find that the trade effects of
LABPTAs start to emerge as the agreements are signed. From this perspective, it is possible that
LABPTAs with the US incentivise competitors to strategically downgrade their labour standards
precisely to avoid the (negative) trade impact. For instance, buyers from the US may try to
negotiate cheaper subcontracts with their existing suppliers, threatening to move their supply
chain to the signatory country of the LABPTA. Looking at competitors’ engagement in LABPTAs
with the EU, it appears that these agreements have an impact only in increasing competitors’
export volumes; they do not have any other relevant effect. This suggests that as a country signs
a LABPTA with the EU, its competitors become better able to take advantage of new market
niches for cheap products. However, it is crucial to keep in mind that these results may also be
affected by the way in which the WLABPTA series is built. Scholars should therefore be cautious
202
CHAPTER 5 203
in drawing inferences from this specific result.
A final note about Chapter 4 is necessary. Consistent with the results of Chapter 2 and
with the logic of the displacement effect, the paper in Chapter 4 shows that trade shocks can
trigger patterns of strategic diversification in labour standards. Indeed, the displacement approach
assumes the same competitive dynamic of strategic diversification. The difference is that while
displacement starts from the positive shock to labour standards that a LABPTA can trigger, the
Shanghai effect starts from the negative shock that exports to China may generate. The paper also
shows that competitors’ engagement in child labour does not have an impact on states’ exports
towards China. This suggests that strategic diversification occurs in labour outcomes in response
to trade shocks, and that it does not occur in trade flows in response to shocks to labour outcomes.
In conclusion, this thesis argues that scholars should take a systemic approach in order to ex-
amine the link between GLG, trade and working standards. Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 cite
evidence consistent with the idea that competitors may engage in patterns of strategic diversifica-
tion when it comes to labour standards. This form of competition complicates the evaluation of
the impact of trade and GLG on working conditions. The improvement/deterioration of labour
conditions in one country can result in their deterioration/improvement in that country’s competi-
tors. This implies that a systemic analysis of the GLG–trade–working conditions link is essential
to evaluate whether local upgrading aggregates to deliver global developments, and not accounting
for the systemic effects could lead to misleading conclusions. The systemic perspective, however,
involves numerous empirical challenges. Most importantly, this approach requires reliable data on
labour standards, trade and participation in GLG initiatives of the target countries (or firms) and
their competitors. This data is often difficult to acquire or non-existent. To overcome these prob-
lems, the thesis uses data with a high level of aggregation (country or state level) to make a first
attempt to empirically evaluate the complex interactions between competitive dynamics, trade,
labour standards and GLG. Thanks to this approach, the dissertation finds evidence showing the
existence of systemic effects; however, this strategy has its limitations and, for example, it is not
able to precisely explain the significant amount of heterogeneity revealed by its results. Further
qualitative and quantitative research – possibly using firm-level data – is necessary to fully reveal
how these systemic effects unfold. In sum, the work in this thesis is a first attempt to engage with
the questions of the systemic effects of trade and labour governance and by no means claims to
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have provided a definite answer to the questions it asks. Its main contribution is to open up a new
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